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The United States often acted in Latin America as an empire. Nevertheless, there 
has been an obvious dissimilarity between US actions in South America and US actions 
in the rest of Latin America, which is illustrated by the fact that the United States never 
sent troops to invade a South American country. While geographic distance and strategic 
considerations may have played a role, they provide at best incomplete explanations for 
US relative absence south of Panama. The fact that the United States has had a distinct 
pattern of interactions with South America is thus not captured by the typical concept of 
Latin America. By recuperating the virtually neglected literature on regional subsystems, 
this dissertation maintains that researchers of inter-American relations would greatly 
benefit from a characterization that reflected more regional realities than entrenched 
preconceptions. Such a characterization would mean subdividing the Western 
Hemisphere in two regional subsystems: North and South America. This subdivision 
allows for uncovering regional dynamics that can help explain US relative absence from 
South America when contrasted to the remainder of Latin America. This dissertation 
argues that the role of Brazil as a status quo regional power in South America is the key 
to understanding this phenomenon. Through a historical analysis focusing on specific 
cases spanning three centuries, this research demonstrates that Brazil has deliberately 
affected the calculations of costs and benefits of a more significant US involvement in 
South America. While in the past Brazil has taken actions that resulted in increasing the 
benefits of US limited involvement in South American affairs, in more recent times it has 
sought to increase the costs of a more significant US presence. The concluding session 
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The first factor that students of US foreign policy toward Latin America 
immediately have to take into consideration is the obvious disparity of power between the 
United States and its southern neighbors. Faced with this reality, the second factor should 
be to avoid the temptation of translating this indisputable fact into monocausal 
explanations for the international relations of Latin America. While the first aspect has 
been diligently observed by virtually all studies of the subject, the second has met more 
resistance. Indeed, every important event in the history of Latin America, from peace to 
war, from stability to instability, for good or for bad, can be attributed to actions planned 
in offices in Washington under the usual framework of US-Latin American relations. As 
one US Ambassador once observed: "We Americans tend to be societally ethnocentric -
almost narcissistic - exaggerating the influence of both our positive and our negative 
actions in the world." ! This perspective is greatly helped by the fact that the customary 
frameworks for the study of international relations are focused on the great powers. 
But reality seems to indicate that if there is a region in which it would apparently 
be difficult to exaggerate US influence, this would be Latin America. After all, history 
shows an impressive array of military interventions, both overt and covert, territory 
annexations, and other actions that indeed decisively changed the course of events in 
Latin American countries. Hence, even before the United States was described as a global 
This dissertation follows the format requirements of the Chicago Manual of Style 15th Edition. The 
translations from foreign language sources are those of the author 
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 Nathaniel Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), x. 
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empire after the end of the Second World War, it could already be characterized as a 
regional empire in the Western Hemisphere. For an extended period of their historical 
relationship, whenever a country in Latin America was perceived as contradicting US 
interests, Washington would repeatedly dispatch the Marines or find someone else to do 
the job. Nevertheless, any brief examination of these actions reveals an obvious 
geographic pattern concentrated north of the Panama Canal, with the vast South 
American region basically spared the US imperial urge. This abundance of involvement 
in one half of Latin America in contrast to a relative absence in the other half has been 
translated in an abundance of studies focusing on the former in parallel to a relative 
absence of studies focusing on the latter. The general result is that analyses of US policies 
toward "Latin America" are mostly analyses of US policies toward Mexico, Central 
America and the Caribbean, with occasional references to South American countries to 
give an impression of homogeneity or, when the researcher chooses to focus on South 
American countries, the framework used is basically the same as ones used to analyze US 
relations with the rest of Latin America. In this latter view, the distinctiveness of South 
American international relations is occasionally acknowledged, but it is studied as a 
special case within the broader Latin American framework. In other words, these 
analyses interpret the different level of US involvement in South America as a mere 
quantitative issue. 
This dissertation aims to address this issue by first laying out a theoretical 
framework for understanding and investigating South America that captures and explains 
the distinct dynamics that have characterized the US relationship with that region in 
contrast to the rest of Latin America. The most evident aspect illustrating these different 
3 
dynamics is the fact that, compared to its historical over involvement in Mexico, Central 
America, and the Caribbean, the United States has been a relatively absent empire in 
South America. This relative absence must be explained not just by looking into domestic 
factors in the United States, but also by detecting how particular regional dynamics help 
to shape the outcome of US foreign policies. Thus, the second aim of this research is to 
demonstrate that there is a distinct pattern of interactions within Latin America that 
justify treating South America as a distinct regional subsystem. In other words, South 
America must be distinguished from the rest of Latin America not only because of the 
different patterns of relations in respect to the United States, but also because there is 
clearly a distinctive pattern of relations within South America that is not captured by the 
customary concept of Latin America. The practical significance of this is that Latin 
America as a concept has limited applicability in the field of international relations, and 
its theoretical predominance often leads to error of analysis, judgment and, ultimately, 
policies. In fact, this research implies that dropping the concept of Latin America 
altogether in favor of the notion of a South and a North American regional subsystem 
would lead to a significant refinement of the understanding of the international relations 
in the Western Hemisphere. 
THE ARGUMENT 
In labeling the United States as an "absent empire" in South America, this 
dissertation makes a relatively bold claim. After all, the references to Latin America as 
the US "backyard" are abundant and the United States indeed frequently acted in the 
4 
region as a true empire. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the very notion of Latin 
America when used to study phenomena related to the discipline of international relations 
is inaccurate. A central assumption of this dissertation is that analysts of inter-American 
relations would greatly benefit from a change in perspective that substitutes the culturally 
defined notion of Latin America for the concept of a North and a South American 
regional subsystem. The use of Latin America as a theoretical concept in US scholarship 
tends to generate two main fallacies in the study of international relations in the Western 
Hemisphere. Firstly, it assumes that there is somehow a level of integration - or at least a 
very important integrating variable - that gives the region identified as Latin America a 
degree of homogeneity. Secondly, and as a corollary of the first, it implicitly accepts that 
there is a pattern of US foreign policy towards the region that justifies treating it as a 
coherent unit. 
This dissertation disputes both claims. First, it demonstrates that the variables 
generally used to give homogeneity to Latin America, such as culture and level of 
development, are not evenly used to define other regions in the world, and in any case 
they are largely irrelevant for the purposes of international relations research. 
Accordingly, when only the relevant variables are used, the notion of Latin America loses 
its usefulness. Based on the literature on regional subsystems, it is argued that the 
relevant variables should be based on geography and patterns of interactions, and that 
these criteria tend to lead to the identification of a North and a South American regional 
subsystem. Second, and following this characterization, this research argues that a 
fundamental distinction should be made regarding the outcomes of US foreign policies in 
each of the two regional subsystems in the Western Hemisphere. This fundamental 
5 
difference is captured by this dissertation's depiction of the United States as an absent 
empire in South America, as opposed to being historically a very present empire in the 
remainder of Latin America. 
Thus, the central question of this research is what factors explain US relative 
absence from South America? Although the literature has obviously noted the fact that 
US foreign policies toward South America have displayed distinct characteristics in 
relation to the rest of Latin America, the explanations given for this phenomenon have 
been unsatisfactory at best, especially since the central factor typically mentioned has 
been simply that South America is too far away, while Mexico, Central America and the 
Caribbean are too close to the United States. In addition, at the same time it 
acknowledges this distinction, this literature also assumes that there is no reason to see 
South America as a different region. In other words, the argument goes that the United 
States has had the same policies towards the whole of Latin America, but because the 
region south of the Panama Canal is deemed as having little strategic significance, it has 
paid relatively little attention to South America. This is indeed a compelling argument, 
but although it may explain a certain lack of interest, it fails to provide explanations for 
the instances when the United States did pay attention to South America and yet the 
outcome was the same relative absence of imperial policies. Moreover, as this 
explanation holds that the United States has paid little attention to South America, 
researchers have followed suit and the result is that US relative absence from South 
America has been translated in a relative absence of South America in US studies on 
Latin America. 
This dissertation inverts the traditional argument indicated above and claims that 
US relative absence from South America, even in the instances when the United States 
demonstrated a clear interest in the region, must be understood not only in terms of South 
America's distance from the United States, but also in terms of its "proximity" to Brazil. 
The hypothesis put forward by this dissertation is that Brazil is a status quo regional 
power that has affected the calculations of costs and benefits of a more significant US 
involvement in South America. It is shown that while Brazil historically played a role 
that resulted in increasing the benefits of relatively limited US involvement in the region, 
in more recent times it has sought to increase the costs of a more substantial US presence. 
As this research intends to demonstrate, this change can be understood not as a result of 
particular domestic circumstances in Brazil, but because of changes in the international 
and regional environments, with Brazilian regional strategic goal of preserving its 
position in the South American subsystem remaining by and large invariable throughout 
time. Hence, the fact that South America has been considered as a region of little 
strategic relevance for the United States is but part of the explanation, in which it allowed 
Brazil to play this role with fewer resources than it would have been case had South 
America been located in a more strategically important region. 
THE IDEA OF LATIN AMERICA 
The concept of Latin America is fairly recent in its origins and it is usually 
attributed as originally a French concept - where the idea of a Latin "race" was common -
used since at least the late 1830s, but particularly in the 1860s to give an ideological 
justification for French imperialism in Mexico and to create the impression of cultural 
affinity in the region, of which France would be the natural "protectress" against the 
Anglo-Saxons in the north. In a pioneering study, John Leady Phelan maintains that the 
first use of the expression VAmerique latine was in article entitled "Situation de la 
latinite''' by L. M. Tisserand, published in Januray 1861. Nevertheless, more recent 
studies demonstrate that "a number of Spanish American writers and intellectuals - many 
of them, it is true, resident in Paris - had used the expression 'America Latina' several 
years earlier." Joao Feres Jr. claims that the first usage of the term was made by the 
Colombian poet Jose Maria Torres de Caicedo, who spent most of his life in France, in a 
poem called Las Dos Americas (The Two Americas), in 1856. As the title of Caicedos's 
poem makes clear, not much differently from the French, these Spanish American writers 
employed the concept of America Latina to reinforce a common identity in the Americas 
in opposition to the "other" America in the North. In fact, Caicedo proposed a union of 
the "Latin American" republics against the threat of "North American" aggression, which 
became a particularly relevant issue after the Mexican-American War in the 1840s. 
Therefore, before there was Latin America, there was Amerique Latine and 
America Latina. For these writers though, Latin America was synonymous with the 
Spanish American republics, and hence Brazil - which was not only Portuguese-speaking 
but was also a monarchy - was not included. Likewise, Brazilians also did not consider 
themselves as Latin American, not least because Brazil on one hand emphasized its 
2
 Michel Chevalier, Society, Manners, and Politics in the United States, Reprints of Economic Classics 
(New York,: A. M. Kelley, 1966). 
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 John Leddy Phelan, "Pan-Latinism, French Intervention in Mexico (1861-7) and the Genesis of the Idea 
of Latin America," In Concienciay Autenticidad Historicas; Escritos en Homenaje a Edmundo O'Gorman, 
Emerito, Aetatis Anno LXDicata, ed. Juan Antonio Ortega y Medina (Mexico: UNAM, 1968). 
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 Leslie Bethell, "Brazil and 'Latin America'," Journal of Latin American Studies 42, no. 03 (2010): 458. 
5
 Joao Feres Jr.," A History of the Concept of Latin America in the United States: Misrecognition and 
Social Scientific Discourse" (Phd Diss., City University Of New York, 2003), 68. 
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American identity, and on the other it had a certain feeling of foreignness in relation to its 
Spanish-speaking neighbors; therefore it was not interested in creating a sense of 
separation in regards to the United States. But with the popularization of the term in US 
academic circles, the idea that the nations south of the United States could be considered 
as part of a region called Latin America gained ground and with that Brazil was also 
included. As Leslie Bethell argues, it was only when "America Latina became Latin 
America" in the 1920s and 1930s, but most particularly after the Second World War, that 
Brazil became to be regarded as part of a region called Latin America.6 Yet, only much 
later on, during the Cold War, would some Brazilian writers begin to identify themselves 
as Latin Americans, which was particularly evident among the Left seeking to reinforce 
the ties with the Cuban Revolution as well as the distance from the United States. 
In the United States, the expression "Latin America" can be found in official 
documentation by the late 1890s, and before that the term used was "Spanish America" 
or "Hispanic America." But it was only after the First World War that "Latin America" 
became widely used in English. A research in the Library of Congress and the New York 
Public Library revealed that before 1900 there was not a single publication containing the 
term "Latin America" in its title, while between 1900 and 1910 only two publications 
were found, between 1911 and 1920 twenty-three, between 1921 and 1930 twenty-five, 
with steady growth after that and burgeoning after 1960, when "Latin American 
studies" became somewhat fashionable in the United States, owing specially to the Cuban 
Revolution. An interesting illustration of the problems associated with the concept of 
6
 Bethell, "Brazil and 'Latin America'," 474. 
7
 Feres Jr.," A History of the Concept of Latin America in the United States: Misrecognition and Social 
Scientific Discourse," 363. 
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Latin America, and its struggle to be accepted as an adequate referent during its initial 
stages of existence, can be seen on the occasion of the foundation of the Hispanic 
American Historical Review, in 1918, which was the first journal in the United States 
dedicated to the study of Latin America. The editors considered naming the journal as 
"Latin American Historical Review," but they eventually concluded that the term was 
Q 
"ambiguous, misleading, and unscientific." They argued that the original notion of 
"Hispania" included both Spain and Portugal. 
As it was the case when the term was employed both by French and Spanish 
intellectuals, in the United States the concept of Latin America was also used on one 
hand to create the impression of cultural affinity among the countries south of the United 
States, and on the other hand to create a sense of separation between the United States 
and its less developed "Latin" neighbors. Feres Jr. argues that the notion of Latin 
America, far from being a value-free geographic concept, has been used in the United 
States to perpetuate and justify an asymmetry between the perceptions of the American 
"self in opposition to the Latin American "other." For Feres Jr., "Latin America" can 
be understood as an "asymmetric concept, i.e., a concept defined in opposition to a 
collective self-image and used to name a generalized other." 10 
In any case, since its inception, it seems clear that the relatively recent concept of 
Latin America, in its Spanish, French, and English versions, has been employed not on a 
geographical basis but on perceived cultural similarities and in order to establish a clear 
8
 Charles E. Chapman, "The Founding of the Review," The Hispanic American Historical Review 1, no. 1 
(1918): 17. 
9
 Feres Jr.," A History of the Concept of Latin America in the United States: Misrecognition and Social 
Scientific Discourse." 
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 Ibid., 61. 
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contrast in relation to the United States. Given the definitional problems associated with 
the concept, the fact that it is a unique case of widespread use of a term to identify a 
region based on cultural referents, as well as its racialist implications, it is remarkable 
that "Latin America" has been uncritically accepted as a scientific concept used to study 
the international relations of the Western Hemisphere. 
THE QUESTION OF EMPIRE 
This dissertation makes reference to the United States as an "empire" or as 
occasionally pursuing "imperial policies." Although the United States has been referred 
to as an empire innumerable times,11 the definition of what this term effectively means in 
this context is far from a settled issue. In fact, empire is one of those terms in the social 
sciences that have acquired significant emotional undertones, and as such it has 
inevitably lost some of its scientific usefulness. This issue is especially controversial in 
the US context since it was a country born in reaction to an overseas empire and is 
11
 The examples are virtually endless, but some include, in chronological order: Robert Rutherford 
McCormick, The American Empire (Chicago: Chicago Tribune, 1952); Amaury De Riencourt, The 
American Empire (New York,: Dial Press, 1968); Sidney Lens, The Forging of the American Empire 
(New York,: Crowell, 1971); Jan Knippers Black, Sentinels of Empire : the United States and Latin 
American Militarism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986); Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The 
United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952," Journal of Peace Research 23, no. 3 (1986); Robert W. 
Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's 
Purpose (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: 
Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1997); 
Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898, 35th anniversary 
ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998); A. J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and 
Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); Michael Ignatieff, 
"The American Empire," New York Times Magazine, May 1, 2003; Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of 
America's Empire (New York: Penguin Press, 2004); Chalmers A. Johnson, Blowback: The costs and 
Consequences of American Empire (New York: Henry Holt, 2004); Greg Grandin, Empire's Workshop: 
Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism, The American Empire Project. 
(New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006); David C. Hendrickson, Union, Nation, or Empire: the American 
Debate over International Relations, 1789-1941 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009). 
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therefore imbued with a strong anti-imperialistic rhetoric. While it is not the purpose of 
this dissertation to offer a final answer to this definitional problem, it is important to 
make some observations regarding the broad sense in which the term is employed here, 
even if the term is admittedly used in a loose way. 
First of all, a clear conceptual distinction must be made between empire and the 
notion of imperialism. Indeed, considering the way the concepts have evolved, it seems 
pretty reasonable to treat empire and imperialism as two distinct sets of literature. A 
common factor present in the studies of imperialism is an economic interpretation of 
history, which is insufficient to understand instances when motivations other than 
economic are present.1 As Norman Etherington, who wrote one of the best accounts on 
the subject, remarks, "an enormous amount of confusion has been generated by using 
empire, colonialism, and imperialism as synonyms. Theories of imperialism were not 
theories of empire."13 Some may argue that, as the concept of imperialism has historically 
been appropriated by the left to denounce alleged evils of capitalism, an effort to separate 
it from the broader concept of empire is an attempt to avoid an ideological contamination. 
This is not entirely wrong and even William Appleman Williams, who could hardly be 
considered a right wing writer, acknowledges the problems of putting empire and 
imperialism in the same basket. Williams observed that "the semantic trouble began with 
the causal appropriation of the world imperial, originally associated with empire, to 
12
 Classical studies on imperialism as used in the modern sense include the pioneering work of John 
Hobson and the influential piece by Vladimir Lenin: J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (New York,: J. 
Pott & Company, 1902); Vladimir Ilich Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York,: 
International publishers, 1933). 
13
 Norman Etherington, Theories of Imperialism: War, Conquest, and Capital (London; Totowa, N.J.: 
Croom Helm; Barnes & Noble Books, 1984), 267. For other good accounts on theories of imperialism see: 
Richard Koebner and Helmut Dan Schmidt, Imperialism; The Story and Significance of a Political Word, 
1840-1960 (Cambridge University Press, 1964); Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Theories of Imperialism (New 
York: Random House, 1980); Earle Micajah Winslow, The Pattern of Imperialism: A Study in the Theories 
of Power (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1948). 
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describe an evolving set of different relationships between advanced industrial societies 
and the rest of the world." 14 Likewise, George Liska observes that an "imperial function' 
is distinctive from "its deformative 'ism', aggressively expansionist imperialism." Thus, 
it is not merely a matter of avoiding an ideological corruption, but of elucidating the fact 
that empire and the conventional notion of imperialism refer in fact to two different sets 
of relationships. This research is about empire, not imperialism. 
The second important characteristic that must be emphasized regarding the use of 
the term empire in the present dissertation is that it does not refer to a political entity but 
to a system of relationships that may or may not be pursued as a strategy by powerful 
states. In this sense, the question is not whether the United States is or is not an empire, 
but whether or not it has pursued imperial solutions for specific problems. In other words, 
power is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the establishment of imperial 
policies, and so the question becomes whether the reality of US power was or was not 
translated in imperial ways in order to pursue specific policy objectives. This perspective 
is similar to the one adopted by modern students of empire, such as George Liska, Geir 
Lundestad, Michael Doyle, Alexander Motyl, Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim.16 
14
 William Appleman Williams, Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Causes and Character of 
America's Present Predicament, along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1980), 7. 
15
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of America, 2003), 55. 
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All these authors define empire not as a political entity but first and foremost as a 
"system" or "structure" of relationships, which allows the researcher to identify which 
relationships between individual states display imperial characteristics and which do not. 
Basically, the kind of relationship that characterizes an imperial system described by 
these authors is one in which the anarchical aspect of the international system is 
challenged and elements of hierarchy come into the fore. For Doyle, who wrote one of 
the most relevant works that attempts to give a scientific definition to the concept, an 
empire is a "system of interaction" characterized by "control of both foreign and 
1 7 
domestic policy" whereas hegemony is characterized only by the control of the first. 
Thus, imperial control is understood as "one form of the exercise of asymmetrical 
1 R 
influence and power" among others. This distinction has also been made by Adam 
Watson, who distinguished between hegemony, "where a powerful state controls the 
external relations of its client states," and what the author calls dominion, "where it also 
intervenes in their domestic affairs."19 
One useful way to differentiate an imperial relationship from other kinds of 
relationships, such as hegemony for example, is by relating it to the concepts of 
autonomy and sovereignty. While the latter relates to the classical Westphalian 
conception and means that the state "is subject to no other state and has full and exclusive 
powers within its jurisdiction,"20 the first can be broadly understood from the perspective 
of international relations as the notion of freedom of action, or the opposite of 
Daniel Friedheim, "Hierarchy under Anarchy: Informal Empire and the East German State," International 
Organization 49, no. 4 (1995). 
17
 Doyle, Empires: 12, 40. 
18
 Ibid., 34. 
19
 Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis (London ; 
New York: Routledge, 1992), 123. 
20
 Stanley Hoffmann, Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 172-73. 
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dependence. Doyle remarks that while a dependent state is "a state subject to limited 
constraints on its economic, social, and (indirectly) political autonomy," an imperialized 
state is one whose "effective sovereignty" is controlled by the imperial state. Similarly, 
a recent study on the subject of empire has defined an "imperial rule" as "a relationship in 
which a state assumes some degree of sovereign political control over a subordinate 
polity."22 A sovereign state may enjoy more or less autonomy in the pursuit of its 
objectives on the international arena without necessarily affecting its condition of 
sovereignty. As Kenneth Waltz commented, "to say that a state is sovereign means that 
it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems, 
including whether or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its 
freedom by making commitments to them." This limitation in freedom that Waltz 
refers to can be interpreted as the autonomy aspect, which claims that the more limits are 
placed on its freedom, the less autonomy a state has. Because the condition of 
sovereignty requires a hierarchical structure in which there is no higher authority within a 
given territory above that of the state that controls it, whenever an imperial relationship is 
established, a new hierarchy is in place and the result is loss of sovereignty. For Roberto 
Russell and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, who studied the question of autonomy and 
sovereignty specifically within the context of Latin America, the first 
was more a South American issue than a Latin American one. In northern Latin 
America (of which Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean form a part), the 
accent was more on the question of sovereignty, given that this region has 
historically been the object of diverse uses of force by the United States-conquest 
and annexation of territories, invasion and military intervention, covert 
Doyle, Empires: 12-13. 
22
 Paul K. MacDonald, "Those Who Forget Historiography are Doomed to Republish it: Empire, 
Imperialism and Contemporary Debates about American Power," Review of International Studies 35, no. 1 
(2009): 81. 
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 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1st ed. (Boston, Mass.: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 96. 
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operations, and so on. South America, from Colombia to Argentina, on the other 
hand, had a relatively greater margin for diplomatic, commercial, and cultural 
maneuvering with respect to Washington. It is thus not surprising that most of the 
literature on the subject of autonomy has been produced in South America and, 
more specifically, in the Southern Cone. 
Therefore, when this dissertation refers to the United States as an "absent empire" 
in South America, it does not imply that this country has been absent in that particular 
regional subsystem, which would be nonsense, but that a system of relationships between 
the United States and South America that could be accurately characterized as being 
imperial in nature has not been established. This observation is even more pertinent when 
one considers the kind of policies that the United States repeatedly pursued in Mexico, 
Central America, and the Caribbean, policies that have historically demonstrated obvious 
imperial characteristics, the clearest evidence for which being the fact that the US sent 
troops to decisively affect domestic politics in these regions a number of times during the 
nineteenth and twentieth century in order to enforce its interests. 
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
This introductory chapter has made reference to the notion of "regional 
subsystems." This concept is not nearly as popular in international relations literature as 
the notion of an "international system." While the latter is the focus of much of the 
research in the field, the former is sparsely studied, and the result has generally been 
much conceptual confusion and little scientific validity. In order to examine the trajectory 
of studies focusing on regional subsystems, chapter 2 offers a review of the literature 
24
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produced on this subject. This chapter seeks to accomplish three main goals. First, it aims 
to rediscover this literature, which was born around the late fifties but had died down by 
the late seventies, swallowed first by the neorealist approach during the Cold War, which 
tended to neglect regional dynamics, and later by the regionalist approach after the Cold 
War, which tended to neglect systemic factors. Second, by organizing and clearly 
locating the literature on regional subsystem within the broader international relations 
literature, I am able to offer a definition of a regional subsystem by arguing that there are 
only two necessary and sufficient criteria for its establishment: geography and patterns of 
interaction. Finally, with this conceptualization in mind, I examine how the literature on 
regional subsystems has been applied to the study of Latin American international 
relations before and after the Cold War. I show that while earlier works did not make any 
analytical differentiation between South America and the rest of Latin America, some of 
the more recent works have discovered the advantages of doing so. 
Chapter 3 addresses the advantages of the regional subsystemic approach and sets 
the methodological basis of the dissertation. I present the regional subsystemic approach 
as a useful theoretical tool to the study of international relations in terms of overcoming 
the traditional international-domestic dualism that has prevailed in the field, and argue 
that the regional level can be seen as a third level of analysis, between the domestic and 
the international. I define a regional subsystem as a subset of the international system 
reflecting the outcome of actual patterns of interactions - including the whole spectrum 
between conflict and cooperation - among countries in condition of geographic 
proximity. Then I indicate what the regional subsystemic approach can accomplish and 
explore in more detail the definitional aspect by showing what a regional subsystem is 
17 
and what it is not, and by stressing the main aspects of the definition. In addition, I make 
the case for a constructivist approach to the study of regional subsystems as social 
systems and for the importance of a historical approach based on the notion that agents 
and structures are not independent variables but are co-determined. The main implication 
of this constructivist approach is the fact that regional subsystems should be studied by 
taking into consideration both the spatial dimension and the time dimension. 
While chapter 3 makes the methodological case for a regional subsystemic 
approach to the study of South America, chapter 4 makes the specific case for the 
existence of a South American regional subsystem. I show that the existence of a South 
American regional subsystem is a corollary of the methodology and the definition 
developed on the previous chapter which considers the necessary and sufficient criteria of 
geographic proximity and patterns of interaction and logically leads to the conclusion that 
South America should be treated as a separate regional subsystem in the Americas. After 
some quick geographical considerations, I define what I mean by patterns of interactions 
and indicate a way to operationalize these patterns in order to include a broad range of 
interactions, both conflictive and cooperative in nature. Then I apply this to the case of 
Latin America in order to demonstrate the existence of a South American subsystem, and 
to emphasize the importance of Brazil within this subsystem. In addition, I draw from 
Robert Gilpin's work on international system change and adapt these theories to the 
regional subsystemic approach in order to understand what factors can potentially lead to 
regional subsystemic change. With this framework in mind, I am then adequately 
equipped to address the central claim of this dissertation, which is that the United States 
has been an "absent empire" in South America. I examine the usual explanations 
18 
provided by the literature for this relative absence, showing that there is a latent discourse 
of US absence from South America that is not clearly articulated. After presenting a 
critique of these explanations, I offer my own point of view based on the role of Brazil 
affecting the structures of costs and benefits of subsystemic change for the United States. 
This basic explanation forms the framework for the subsequent case studies. 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are composed of case studies selected following three main 
criteria. First, if a pattern of interaction was to be demonstrated, they should encompass a 
lengthy period of time. Indeed the chapters cover a period spanning three centuries, going 
from the time of the independence of Latin American states until recent years. Second, 
because the focus is on the regional subsystem, it would be useful if the case studies 
comprised different configurations of the international system in order to demonstrate 
that regional subsystemic dynamics remained relatively constant regardless of variations 
in the international system. Thus, each case study corresponds to a distinct configuration 
of the international system and of the corresponding US position in it: multipolar, with 
the United States as a regional power; bipolar, with the United States as a global power; 
and unipolar, with the United States as the remaining superpower. Third, the cases 
selected should consider periods when the United States clearly demonstrated an interest 
in South America in order to detect how its policies interacted with the South American 
subsystem. Otherwise, just demonstrating US absence in terms of neglect would be 
repeating the existing argument in the literature. Although they cover lengthy periods of 
time, each chapter focuses on a specific US policy in which South America was an 
important component. Therefore, chapter 5 focuses on the Monroe Doctrine in the 
nineteenth century, chapter 6 on the US actions in Chile during the Cold War, and 
19 
chapter 7 on the US proposal for a Free Trade Area of the Americas in the post-Cold War 
period. The case studies show that for each period there is a corresponding Brazilian 
strategy affecting the structure of costs and benefits of US presence or absence. While for 
the first two periods Brazil sought to raise the benefits of US absence from the South 
American subsystem, in the latter period Brazil attempted to raise the costs of a more 
significant US presence. Lastly, chapter 8 presents the conclusions of the research, 
including some theoretical and policy implications. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE LITERATURE ON REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS 
Virtually as soon as the system's approach took hold in the field of international 
relations with Morton Kaplan's "System and Process in International Politics", first 
published in 1957,25 a number of international relations' scholars reacted against the 
notion that international politics should be assumed as being "total and global," and that 
it was imperative to consider how the fact that international politics often has a "non-
• Oft 
global character" would impact the application of systems theory. Most of those 
scholars were area specialists and were concerned particularly with the connection 
between area studies and the emerging systems approach to international relations. What 
derived from this incorporation of systems theory into area studies was a subsystemic 
approach based on regional criteria. 
The literature on regional subsystems (or "subordinate systems" , or "partial 
international systems"28 as they have been called) gained momentum in the sixties and 
Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957). 
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(1958): 409. 
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as a Subordinate State System in International Relations," International Organization 21, no. 3 (1967). 
Additionally, Peter Berton used the term "submacro" to refer to regional subsystems, while Michael 
Wallace talked about "cluster of nations". Peter Berton, "International Subsystems-A Submacro Approach 
to International Studies," International Studies Quarterly 13, no. 4 (1969); Michael D. Wallace, "Clusters 
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19, no. 1(1975). 
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International System," International Organization 17, no. 3 (1963); Karl Kaiser, "The Interaction Regional 
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seventies, but the success of the neorealist approach in the late seventies and its focus on 
the global level and the constraints imposed by the international system - which was a 
useful fit for the Cold War environment - eclipsed the regional approach. After the end 
of the bipolar configuration, however, a new wave of studies taking the region as a 
referent for analysis appeared. The reasons for this resurgence are commonly attributed to 
the fact that great powers had less incentive to intervene after the end of the Cold War, 
which tended to give regions more autonomy to develop with a lower degree of outside 
influence. Nonetheless, this literature was generally more concerned with processes of 
regionalization based on cooperation and the establishment of institutions and thus little 
room was left for the regional subsystemic approach that had been developed up until the 
seventies. 
THE REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMIC APPROACH 
The regional subsystemic approach to studying regions, as contrasted to other 
possible approaches, takes into consideration two main factors in order to establish the 
existence of a regional subsystem: geographical proximity and patterns of interaction. In 
fact, an approach that takes only the first criterion is not necessarily systemic, while 
approaches considering only the second are not necessarily regional. The importance of 
these two aspects will be considered later on, as now the goal is to present an overview of 
this literature. Although not all authors presented here refer specifically to the term 
Subsystems: Some Preliminary Notes on Recurrent Patterns and the Role of Superpowers," World Politics 
21, no. 1(1968). 
29
 Barry Buzan and Ole Wasver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge 
Studies in International Relations 91 (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 77. 
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regional subsystem, they advance a concept of region that is systemic, and this justifies 
their inclusion in this literature. 
Even though other criteria have been offered for the identification of a regional 
subsystem, geographic proximity and regular interactions can be considered as providing 
both necessary and sufficient conditions. Indeed, in a widely cited article analyzing the 
literature produced on regional systems up until the early seventies, William Thompson 
concluded that there were a "lack of uniformity" in the concept of regional subsystem and 
identified a total of twenty-one attributes mentioned in the literature, which he reduced to 
the two that were the "most consistently cited" and that were after all "already implied by 
the regional subsystem term": proximity and regular interaction. The other nineteen 
characteristics attributed to regional subsystems, such as common developmental status, 
degree of integration, or shared ethnic, cultural, and historical bonds were deemed neither 
necessary nor sufficient conditions. 
A corollary of the concept of a regional subsystem is the notion that states in a 
regional subsystem have a degree of interdependence in the sense that "the activities of 
other members of the region (be they cooperative or antagonistic) are significant 
-5 1 
determinants of its foreign policy." The caveat that the interactions can be "cooperative 
or antagonistic" is crucial, as the very notion of system is neutral vis-a-vis the nature of 
the relationship. Karl Kaiser defines a subsystem in terms of pattern of interaction and 
William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional 
Inventory," International Studies Quarterly 17, no. 1 (1973): 96. 
31
 Lynn H. Miller, "Regional Organizations and Subordinate Systems," in The International Politics of 
Regions, ed. Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 1. 
32
 This is a key difference between the literature on regional subsystems and the literature on 
regionalism/regional integration as will be seen below. 
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adds an "awareness of interdependence among participating units" as a characteristic.33 
Similarly, Joseph Nye talks about a region as being characterized by "a limited number of 
states linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual 
interdependence." Again, it is important to remember that interdependence may 
involve both conflictive and cooperative aspects, friends and enemies alike. In this sense, 
states are considered to be interdependent "when the outcome of an interaction for each 
depends on the choices of the others." As Wendt remarks, interdependence should be 
distinguished from "common fate", such as a common threat. The difference between 
them is that common fate does not imply interaction. The interdependence aspect that 
characterizes the regional level is important because it determines one key assumption of 
the regional subsystemic approach: the notion that for a number of countries with a 
number of issues, the regional setting, as "a relatively self-contained network of political 
interactions," is more relevant than the global setting in foreign policy actions. 
Since Thompson's article was published, there have been no noteworthy 
challenges to the notion that proximity and patterns of interactions are the key variables 
to define a regional subsystem. The most significant challenge comes perhaps from 
David Lake and Patrick Morgan, who concentrate on the security aspect and dropped 
both geography and interactions as factors in order to define a "regional security 
complex" is terms of shared "security externalities" among its members - with all other 
33
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criteria being secondary. However, the more recent scholarship has generally confirmed 
the conceptualization of geographic proximity combined with patterns of interaction as 
necessary conditions. Douglas Lemke, based on Haas' earlier conception, defined a 
regional subsystem in terms of states' "ability to interact militarily," which he claims to 
combine both proximity and interaction.39 For Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, who 
developed the notion of regional security complexes, the chief criteria for defining a 
region must be "the actual patterns of security practices."40 Michael Schulz et al also 
stress that a regional subsystem is characterized "by the patterns of interaction," and add 
that they can be manifested in a variety of fields such as economic, cultural, and 
security.41 Similarly, Arie Kacowicz maintains that regional subsystems "are 
characterized by cluster of states coexisting in geographical propinquity as interrelated 
units that sustain significant security, economic, and political relations."42 
Nevertheless, as Thompson had detected, besides geography and interactions, 
several other criteria have been used by a number scholars in order to identify a regional 
subsystem. Perhaps the most mentioned alternative, and the one that even presently 
seems to bring more problems to the clarity of the concept, has been the need for a 
collective identity and culture. Even for those authors who concentrate on the two main 
conditions presented hitherto, the temptation to include factors related to identity and 
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culture has been strong. For instance, after making the case that a regional subsystem is 
characterized by the interrelatedness among states in a given geographic area, Louis 
Cantori and Steven Spiegel defined a regional subsystem as consisting of "one state, or 
two or more proximate and interacting states which have some common ethnic, linguistic, 
cultural, social, and historical bonds, and whose sense of identity is sometimes increased 
by the actions and attitudes of states external to the system."43 Likewise, Kacowicz, after 
insisting on the geographical and patterns of interactions criteria, feels it necessary to add 
that an important factor is a "subjective perception of belonging to a distinctive 
community and having a collective identity." Hans Holm and Georg Sorensen maintain 
that the concept of region is "multidimensional" and used Latin America as an example 
of "regions of identity."45 In none of these cases is it clear how the cultural criterion is 
helpful for the analysis of regional subsystems, except perhaps to justify the culturally-
defined referent "Latin" in Latin America. 
INITIAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LITERATURE ON REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS 
Often-cited works of the initial wave of the literature on regional subsystems 
include Leonard Binder on the Middle East, which is considered one of the first works 
referring to the region as an analytical level between the global and the local, Michael 
Brecher on Southern Asia, Larry Bowman on Southern Africa, and George Modelski on 
43
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South-East Asia.46 Because of their important early efforts to elaborate the notion of 
regional subsystems, a brief exploration of these four works is necessary. 
Binder's pioneering work is especially relevant as he was perhaps the first author 
to acknowledge that approaching the study of international relations uniquely through the 
lenses of the international system - that is, the assumption that "international politics is 
total and global" - led to "a lack of refinement" when dealing with issues that did not 
necessarily fall under the bipolar logic. These issues were particularly germane when 
moving from a great-power view to the study of lesser powers. International politics 
should then be viewed, Binder argued, not "as a single global international system" but 
instead as several systems "with a variety of relationships". The author recognized that 
the bipolar system of the Cold War was in fact the dominant system, thus the label 
"subordinate systems" to define what we call regional subsystems. Therefore, Binder 
maintained, the need for describing and analyzing these several systems would have to be 
an important task for area specialists and political scientists. Although he attempts to 
present some general guidelines, Binder does not offer specific criteria for the 
delimitation of such subordinate systems, but hints that they "must be referred to 
substantive problems which cannot be solved without the concept of area." He then 
goes on to analyze the Middle East as a subordinate system, noticing the "inapplicability 
of the theory of bipolarity to Middle Eastern international politics"49 both to describe 
"relations within the Middle East or between the major bipolar system itself and this 
46
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subordinate system."50 Binder argues that, notwithstanding a history of US and Soviet 
intervention, the Middle East region operated with rules that were "relatively independent 
of the 'rules' regulating the dominant bipolar system." 51 The consequence of these 
relatively independent rules would be that when external power was projected into a 
subordinate system it would be "refracted" by the particular dynamics of that system.5 
Binder's evident interest in the application of the concept of subordinate systems to 
analyze both the relationships within those systems as well as how those relationships 
related to the global system and affected the projection of power by the great powers is an 
important factor that often reappeared in subsequent studies. 
Brecher also challenges the assumption of a single international system in the 
study of international politics. Like Binder, Brecher considers the international system to 
be the dominant system but not the only one, and while the international system approach 
was valid to explain certain features of international politics, there was "an array of inter-
state problems, conflicts, and relationships among actors outside the blocs that have 
nothing or little to do with the bloc system", and thus the notion of subordinate systems 
was pertinent.5 In examining the "Southern Asian" subordinate system, Brecher notes 
that for all states composing that system, except China and India, the subordinate system 
"is the primary, if not exclusive, framework for foreign policy."54 Although Brecher 
focuses on Southern Asia, his article is fundamentally an attempt to build a systematic 
approach to the study of subordinate systems and in this sense it is a further step in 
50
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relation to Binder's work. Brecher identifies five "definable subordinate systems": 
Middle Eastern, American, Southern Asian, West European, and West African.55 He does 
not explain how to categorize the other regions in the world left out of the five 
subordinate systems he presents nor the specific composition of the other four systems he 
does not examine in detail, but offers six conditions for the conception of a subordinate 
system: delimited geographical scope, at least three actors, external recognition by other 
actors, internal recognition by the members, relative inferiority of power in relation to the 
powers composing the dominant system, and the fact that changes in the dominant system 
have a greater effect in the subordinate system than the reverse. Brecher also identifies 
three "structural features" for classification of subordinate systems: the configuration 
(distribution and level) of power, organizational integration, and "character and 
frequency of interaction among the members."57 In the case of the American system the 
structural features would be respectively: "unqualified domination" of the United States ; 
"impressive" organizational integration, but only "on paper;" and "continuous bilateral 
ties with the hegemonial power, but variation of intensity among Latin America - high in 
Central America and the "deep south", and lower among the other members.58 Similarly 
to Binder's concern with the relationship between outside powers and subordinate 
systems, Brecher draws attention for the question of examining the links between the 
dominant and the subordinate systems, especially "the nature and degree of penetration" 
of one system into the other. In the case of the "American system," Brecher argues that 
55
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thanks to American hegemony, and unlike Southern Asia, there was no power vacuum 
and hence Soviet penetration was prevented until the Cuban Revolution in 1959. .59 
In a similar effort to systematize the study of regional subsystems, Modelski, who 
actually prefers the term "regional subsystem" over "subordinate system," identifies 
some characteristics of such systems. The main innovation introduced by Modelski -
and not generally followed by the subsequent literature - was the consideration of only 
small powers as constituting a regional subsystem. Thus, for Modelski, a regional 
subsystem is defined as "a less than universal pattern of relationships created by a cluster 
of small powers in a condition of proximity."61 Therefore three conditions for the 
establishment of a regional subsystem are presented. The first of these conditions is the 
existence of "a number" of countries, which the author estimates in "around a dozen," in 
order to "create favorable conditions for the emergence of certain system properties." The 
second condition established by Modelski is the exclusion of great powers since they 
"tend to have world-wide and small powers only sub-system centered interests" and that 
"the great power's impact upon a sub-system is the key to the understanding of its 
functioning." Finally, a regional subsystem is geographically determined but 
"functionally diffuse" and should therefore be "distinguished from regional alliances 
which are functionally specific arrangements concluded by some or all members of a sub-
system, usually with one or more great powers, for certain determinate political and 
military purposes." Modelski also adds that a crucial factor to be taken into 
consideration is the level of influence that great powers have upon the regional 
59Ibid., 228. 
60
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subsystems. Hence, subsystems should be distinguished by the number of great powers 
that exert influence over them: if there is one dominant power, if there are two or more, 
or if the subsystem is relatively free from great power influence.63 
Although not identified by Brecher as one of his five subordinate systems, 
Bowman draws from Brecher's framework to argue for the existence of a subordinate 
system in Southern Africa, emphasizing that it is even more justified than the existence of 
a West African system mentioned by Brecher. According to Bowman, one central factor 
that would give unity to this subordinate system is the regional economic dominance of 
South Africa.64 Besides arguing for the existence of a separate Southern African system, 
the main innovation Bowman introduced to the analysis of subordinate systems is related 
to the exploration of factors determining the reasons for the stability of the Southern 
African system in terms of its power to prevent outside intervention. This supposed 
power to prevent intervention has two sources, one defined negatively and other 
positively. The first relates to the "unpredictability of the direction of coerced change" in 
a "troubled" region of the world. This would have as a consequence a "lack of great 
power interest in a Southern Africa military adventure" which would constitute a "central 
pillar of support for the system." The second positive source of stability is identified as 
the "South African defense establishment," the existence of which would mean that "any 
63
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invasion would meet strong resistance."65 Bowman can thus explain the stability of the 
South African system exclusively through references to subsystemic properties. 
A common theme that appears in all early works mentioned above is the role of 
outside powers when they interact with the regional subsystem. This theme is taken up by 
Karl Kaiser in an article specifically addressed to examine how external factors, 
particularly the role of superpowers and the interactions with other subsystems, affect the 
evolution of regional subsystems.66 Kaiser seems eager to demonstrate that a regional 
subsystem is not necessarily based on states. He develops a typology of regional 
subsystems based on "the location of the elites who make decisions on matters relevant to 
relations between the members of the regional subsystem." The three ideal types 
described by Kaiser are: the Transnational Society Subsystem (nongovernmental elites 
acting independent of states), Intergovernmental Regional System (decisions taken by 
governmental elites), and Comprehensive Regional Subsystem (a hybrid of the other 
two). But possibly more important than this typology developed by Kaiser are his 
considerations regarding the interaction between different regional subsystems. Two 
forms of interaction deserve particular consideration: the "demonstration effect" and the 
"threat effect." For instance, Kaiser remarks that the process of European integration 
would have worked both as a model and as a threat (because the potential exclusion from 
/TO 
the European system) to similar processes in Central and South America. Regarding the 
role of superpowers, Kaiser points out "the desire to gain autonomy vis-a-vis the 
superpower" as a driving force for the consolidation of regional subsystems and again 
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mentions the examples of Central and South America, with the United States acting as an 
incentive for processes of regionalization. Although Kaiser claims not to be interested 
in the study of regionalism and processes of integration, his analysis is focused on 
institutions such as the EEC and NATO, and he seems heavily influenced by the 
regionalist literature.70 
This first wave of literature in the fifties and sixties was followed by a renewed 
attempt to theorize the notion of regional subsystems in the seventies. Two major efforts 
during this period are Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel's "The International Politics of 
71 
Regions", and Bruce Russet's "International Regions and the International System". 
What distinguished these works from the early wave is their greater effort to define what 
exactly a regional subsystem consists of and how to delimit their borders. Russet's book 
is a particularly good example of this preoccupation. Faced with a number of criteria to 
demarcate regional subsystems, Russet selected five different criteria in order to come up 
with five different ways of categorizing regional subsystems: social-cultural homogeneity 
(economic development, religion, size, etc); political attitudes/external behavior (based 
on pattern of United Nations voting); political interdependence and institutions (measured 
by membership in international organizations); economic interdependence (measured by 
trade); and geographical proximity. For each of the five criteria, Russet presented a 
distinct possibility of demarcating a region. For example, according to the criterion of 
geographic proximity, there would be a region called Africa and another called Asia, but 
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using the criterion of socio-cultural homogeneity or external behavior, a new "Afro-
Asian" region is conceived. Russet's book is especially important in the sense that it 
makes clear the different ways one can conceive a region depending on the criteria that 
are being used. However, beyond this effort of categorization, Russet does not offer 
79 
much theoretical insight. 
In comparison to Russet's, Cantori and Spiegel's book is more theoretically 
oriented. In contrast to Brecher, who a few years earlier had identified only five, Cantori 
and Spiegel identified a total of fifteen regional subsystems (Middle East, West Europe, 
East Europe, USSR, North America, Latin America, East Asia, Southwest Pacific, 
Southeast Asia, South Asia, North Africa, West Africa, Southern Africa, Central Africa, 
East Africa), but concentrated only on five of them for the purposes of their study (West 
Europe, Middle East, West Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America). It is interesting to 
note that the subsystems on which they chose to focus are very similar to the five 
subsystems identified by Brecher, but where Brecher identified an American system, 
Cantori and Spiegel see Latin America as separated from North America. Like some of 
the earlier works mentioned, Cantori and Spiegel offer some variables to compare and 
construct a typology of different regional subsystems: nature and level of cohesion 
(social, economic, political, organizational); nature of communications (high or low 
degree); level of power; and structure of relations (conflictual or cooperative). Likewise, 
mirroring the concerns presented in the first wave of literature on regional subsystems, 
the authors remark on the important role played by outside powers in defining those 
systems in their concept of "intrusive" systems. Here, two types of "externally based 
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regional participation" are offered: politically insignificant and politically significant 
involvement. The first "comprises material aid, trade, economic investment, and cultural 
and educational efforts which do not usually produce participation in the balance of 
power in the region", while the latter 
is expressed by the possession of a colony; economic or military aid producing an 
alteration in the balance of power in the region; formal alliance, troop 
commitment, or any agreement which causes the external power to act in ways 
which resemble the types of actions that would ordinarily be taken by a country 
indigenous to the region. 
LATIN AMERICA IN THE EARLIER LITERATURE ON REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS 
With these theoretical efforts that accompanied the development of the literature 
on regional subsystems, the problem of how to treat Latin America became evident. As 
shown above, while some authors spoke of an American subsystem, others referred to a 
Latin American subsystem. With few exceptions, none of these works came to the 
conclusion that it would be analytically useful to treat South America as a separate 
subsystem,7 and little was produced on Latin America. One of the few works applying 
the concept of regional subsystem and the theoretical insights of the earlier works in 
order to analyze specifically the case of an "emerging" Latin American subsystem did not 
bother to notice any distinctions between South America and the rest of the region. This 
is even more remarkable considering the authors began their essay by mentioning Robert 
Burr, who talked explicitly about a South American system in contrast to the rest of the 
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region7 . But since the authors used the terms South America and Latin America 
interchangeably, this difference seems to have escaped their analysis. Another study on 
"Latin American International Politics," treats Latin America as a coherent subsystem 
and at some point refers to the existence of "a balance of military power, particularly 
77 • 
among the South American countries." The addition of the adverb particularly leads 
the reader to assume that there is a balance of military power among other parts of Latin 
America, but the author is silent about this possibility. 
A common feature of the works making the case for treating Latin America as a 
coherent regional subsystem is their lack of compelling evidence for doing so. For 
example, in their study, Cantori and Spiegel acknowledge in a footnote that there may 
exist in fact some problems in considering Latin America as a single system, but they 
present evidence to justify their choice of doing so. It is worth noticing that, akin to other 
works, while all fifteen subsystems proposed by Cantori and Spiegel are geographically 
referenced, the only one that is culturally referenced is Latin America. Whereas the 
authors consider Latin America as a single system, they divide the African continent in 
North Africa, West Africa, Southern Africa, Central Africa, and East Africa. Their 
explanation for this profusion of African subsystems is that "the African continent is 
fragmented by a variety of local interactions, while in Latin America, despite great 
differences, the area is more interrelated." To demonstrate the supposed interrelatedness 
of the Latin American subsystem they mention the fact that the region has organizational 
76
 Robert N. Burr, "The Balance of Power in Nineteenth-Century South America: An Exploratory Essay," 
The Hispanic American Historical Review 35, no. 1 (1955). In fact, as will be shown, Burr argues that only 
South America had the conditions for a regional balance of power, in contrast to the rest of Latin America. 
77
 Carlos Alberto Astiz, ed. Latin American International Politics; Ambitions, Capabilities, and the 
National Interest of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina (Notre Dame Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1969), 14. 
78
 Cantori and Spiegel, The International Politics of Regions: 6. 
36 
cohesiveness, high degree of communication, and a low level of conflict - predictably, 
thanks to American hegemony. The evidence they offer, however, fails to make the case 
for either variable. To show "organizational cohesiveness" the authors mention the 
creation of LAFTA (Latin American Free Trade Association, today known as ALADI) 
and CACM (Central American Common Market) and conclude that "a high degree of 
cooperation of the alliance variety" exists in Latin America. A closer look on the 
membership of these organizations, however, would only serve to reinforce the notion 
that there are actually two different systems at work in Latin America - while LAFTA 
included only South American countries (with the exception of Mexico), CACM included 
only Central American countries. To demonstrate the high degree of communication in 
Latin America, the authors footnote a work that focused specifically on South America.80 
Finally, arguing that the structure of relations in the region was characterized by low 
levels of conflicts, they except the Chaco War, and "a variety of disputes which include 
Peru vs. Ecuador, Chile vs. Peru and Bolivia, Argentina vs. Chile, and Argentina vs. 
Brazil," which are all examples taken exclusively from South America.81 
In his study on the influence of the United States and the Soviet Union in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe respectively, Edy Kauffman adopted Cantori and Spiegel's 
framework but went even further in his defense of the existence of a single Latin 
American subsystem. The author uses the usual criteria of geography and patterns of 
interaction and concludes that given the "high intensity of interaction between the twenty 
Latin American countries," Latin America could be treated as "a unified entity, while 
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Africa, Asia and Europe can be divided into two or more subsystems." One major 
problem of Kauffman's analysis is that he is not consistent with his own adopted criteria 
of geography plus patterns of interactions. For example, he justifies the exclusion of 
some countries from Latin America, like Jamaica and Guyana, on the basis of "different 
historical tradition and experience, and the linguistic, ethnic, religious and cultural 
differences of these countries." The rest of Latin America would be unified in terms of 
"common historical links, religion, race and culture, not only inside the component states 
QA 
but crosscutting them." Therefore, argues Kauffman, given this remarkable degree of 
"cohesiveness," it would be "impossible to divide the subsystem into smaller regions." 85 
At some point, the author also considers particular governments such as Castro's Cuba 
and Allende's Chile as "exceptions." They would not be part of the Latin American 
subsystem, the author affirms, because "they maintain policies different from the 
majority of countries in their respective subsystems" and thus they would constitute 
"exceptions to the rule of superpower domination in Latin America." 8 This means that 
Kauffman implicitly includes the convergence of policies among its members as another 
variable for the constitution of a regional subsystem, which means that participating in 
the subsystem becomes a matter of domestic decision. It is interesting to note that in 
contrast, Eastern Europe is seen as a complex region with important cultural, historical, 
and economic differences, and it is considered single a subsystem basically because of 
penetration by the Soviet Union. Why Kauffman abandoned the cultural and historical 
Edy Kaufman, The Superpowers and their Spheres of Influence: The United States and the Soviet Union 
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criteria he used for Latin America when he switched to Eastern Europe is never explained 
to the reader. 
There were, of course, some exceptions to the rule of lumping together Latin 
America as a regional subsystem in this earlier literature. Jorge Dominguez, for example, 
differentiates between a Middle American and a South American subsystem based on 
different patterns of territorial disputes and economic links. He adds that they are not 
only distinct but they "compete against each other" for the "economic favors" of the 
United States. Russet had forewarned that although he used the concept of Latin 
America as a single subsystem, it seemed apparent to him that "not all Latin America is 
equally involved in this potential subsystem" but that a core group existed in Central 
America and the Caribbean, "with the nations in the lower half of South America, and of 
course the United States and Canada, very much more marginal." In fact, with more 
careful scrutiny, the author detected discrepancies on trade, "where the hemisphere was 
split into two components, a North and Central American aggregate, and one for South 
America", as well as in political behavior and international organizations.8 Even so, in 
the few instances where Latin America was studied under the regional subsystemic 
perspective during this period, the general rule was that it was commonly treated as a 
single coherent unity, and that included Russet in spite of his caveats. Typically, this 
interpretation led to generalizations about international politics in the region - particularly 
* 
concerning the relationship with the United States - that were often based on empirical 
data taken from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. 
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REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS AND THE END OF COLD WAR 
Although a good amount of theoretical insights were produced by the literature on 
regional subsystems from the fifties to the seventies, the consolidation of neorealism as 
the main theoretical paradigm in international relations, especially after the publication of 
Kenneth Waltz's "Theory of International Politics" in 1979, eclipsed the subsystemic 
approach. The main argument of neorealism was that the most important features of 
international politics could only be explained by references to systemic pressures which 
emanated from the anarchical environment of the international system. Any reference to 
interacting units should therefore be seen as "reductionist," as opposed to a "systemic" 
approach. Likewise, neoliberal reactions to neorealism also generally took the point of 
view of the global international system.90 Consequently, the regional subsystems became 
a mere footnote when explaining international politics and little interest was directed to 
this literature. The resilience, and in a certain way the neatness, provided by the bipolar 
environment certainly contributed for the success of the neorealist approach. With two 
global superpowers struggling for supremacy, references to balance of power concerns 
seemed, in effect, to explain a great deal of international politics. The dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, however, changed the international landscape and removed an important 
incentive for intervention by the remaining superpower. This in turn gave more relative 
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autonomy to regional subsystems which translated into new impulse to the literature 
focused on regional processes. 
Despite this renewed interest, when scholars turned their attention to regional 
dynamics with the end of the Cold War, the majority of the literature produced dealt with 
processes of regionalization, i.e., when statesmen deliberately design strategies of 
regionalization through political-economic integration and formalize it in regional 
organizations. However, as Oran Young points out, it is analytically important to make a 
clear differentiation between institutions and organizations.91 While the first refers to 
social practices, the latter is translated into formal structures, or "material entities 
09 
possessing physical location (or seats), offices, personnel, equipment, and budget." The 
notion of a trade regime would be an example of the former, while the World Trade 
Organization would be an example of the latter. Likewise, regional subsystems can be 
understood as institutions, while regional trade agreements are organizations, and the first 
may or may not coincide with the latter. This commonly overlooked distinction is 
important because, as Young remarks, it allows the analyst to explore the relationships 
between institutions and organizations. Therefore, it can be argued that empirical 
observable processes that characterize a given region are based on actual patterns of 
interactions that may or may not be eventually formalized in formal organizations. In 
other words, the formalization of a regional subsystem in the form of a regional 
organization is not an independent phenomenon, but the two generally follow previous 
patterns of relationships that were socially constructed. The reality of interactions 
Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the 
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precedes the building of formal organizations, which does not mean to negate the fact 
that the establishment of formal organizations may affect the pattern of interactions in a 
93 
region. 
As a matter of fact, one could hypothesize that a regional subsystemic perspective 
based on actual patterns of interactions can help to predict the relevance and effectiveness 
of formal regionalist schemes. As David Lake observes, rather than including the 
establishment of institutions in the definition of regional subsystem, "it is preferable to 
treat the degree of institutionalization as a dimension of possible variation for further 
analysis." Cooperation is just one extreme aspect of a spectrum of interactions in which 
the other end may be characterized as conflict. Hence, this dissertation will not focus on 
processes of regional cooperation among governments leading to policies of 
regionalization, but rather on the consolidation of regional subsystems as subset of the 
international system reflecting the outcome of actual patterns of interactions — including 
the whole spectrum between conflict and cooperation - among countries in condition of 
geographic proximity. It is not the concern of the present study to analyze states' 
integration strategies or to raise normative concerns, but to make the case that the 
existence of regional subsystems as a social reality and as an analytical tool is an 
The idea that regional institutions shape patterns of interaction is a central claim in the literature on 
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important factor to consider in the study of foreign policy. Therefore, this dissertation 
assumes that, while there may be some overlapping between the literature on regionalism 
and the literature on regional subsystems, the two can and should be clearly 
distinguished.9 
When this distinction is made, it becomes clear that while the "regionalist" 
literature burgeoned after the end of the Cold War, the literature on regional subsystems 
reappeared quietly and sparsely. Probably the most significant theoretical insight among 
the works taking the regional subsystemic perspective to study contemporary 
international politics is the development of the concept of "regional security complexes" 
by Barry Buzan and the so called "Copenhagen School." Buzan adapted much of the 
early literature on regional subsystems in order to apply it specifically to the context of 
security. He criticized, for instance, Cantori and Spiegel for attempting "to tackle regions 
across the whole agenda of international relations" which would be "too complex and 
cumbersome to establish a generally followed understanding of region." Thus, by 
focusing on security, Buzan seeks to "provide a narrower and more manageable 
The literature on processes of regionalization based on cooperation and the establishment of formal 
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approach." The problem with this argument is that, while claiming to offer a "narrower" 
approach, the concept of security itself employed by Buzan and the Copenhagen School 
in general, is considerably broad, covering military, political, economic, societal, and 
go
 t t 
environmental security. Buzan characterizes a regional security complex, or RSC, as 
being "defined by durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of subglobal, 
geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence"99 and that has a "mediating 
effect [...] on relations between the great powers and the local states."1 Consequently, 
even though geographical proximity is considered to be an important factor, the author 
remarks that RSCs "are socially constructed in the sense that they are contingent on the 
security practice of the actors." The fact that RSCs are "socially constructed" 
evidences its "constructivists roots," given the fact that regional subsystems are 
"dependent on the actions and interpretations of actors, not just a mechanical reflection of 
1 09 
the distribution of power." Hence, as regions are then defined both by geographic 
factors as well as "by the actual patterns of security practices," it becomes clear that 
the regional subsystemic perspective used by Buzan is similar to the one that was 
developed by the early literature as seen above. Moreover, reminiscent of the earlier 
literature on regional subsystems, Buzan acknowledges the effects of regional subsystems 
in the relations between great powers and states in a given subsystem. 
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At the same time that this double focus on geography and patterns of interactions 
places the notion of regional security complexes side by side with the literature on 
regional subsystems, it also distinguishes it from the notion of "security communities," a 
concept initially developed by Karl Deutsch104 in which boundaries are "determined by 
shared understanding rather than geography." Somewhere between these two 
literatures lies the notion of regional security complex as developed by David Lake and 
Patrick Morgan. Contrary to Buzan, Lake and Morgan do not define a regional security 
complex in terms of geography plus patterns of interactions, but on the idea of "security 
externalities". A regional security complex is thus defined as "a set of states continually 
affected by one or more security externalities that emanate from a distinct geographic 
area."106 While Buzan sees geography as a necessary condition for a RSC, Lake and 
* 
Morgan do not. Whereas Buzan stresses that "the actual patterns of security practices" are 
the key to define a RSC, Lake and Morgan maintain that since externalities are what 
define a RSC, they "may be created even when there is no manifest or measurable 
1 07 
'interaction' between states, such as the exchange of goods and services." The problem 
with this argument is that the authors seem to equal interactions with the "exchange of 
products or material,"108 or only with practices of cooperation, which is evidently a 
mistakenly narrow definition of interaction. 
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Other examples of the application of the insights generated by the literature on 
regional subsystems after the Cold War are Arie Kacowicz's "Zones of Peace in the 
Third World" and, more recently, Markus Kaim's "Great Powers and Regional 
Orders."109 Kaim's edited book is dedicated to the analysis of the role of external powers 
in regional subsystems with a focus on the United States in the Persian Gulf. Kaim 
develops an analytical framework based on four variables that would determine an 
external actor's influence in regional subsystems: the level of domestic consensus such as 
"the influence of societal forces, predominantly manifested in the existence of specific 
interest or lobby groups;" intra-regional dynamics, or "the quality of a given regional 
order," which includes "intra-regional patterns of power and influence and the way the 
regional parties cooperate with, or confront, each other;" domestic politics of regional 
players; and the structure of the international system.110 These variables, Kaim maintains, 
"determine whether the United States can be influential in a regional order, when, and 
under what circumstances."111 
Kacowicz focuses on South America since the 1880s and West Africa since the 
sixties in order to explain "the maintenance of periods of extensive peace" in these two 
regions in spite of the fact that they have not been democracies for most of the goven 
time frame.112 Because Kacowicz is interested in explaining the "preservation of 
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international peace at the regional level," the framework of regional subsystems is 
uniquely well-suited for his purposes as it allows him to focus on a level between the 
dyadic and the international system and "to define several zones of peace instead of just 
one democratic zone."114 Although Kacowicz presents several possible explanations for 
this phenomenon, he emphasizes the satisfaction with the territorial status quo by states 
within the region as the strongest factor. By focusing on regional subsystems, Kacowicz 
is able to produce some interesting insights, one of the most relevant of which is the idea 
to highlight the role of Brazil in the South American subsystem and at the same time 
situate the commonly overemphasized role of the United States in that region within 
perspective. Brazil, Kacowicz points out, has been the most territorially satisfied country 
in the subsystem and is the country that would have most to lose from a change in status 
quo, which "might affect the existing structure of prestige."115 Therefore, as a 
"quintessential status quo power," Brazil would play an important role in maintaining 
South America peace.'] 6 Thus, the Brazilian interest in keeping the status quo in the 
region is presented by Kacowicz as being an important part of the explanation for the 
establishment of a zone of peace in South America since 1883, in contrast to Central 
America which is characterized as a zone of conflict. As Kacowicz argues, "in regional 
rather than systemic terms it can be argued that Brazil has played a more preponderant 
role as a potential hegemonic power than the United States." m Likewise, Buzan and 
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Waever argue that the role of Brazil as a "hegemonic stabilizer" is "more important than 
the often-made reference to the United States as a regional hegemon."118 
LATIN AMERICA IN THE RECENT LITERATURE ON REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS 
In relation to Latin America, a common trait of Buzan's and Kacowicz's approach 
is their insistence in making a clear differentiation between South America and the rest of 
Latin America, which allows them to provide interesting insights that would be lost if 
they did not make this distinction. In his study, Kacowicz found it necessary to "clearly 
distinguish between two regions or subsystems: Middle America [...] and South 
America."119 The reason for this is that only in South America could Kacowicz identify a 
zone of peace, as Middle America was a zone of conflict until at least the end of the Cold 
War. Similarly, in their study on regional security complexes, Buzan and Waever also 
found it useful to take apart South America as a distinct region from the point of view of 
security, while incorporating Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean into the North 
American complex. The authors justify that "despite recurrent hemispheric projects [...] 
North and South America have different security dynamics and connections are highly 
asymmetrical."120 In fact, Buzan and Waever argue that the North American and the 
South American complex are not only dissimilar, but they also consist of different types 
of RSCs - while the South American RSC is characterized as a "standard" RSC, the 
North American would be a "centered" RSC. The difference is that a centered RSC is 
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dominated by a great power, while in the standard RSC the polarity is determined by 
regional powers. It is interesting to notice that this preoccupation in clearly 
distinguishing South America from the rest of Latin America was present only in an 
embryonic way in Buzan's earlier work. In "People, States, and Fear" Buzan found the 
Americas "somewhat harder to characterize" and made mention to a "Latin American 
complex" that was congruent with South America, but only by exclusion, since the fact 
that Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean were included as a "hegemonic 
complex" part of the North American complex, because they "have been so penetrated by 
the United States" that "any independent security dynamics" was "virtually impossible to 
discern."122 The direction of his subsequent work demonstrated how Buzan later refined 
this idea. Nevertheless, for some unexplained reason, Buzan and Waever felt it necessary 
at a certain point to justify treating South America as a distinct regional subsystem would 
be relevant only from the point of view of security. In fact, they claim that the South 
American subsystem "is a useful example of where the pattern of regional security does 
not line up with other patterns of regionality." However, aside from a general mention of 
the "southward ties" of Central America and the Caribbean, the authors do not explain 
what other "patterns of regionality" would make Latin America a coherent regional 
subsystem.123 
Like the works just mentioned, other works in the post Cold War era also tend to 
consider South America as a separate regional subsystem, yet they generally either view 
this as a new phenomenon or as restricted to some issue-areas. David Myers, for 
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example, argued that the view of South America "as an autonomous international arena in 
its own right" was an "emerging" trend and while in the past "the United States once 
crafted policies for all of Latin America (the Monroe Doctrine, the Good Neighbor 
Policy, and the Alliance for Progress) more recent initiatives have centered on the 
Caribbean Basin."124 In Schulz et al there is a separate chapter dedicated to South 
America, but because of their focus on cooperation, the authors see this detachment of 
1 9S 
South America as a trend that begun only with the end of the Cold War. 
Perhaps the most important work applying the concept of regional subsystem 
exclusively to the case of Latin America is G. Pope Atkins' "Latin America and the 
Caribbean in the International System."126 Contrary to Buzan/Waever and Kacowicz, 
Atkins chose to make the case that Latin America as a whole should be treated as a 
regional subsystem. Like the earlier works previously mentioned, the problem with this 
view is that Atkins is unable to make a convincing case why it is relevant to do so. The 
author claims that the criteria for the identification of boundaries of a subsystem are not 
only geographic proximity and "regularity of interactions among the units," but also a 
"degree of mutual identity" based on "regional self-perception and the views of the 
external actors about the region." As it is the case with other authors who overlook the 
centrality of patterns of interaction in order to emphasize the notion of a supposed 
"mutual identity" in Latin America as a justification for treating it as a coherent system, 
Atkins also encounters some difficulties. The author argues that the reason some 
124
 David J. Myers, ed. Regional Hegemons: Threat Perception and Strategic Response (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1991), 225,31. 
125
 Schulz, SOderbaum, and Ojendal, Regionalization in a Globalizing World: A Comparative Perspective 
on Forms, Actors, and Processes, 245. 
126
 G. Pope Atkins, Latin America and the Caribbean in the International System, 4th ed. (Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview Press, 1999). 
127
 Ibid., 26-27. 
50 
specialists prefer not to treat Latin America as a system would be because of "great 
differences and heterogeneity among the states within the region," and that this view of 
Latin America as "so internally different" that "it cannot be treated as a whole" would be 
"exaggerated and misleading." 128 However, the fact that internal differentiation is not a 
part of his own definition of a regional subsystem seems to have escaped his 
examination. In fact, states in a regional subsystem can be very different internally and 
still be part of the same regional subsystem. Therefore, Atkins is left with supposed 
notions of a shared identity and recognition by external actors - which would be proven 
by their "Latin American policies" - to make the case for treating Latin America as a 
regional subsystem.129 When Atkins attempts to show patterns of interactions, he briefly 
mentions some regional organizations, with many of them, such as the Latin American 
Parliament, having little or no actual significance. Other important aspects of interaction, 
such as trade and conflicts, are not mentioned. Although claiming to be "appropriate" to 
treat Latin America as a single coherent unit, Atkins concedes that it is "incomplete" 
because it is necessary "to highlight those subsystems with different conditions," and he 
mentions Mexico, Circum Caribbean, South America and Brazil as subsystems within the 
1 ^0 
subsystem. By considering individual countries, the author confuses a subsystem with 
a regional subsystem and does not make clear why this is analytically useful from the 
point of view of international relations. Atkins acknowledges that "much of the Mexican 
international subsystem has been and is largely divorced from the broader inter-American 
arena," that "the United States has engaged in unilateral military intervention only in 
Mexico and the Circum-Caribbean," and that the Southern Cone "forms a regional 
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subsystem distinguished by a number of characteristics that make it dramatically different 
from the northern sector of Latin America" with "intense patterns of interaction among 
themselves largely shaped by regional factors with minimal reference to outside states or 
intergovernmental organizations."1 ' When these factors are taken into consideration, it 
becomes hard to justify why Atkins stick to the notion of a Latin American subsystem as 
analytically dominant in the field of international relations over the notion of a South 
American and a Middle American regional subsystems. In fact, throughout Atkins' book 
there is not a single relevant explanation that is generated by the notion of a Latin 
American subsystem, as the author is constantly forced to remember the different patterns 
of interaction in the region. Chapter 4 aims to address these weaknesses by making the 
case for a South American subsystem. Before that though, a few theoretical 
considerations are necessary. 
131
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS 
The concept of a subsystem as applied to international relations theory is 
straightforward: an international subsystem can be understood as "any subset" of the 
international system. In general, a subsystem can by and large be considered as "a 
component of a larger system" but one "with systemic properties of its own." Within 
this basic conception, a subsystem of the international system can actually be "any set of 
specific variables"134 according to the purposes of the researcher. 
In fact, the idea of a subsystem within the overall international system has been 
used to direct attention to different sets of variables. For example, when Kenneth Waltz 
refers to subsystem he means the nation-states.135 Similarly, in his celebrated "level-of-
analysis" essay, J. David Singer uses the notion of subsystem to refer to the domestic 
level - the choice would then be selecting between "the international system and the 
national sub-systems" as a referent for analysis. For Morton Kaplan, subsystems can be 
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either national actors or supranational actors such as the United Nations. Thomas 
Robinson analyzed the "Communist System" as a subsystem of the larger international 
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system.138 One aspect of Niklas Luhmann's Modern Systems Theory is the notion that 
subsystems in the international systems are functionally differentiated. Thus, functional 
subsystems would include politics, law, the economy and science.139 
Consequently, the choice to focus on regional subsystems is but one choice 
among other possibilities for subsystemic research in international relations. The 
justification for this preference is based on the belief that delimiting the boundaries of 
international subsystems in terms of regional factors can bring significant contributions 
for the understanding of international politics. Perhaps the main contribution would be 
overcoming the conventional domestic-international dualism that has shaped the majority 
of the researches in international relations, thereupon opening up different possibilities 
for analysis by taking a step down in relation to the neorealist focus on the global system 
and a step up in relation to the liberal focus on the domestic system. It is not a matter of 
attempting to integrate both theories, but of acknowledging the existence of a third level 
beyond the usual two that are considered by these theories. Yet, by identifying a new 
locus of investigation between the nation-state and the international system, between 
domestic politics and international politics, the regional subsystemic approach holds the 
promise of bringing together foreign policy analysis and theory of international politics. 
It therefore seeks to transcend the notion that theory of foreign policy and theory of 
international politics are utterly distinct140 by using some of the theoretical framework 
provided by systemic theories of international relations in order to generate explanations 
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for foreign policies' outcomes. Thus, a regional subsystemic approach is not 
"reductionist" as it does not make reference solely to unit-level attributes of particular 
states in order to provide explanations. This approach is in fact "systemic" but its main 
focus shifts from the global system to the regional system. It does not look for the 
domestic sources of foreign policy, but more for what one author called the "foreign 
sources of foreign policy".141 
At this juncture, it is important to make a distinction between foreign policy 
formulation, which may be satisfactorily explained by references to domestic politics, 
and foreign policy outcomes, which cannot be fully understood without making reference 
to systemic processes. As Harold and Margaret Sprout demonstrated, for any political 
undertaking, it is important to differentiate between "decisions and operational results," 
in other words, to distinguish between "what is undertaken and what is accomplished."142 
The regional subsystemic approach - akin to the "ecological perspective" advocated by 
Sprout and Sprout - is thus less interested in examining specific foreign policy decisions 
than analyzing the "achievements, actual or potential, with reference to a given 
undertaking or strategy." Thus the methodological focus of regional subsystemic 
research should not be on what is undertaken, but on what is or can be accomplished. For 
that reason, this dissertation will not attempt to explain, for example, why the United 
States decided to intervene in Chile in the seventies or to push for a Free Trade Area of 
the Americas in the nineties, but how regional subsystemic dynamics contributed to the 
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actual outcomes of these initiatives. In general terms, this means that the "absentness" 
thesis proposed here is demonstrated not in terms of thoughtful decision-making 
processes by US statesmen, but in terms of the particular dynamics of the South 
American regional subsystem and its interaction with the United States. 
Additionally, the stress on regional subsystems postulates an explicit assumption 
that geography matters in international relations.144 This is not only "because geographic 
dimensions [...] are nearly always significant in discussions of political undertakings and 
the operational results thereof,"145 and it thus has an impact on the aforementioned 
distinction between decisions and outcomes, but especially because geography shapes a 
number of important interactions such as "the intensity of economic exchanges and the 
likelihood of war." This is particularly relevant for a concept of subsystem that is 
based on interactions ranging from the whole spectrum between cooperation and conflict. 
Moreover, as Hans Mouritzen argued, besides anarchy, the other fundamental 
characteristic of the international system is the fact that "its major units are mutually non-
mobile," and while the consequences of anarchy have been thoroughly explored by the 
international relations literature, the consequences of "non-mobility" have consistently 
been overlooked. In fact, both theories of foreign policy as well as theories of 
international politics seem to neglect the importance of geography. As a result, most of 
the systemic theories of international relations, which were imported from other fields 
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where the basic units are mobile, do not take into account the fact that states, contrary to 
firms for example, are fixed in space.148 The major implication of this characteristic is 
that there is "a cleavage between unit and system" 149 which "means that each state faces 
a specific and stable salient environment rather than the international system as a 
whole."150 The notion of "salient environment" that is explored by Mouritzen is 
coterminous with the concept of regional subsystem as employed by this research. 
WHAT A REGIONAL SUBSYSTEM IS - AND WHAT IT IS NOT 
Following the review of the literature presented in the previous chapter, there are 
two - and only two - sufficient and necessary variables for the establishment of a regional 
subsystem: geographic proximity and patterns of interaction. This reasonably 
parsimonious definition serves the purpose of international relations research and the 
field would greatly benefit if it was applied more consistently. 
Indeed, the exclusive focus on geography plus patterns of interactions does not 
mean that there are no other ways to delimit a region depending on the purposes of the 
researcher. Students of geography, comparative politics, or anthropology may find it 
necessary to choose among a different set of variables, but if the purpose of the regional 
analysis is to refine our understanding of international politics and to advance theoretical 
propositions in this field, the regional subsystemic approach seems to be an adequate fit. 
For this reason, it may be useful to distinguish the term regional subsystem from the 
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usual notion of region, with the first being the focus of investigation of international 
relations.151 This distinction is not merely nominal since a region is not necessarily a 
regional subsystem. The perspective presented by this research, for instance, is that while 
the existence of Latin America as a region is justified from the point of view of other 
disciplines, within the field of international relations the view of a North and a South 
American subsystem is far more useful. The failure to make this distinction has led to 
recurrent errors of analysis, judgment, and policies. This is especially true when it comes 
to US foreign policy towards the hemisphere. In particular, it obscures fundamental 
differences between US foreign policy toward South America and the rest of Latin 
America. Additionally, it prevents a more sophisticated understanding of the role of 
Brazil, which has historically felt uncomfortable being labeled as "Latin American."152 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, by focusing on geography and interaction a 
regional subsystem is understood here as being a subset of the international system 
reflecting the outcome of actual patterns of interactions - including the whole spectrum 
between conflict and cooperation - among countries in condition of geographic 
proximity. Members of the same regional subsystem have a higher degree of interaction 
among themselves in relation to members outside the subsystem, and as a result their 
primary foreign policies concerns lie within their own regional subsystem. That means 
that they usually seek first and foremost to establish a position within their regional 
subsystem before taking into account their situation in the international system as a whole 
- this fact, which is commonly neglected by studies focusing on great powers, is 
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especially consequential when it comes to analyzing the foreign policies of regional 
powers. Defining a regional subsystem only in terms of geographical proximity and 
patterns of interaction, without specifying a minimum number of states, means that there 
can be as many regional subsystems as there are neighboring interacting states. In fact, 
one could envisage a number of different regional subsystems containing only two states, 
and the fewer the number of states, the more coherence of the proposed subsystem. But at 
the same time, the larger the number of regional subsystems identified, the less 
parsimonious the subsystemic approach becomes. The question of drawing boundaries 
then is related to balancing the need for coherence with the need for parsimony in order 
to retain the usefulness of the regional subsystem concept as an analytical tool and a 
research program. 
The definition proposed above has three main components that deserve careful 
consideration. The first is the fact that a regional subsystem is a subset of the 
international system as a whole, which means that the international system can be 
considered the subsystem's environment. This implicates the acknowledgment that 
pressures from the overall system coexist alongside subsystemic pressures, but the latter 
is usually more significant for the members of a regional subsystem. Second, a regional 
subsystem reflects actual patterns of interaction, which implies that it can only be 
detected by looking at past interactions and not by measuring the potential for interaction. 
A regional subsystem is conceived here as being a social system and, as James Rosenau 
has pointed out, "recurring - and therefore patterned - interaction is the distinguishing 
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feature of a social system." This means that attempts to operationalize a regional 
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subsystem in terms of, for example, the "ability to interact militarily", is faulty in the 
sense that it does not reflect the actual patterns of interaction.154 
One needs to look at a reasonably long period of time in order to detect these 
patterns and bear in mind that "not all interactions are equally important in shaping the 
external behavior of an individual state; key patterns of interaction must be uncovered 
and explored." Nevertheless, the problem of operationalizing interaction is certainly 
challenging. As Michael Wallace remarked, "nations may enter into relationships with 
one another in so many different ways, and interact by such a wide variety of means at so 
many different levels, that no single measure, however comprehensive, can claim to be 
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completely adequate." In fact, the index presented by Wallace himself- based on 
common membership in international organizations - is highly inadequate as it 
concentrates only in the cooperation aspect of interaction, thus ignoring the possibility of 
subsystems in which conflictual relations prevail. Finally, the third characteristic of the 
definition suggested above is the fact that a regional subsystem includes members in 
condition of geographic proximity. The geographic criterion is crucial regardless of the 
level of interconnection or interdependence of the global international system, a condition 
that has led some scholars to discount the importance of geography. As Mouritzen 
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But in order to define a regional subsystem, it is also necessary to make clear 
what it is not meant by regional subsystem, since there has been much conceptual 
confusion regarding the use of the term. Perhaps the two most common misconceptions 
are first, equating regional subsystem with processes of regional integration, and second, 
the emphasis on variables other than geography and pattern of interactions. The first 
common misconception, illustrated by the aforementioned index used by Wallace, can be 
explained by the fact that when the literature of regional subsystems emerged in the late 
fifties, the literature on regional integration was already well developed.161 Therefore, 
there was to some extent an amalgamation of these two literatures, and the inability to 
clearly make the distinction contributed to keeping the regional subsystemic approach in 
the fringes of international relations theory. As Thompson commented, the focus on 
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institutions and integration are "legacies or at least 'spillovers' of the older interest in 
processes of regionalism."162 
Systems analysis, as applied to the field of international relations, has never been 
only about cooperation, as the centrality of the notion of balance of power makes clear. 
As Lynn Miller reminds, the term system is "instrumentally neutral as used in the social 
sciences: it neither assumes an inevitable growth in cohesion and stability on the part of 
the processes studied nor does it prescribe for such growth."163 A regional subsystem can 
be less or more integrated, less or more institutionalized, but the degree of integration or 
institutionalization should not determine the existence of a regional subsystem. These two 
factors can, at best, serve as one variable to explain patterns of interactions - above all in 
the cooperation end of the interaction spectrum - or be used to classify different regional 
subsystems. The establishment of international organizations may have an effect on 
regional subsystem, but only as long as they affect patterns of interactions. Thus, the 
mere creation of international organizations should not be fundamental for regional 
subsystemic analysis. Equating integration with the establishment of a regional 
subsystem entails at least two important drawbacks. The first is neglecting to consider the 
role of conflict in regional subsystems. This limitation is particularly relevant if the focus 
of study is, for example, on security issues. The second is "the danger of circular 
reasoning" whereas a regional subsystemic perspective is used to explain processes of 
integration, but regional subsystems themselves are equated with integration.1 This 
approach removes a lot of the explanatory power of regional subsystems - including 
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when it comes to explaining processes of regional integration. Nonetheless, this 
"spillover" from the regionalist literature remains somewhat in place until today, which 
makes it important to constantly remember, as Thompson did forty years ago, that "just 
as some students of regionalism apparently have little use for regional subsystems 
research [...], regional subsystems analysts need not immediately burden themselves with 
the problems of regional integration studies." 165 
The second common misconception of regional subsystems - and this is 
especially relevant for the case of Latin America - is the emphasis on variables other than 
geography and patterns of interactions. Most commonly, the notion of a common culture 
or identity, or of supposed historical affinities, occupy a central place in this second 
category of misconceptions. Since the term Latin America is itself culturally referenced -
as opposed to being geographically referenced like every other standard regional 
classification in the world such as "Eastern Europe," "West Africa," or "Southeast Asia," 
for example, the temptation to justify treating Latin America as a regional subsystem 
based on cultural factors is immense. Obviously, this is true only for those who bother 
offering an explanation for this choice, since many analysts just assume the existence of a 
Latin American subsystem as a self-evident truth. Apart from the discussion of the 
questionable wisdom of ascribing to Latin America a "common culture, religion, 
language, and race,"166 culture and identity - as in the case of the establishment of 
international organizations - only matter for regional subsystemic analysis as long as they 
affect patterns of interaction. As a matter of fact, again as Thompson remarked, "with 
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emphasis on interaction, these characteristics are rendered unnecessary even though they 
may be frequently present and of some significance." 
If the culturally-defined concept of Latin America is used to refer to a regional 
subsystem, one has to prove that it is somehow more useful to group Mexico with Brazil 
than to group Mexico with the United States in a regional subsystem. If culture and 
identity are used as the main variables, the first grouping would arguably make more 
sense. However, if patterns of interaction (as well as geography, for that matter) are used 
as the central factor, the United States and Mexico should be grouped as part of a North 
American subsystem. The case of Mexico is illustrative because several analyses seem to 
assume that including Mexico in studies that mainly focus on South America makes the 
notion of a supposed Latin American subsystem more credible. In the same manner, 
the inclusion of Mexico and other Latin American countries in an all-encompassing Latin 
American subsystem instead of in a North American subsystem is often justified in the 
basis of the level of development. Because the United States stands out as an 
industrialized developed country, the reasoning goes, it somehow does not make sense 
for it to be grouped with less developed Latin American states. However, like culture, a 
common level of development is not a criterion for the identification of a regional 
subsystem. In fact, as also rightfully pointed out by Thompson, "proximate and 
interacting actors may be rich or poor."169 
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In sum, patterns of interaction and geographical proximity are the only two 
variables needed to detect a regional subsystem. Perhaps one of the major reasons that the 
regional subsystemic literature has not enjoyed the importance it deserves in the field of 
international relations is the irregularity in defining what a regional subsystem is. When it 
is equated with integration, is loses significance as it is absorbed by the overwhelmingly 
larger literature on regionalism. When other variables are included, it loses definitional 
consistency, thus becoming little useful for theoretical purposes. As Arthur Kalleberg 
remarks with reference to the study of political systems, in order to classify and compare, 
it is crucial that the criterion for classification be the same for all objects being 
compared. Hence, if one uses cultural variables to define a regional subsystem in one 
area, but uses a different set of variables for another, the result is typically conceptual 
171 
confusion and the subsequent loss of scientific utility. 
REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS AND SOCIAL THEORY 
This dissertation assumes that regional subsystems should be defined not only in 
terms of geographical considerations but also in terms of patterns of interactions. This 
reliance on patterns of interaction as a key element in delimiting the borders of a given 
regional subsystem has several implications, the most important being the fact that 
regional subsystems are treated as social systems. This proposition means that in order to 
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study the emergence and impact of such systems in the realm of international relations, it 
becomes necessary to use a methodological approach that moves beyond the mere 
calculations of power in order to incorporate social elements into the analysis so as to 
better understand the interplay between individual states and regional subsystems. In 
other words, the study of regional subsystems raises the need for the utilization of a social 
approach to international relations. 
In fact, a central concern of social theories in general is the debate on the 
relationship between the individual and society or, more generically, between agents and 
structures. In the field of international relations, this debate can be put in terms of the 
relationship between individual states and the international system. For the purposes of 
the present study, the main preoccupation will be with the relationship between states and 
the regional subsystem. The fundamental question here is whether agents are determined 
by the structure of a particular social system, or the social system is determined by the 
agents. In other words, what is the causal relationship to be studied? Is it the international 
- or the regional - system that affects the behavior of states, or is it the foreign policy 
actions of states that shape the system? The answer to this puzzle is crucial, for it 
determines what the causal direction is and thus which is the independent and which is 
the dependent variable to be studied. 
One of the most prominent answers to this dilemma in the field of international 
relations is offered by the neorealist approach. The neorealist answer to the puzzle of the 
relationship between agents and structure is straightforward - the behavior of the first is 
directly determined by the configuration of the latter. For Kenneth Waltz, the interaction 
among the units in a system should be clearly separated from the properties of the system. 
66 
The author insists that for a system approach to be valid, one must "carefully keep the 
attributes and interactions of the system's units out of the definition of its structure." 172 
Thus, any approach that takes into account the interaction among the units should be 
classified as "reductionist," in opposition to what would be a systemic approach. In other 
words, the neorealist approach implies a clear separation between the structure of the 
system and the interactions between the agents within it. The structure of the international 
system is thus defined not in terms of interaction among states, which is seen as 
exclusively a property of units, but in terms of how the units are arranged in relation to 
one another. "To define a structure," Waltz claims, "requires ignoring how units relate 
with one another (how they interact) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to 
one another (how they are arranged and positioned). Interactions, as I have insisted, take 
1 7^ 
place at the level of units [...]. The arrangement of units is a property of the system." 
For Waltz, the way the units are arranged within the international system is a function of 
the distribution of power, expressed fundamentally by military capabilities, and this view 
is in light of the anarchical character that is the ordering principle of the international 
system. Therefore, by ignoring the systemic effects of interaction among states and 
concentrating exclusively on the distribution of power, the neorealist approach becomes 
focused solely on material attributes and moves away from any interpretation that may 
include elements of a social nature. 
These "mechanistic and unsocial" conceptualizations form the base of the 
constructivist critique to neorealism. Whereas Waltz focuses on the material aspects of 
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the international system, Alexander Wendt claims that social aspects are more relevant. 
The author contrasts the "materialistic" approach offered by neorealism with the 
"idealistic" approach proposed by constructivism. Hence, the international system should 
not so much be characterized by the distribution of power as it should be characterized by 
the "distribution of knowledge." For Wendt, "the character of international life is 
determined by the beliefs and expectations that states have about each other, and these 
are constituted largely by social rather than material structures." 175 Consequently, the 
basic criticism that Wendt advances toward neorealism is not directed toward its systemic 
approach, but to its materialism, since he claims that structure is also constituted by ideas. 
The author is careful enough to remark that this belief does not mean that material forces 
are not important, as a radical version of constructivism would claim. For Wendt, "ideas 
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are based on and are regulated by an independently existing physical reality" and 
therefore "the ideational aspect of international structure [...] supervenes on this material 
base." 177 Among the material factors mentioned by Wendt as having an independent 
1 78 
effect in the international life are "geography and natural resources," the first being 
central to the notion of regional subsystem developed in this research. 
Since constructivism sees the structure of the international system as also being 
constituted by ideas, it is clear that agents have an effect on the structure, which 
complicates the neorealist view that the international system should be treated as an 
independent variable. Wendt rejects the Waltzian notion that in order to adopt 
structuralism as a methodological principle one must clearly separate the structure and 
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the interaction of the agents within this structure, and argues that, because structure and 
agents are not independently existing entities, there cannot be established a causal 
relationship between them. "Structure exists, has effects, and evolves only because of 
agents and their practices,"179 argues Wendt, and therefore "it is impossible for structures 
to have effects apart from the attributes and interactions of agents." Similarly, Walter 
Carlsnaes maintains that foreign policy processes "are a consequence of, and can hence 
only be fully explained with reference to, a dynamic process in which both agents and 
structures causally condition each other over time,"181 and therefore there is the "need to 
view the relationship between actors and social structures in terms of mutual linkage 
1 QO 
rather than causal reduction." The methodological implication of such a view is that, as 
Wendt argues, causal theorizing loses its value in the analysis of international politics, 
and for that reason it should give way to "constitutive theorizing." Since agents and 
1 84 
structures are in fact "simultaneously involved in the production of social phenomena," 
the question of whether agents determine structure or vice-versa is misplaced since the 
relationship is actually one of "co-determination."185 As social structures, the 
international system in general, and the regional subsystems in particular, are not 
independent of the actors that constitute them, and therefore the effects of interactions 
among the actors must become a key element in the analysis. 
179
 Ibid., 185. 
180
 Ibid., 12. 
181
 Walter Carlsnaes, "The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis," International Studies 
Quarterly 36, no. 3 (1992): 256. 
182
 Ibid., 250. 
183
 Wendt, Social Theory of International politics: 84ff. 
184
 Alexander E. Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," International 
Organization 41, no. 3 (1987): 361. 
185
 Carlsnaes, "The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis." Also, Wendt, "The Agent-
Structure Problem in International Relations Theory." 
69 
In separating the structural dimension from the unit level, Waltz, in the words of 
Wendt, "reifies" structure and ignores the effects of interaction.186 In fact, for Waltz, 
units and the interactions among them are treated as being the same thing. To unravel this 
issue, Wendt adds a third level of analysis between unit and structure - the "interaction 
level." By doing so, Wendt seeks to situate the "reductionist" charge within the unit level 
while keeping both the structural and the interaction level within the systemic camp. 
Thus, like Waltz, Wendt also discards theories that attempt to explain international 
politics only with reference to unit level factors, since this approach would exclude the 
possibility of a social analysis and treat states as being "autistic" as opposed to 
"social."187 But instead of putting the question in terms of either systemic or reductionist 
theories, he sees different kinds of systemic theories, one that he denominates "macro-
structural" and the other as "micro-structural." While macro-structural explanations, like 
the one offered by Waltz, would see the structure from the point of view of the system 
and would not seek to explain the behavior of individual actors, micro-structural 
explanations, by focusing on the interaction level, seeks to see structure from the point of 
view of agents. Recognizing the effects of agents on structure opens up the possibility of 
structural change through social interaction and the ensuing production and reproduction 
of identities and interests. Therefore, focusing exclusively on material elements means to 
lose sight of the ideational elements that are also important in international politics and 
1 RR 
that are a "continuing outcome of interaction, always in process." 
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics: 146. 
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If agents and structure both have constitutive effects on each other, but at the 
same time they are not the same thing, there remains the problem of how to treat them for 
1 8Q 
analytical purposes. In other words, if, agents "are inseparable from social structures" 
and, as James Rosenau remarks, they "are so inextricably linked, so endlessly interactive, 
that each is a product of the other," how can the analyst overcome this agent-structure 
challenge in order to identify dependent and independent variables and assess the effects 
that one may have over the other? The answer to this question begins by escaping from 
two kinds of methodological faults. One is to treat either the units or the system as 
completely autonomous, one having ascendancy over the other. This is the kind of 
problem that the neorealist approach falls upon. Nevertheless, there is a second 
methodological fault, which is treating both as "so inextricably linked" that it is 
impossible to separate the two and thus to evaluate how one can have influence upon the 
other. Both of these errors fall under what Margaret Archer termed the problem of 
"conflation." The author detected three kinds of conflation: downward conflation, 
upwards conflation, and central conflation. The first two mean treating structure or agents 
"as an epiphenomenon of the other."191 The problem with these approaches is that they 
lead to "rather crude unilateral accounts" of the social reality, therefore precluding any 
possibility of interplay between the two levels. Essentially, Archer adds, there is no 
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interplay but "one-way domination." 193 Conversely, the problem of central conflation 
means denying any autonomy to agents and structures, and treating them as "so tightly 
constitutive of one another" that it makes it impossible to separate the two 194 "and thus 
their influences upon one another cannot be unraveled." Hence, the major problem 
with central conflation is that even though it acknowledges the interplay between agents 
and structure that exists in the real world, "in the absence of any autonomy, it becomes 
impossible to examine their interplay"196 Since the "practical analyst of society needs to 
know not only what social reality is, but also how to begin to explain it" a methodology 
that addresses this concern becomes necessary in order to overcome "one-dimensional 
theorizing." 197 
The methodological solution for this dilemma is an alternative to conflation that 
Archer calls "analytical dualism." The key here is that even though the entities 
themselves cannot be clearly separated, they are "analytically separable" and thus their 
interplay can be effectively explored.198 This analytical distinction between agents and 
structures, as Archer explains, "allows for their independent variation and in turn makes 
the interface between them the site of intensive investigation." 199 In practical terms, 
when agents and structure are analytically separable, one can attempt to explain a given 
system in the present by moving one stage back in time and referring to past interaction 
within the previous system. A system in fact originates from agency, Archer remarks, but 
with time it acquires autonomy. Hence, we solve the dependent-independent variable 
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dilemma by analytically separating agents and structures, states and systems, and begin 
analysis by assuming that the system is, at one point in time, the independent variable 
that affects the behavior of actors, but as actors interact within this system they can 
eventually transform it, at which point the system itself is treated as a dependent variable. 
As a new system is in place, it can now be analytically treated as the independent variable 
once again, and so on. In other words, regional subsystems can be treated as the 
independent variable affecting interaction among states and foreign policy outcomes, but 
as states interact they can create new patterns and eventually transform the regional 
subsystem through foreign policy actions. 
The corollary of such approach is that the variable of time gains a central place in 
the theory, being "incorporated as a theoretical variable rather than simply as a medium 
in which events take place." 200 Without the centrality of time, "the problem of structure 
and agency can never be satisfactorily resolved" because it is only "by examining the 
interplay between them over time" that the analyst can link structure and agency "rather 
than sinking them one into the other."201 Likewise, if the variable time is not properly 
incorporated, system change "becomes an immanent but indeterminate possibility, 
equally likely or unlikely at any given moment and therefore unpredictable and 
• 709 
inexplicable." Archer presents a sequential process that she calls a "morphogenetic 
approach" which allows for the study of system formation and system change or stability. 
This approach is a three part cycle that begins with any given systemic configuration that 
can be termed "structural conditioning" of that conditions' action. The next step of the 
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cycle is the "social interaction" which happens within the systemic context and is a 
response to it. Finally, the last step is "elaboration," which is when the form, structure or 
state of the system changes. Accordingly, even though they cannot be separated in the 
real world, we can analytically separate system and agency, with system logically 
predating action which transforms it, and this interaction being followed by elaboration at 
which point a system change can be detected. 
In this sense, an approach that focuses on processes of interaction in which the 
variable time necessarily plays a central role is inevitably fated to address historical 
processes. As Wendt claimed, alongside a structural analysis, historical research is 
needed in order "to trace the causally significant sequence of choices and interactions 
which lead to particular events (and to the reproduction of social structure)." For this 
reason, this dissertation is organized along historical lines. The fact that this research 
covers a lengthy time period allows for a more accurate testing of the hypothesis that the 
United States has been an "absent empire" in South America. A focus on a narrower time 
span may be biased in the sense that it would reflect a particular configuration of forces 
and interactions that would not necessarily translate into a broader pattern, and could 
represent an important obstacle when attempting to make generalizations about larger 
trends. The problem of confining the research of regional subsystems to a relatively 
limited time span, as one scholar had observed in the seventies, was a characteristic of 
most of the early studies in this subject.2 4 In the case of South America, for instance, if 
the analysis is concentrated between the forties and the sixties, which was the apex of US 
influence in the region, one would be more tempted to rely on explanations making 
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reference to a homogeneous exercise of US hegemony and to blur the distinctions 
between South America and the rest of Latin America. 
THE SPATIAL DIMENSION 
It is crucial to address the particularity of using the methodological tools 
aforementioned to analyze not the international system as a whole but the regional 
subsystems within it. Such particularity resides in the fact that, in addition to the time 
dimension, a spatial dimension is added. To some extent, the application of this 
constructivist framework to specifically analyze regional subsystems is a novelty, since 
this literature remains largely concerned with the overall structure of the international 
system. Nevertheless, even though this is not clearly addressed in the constructivist 
literature, the notion that there are distinct regional subsystemic configurations within the 
international system is implicitly present, when, for example, Wendt talks about three 
different "cultures of anarchy": Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. The author not only 
locates these three different cultures temporally, with the first comprising much of 
international history, the second emerging during the seventeenth century, and the third 
during the late twentieth, but also spatially, since he explicitly locates the Lockean 
culture in Europe and the Kantian in the West. This effort mirrors the literature 
dealing with the transformation of the international system into an international society 
with shared norms and values. A leading scholar of the international society literature 
admits that the emergence of an international society is spatially uneven while, at the 
same time, he acknowledges the "difficult problems of the tracing of boundaries" of 
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 
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where modern international society begun. 20 Later, in an effort to bring the literature of 
international system and international society together, Buzan conceded that there was a 
need not only to establish the boundaries between international system and international 
society, that is, when an international system develops into an international society, "but 
also between societal subsystems existing within larger nonsocietal international systems 
(i.e., where two or more international societies exist contemporaneously)."207 Thus, for 
Buzan, "international societies, like international systems, will emerge initially within 
regional subsystems and only later develop at the level of the international system as a 
whole." Indeed, the whole notion of a "Westphalian" system of states was at some 
point obviously situated within a regional space. 
Similarly, the idea of a spatial variance within subsystems in the international 
system is also explicitly present in Hans Morgenthau's realism and latent in Waltz's 
neorealist theory. Morgenthau, whose Politics Among Nations is one of the most 
influential books in international relations theory, made explicit reference to the existence 
of regional subsystems operating under the mantle of the international system. After 
describing the functioning of the balance of power in international politics, Morgenthau 
warns that a balance of power is not "one single system comprehending all nations," but 
instead it is "composed of a number of subsystems that are interrelated with each other, 
but that maintain within themselves a balance of power of their own." Using the same 
terminology employed by the early scholarship of regional subsystems, Morgenthau 
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added that the relationship between the "local systems" and the "dominant system" was 
"one of subordination." 209 
Waltz was characteristically far less explicit than Morgenthau in admitting 
regional variance, but he acknowledges that even though his theory focused on the great 
powers, it "could also be applied to lesser states that interact insofar as their interactions 
910 
are insulated from the intervention of the great powers of a system." This affirmation 
was clearly meant to open up the possibility of a regional balance of power, which 
Morgenthau makes reference to and was eventually taken up by the neorealist literature. 
Indeed, a more recent study on the balance of power theory explicitly analyzed the global 
and the regional dimensions of balance of power, the latter meaning a clear stance that 
balance behavior "tends to be reflected at both systemic and subsystemic levels of 
international relations," which therefore means that balance of power theory "is also 
relevant to regional subsystems." The difference between global balancing and regional 
balancing would be the fact that, in accordance with the Waltzian condition of 
"insulated" interactions, "regional powers are less autonomous than great powers, and 
often it is the latter that undertake policies that preserve or upset regional balances." 211 
The spatial dimension is also evident when dealing with the emergence of the 
international system. Because Waltz's analysis is largely ahistorical, he does not have to 
deal with this question and seems to assume that the international system has always 
existed. When more historical approaches are used, it becomes obvious that one major 
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problem in the notion of the emergence of an international system is derived from its 
inherently Western or Euro-centric approach. Basically, there seems to be the assumption 
that once a regional European system was in place, it eventually became global and this is 
the international system as we know it. The problem is not specifically the assumption of 
the globalization of the European system, but the tacit assumption that at the same time 
the European system was globalized, there was no regional European subsystem left, at 
least for the purposes of relevant international relations analysis. Accordingly, the 
reasoning goes on to say that, after 1945, a global system emerged that included basically 
every nation on Earth that substituted the effects of formerly compartmentalized regional 
systems. Raymond Aron, for example - whose definition of an international system is 
based on the notion of political units "capable of being implicated in generalized war" -
919 
maintains that, consequently, there was no international system before 1945. Robert 
Gilpin recognizes that the notion of an "international system" is "ambiguous" and that 
before the modern era "there was no single international system, but rather several 
international systems."213 In sum, the reasoning seems to be based on the assumption that 
before 1945 there were several regional systems, but afterwards, one encompassing 
international system emerged concomitant with the disappearance of those regional 
systems. The obvious question is if regional patterns of interactions that were operative 
before 1945, in Europe and other regions, suddenly ceased to have any relevance for 
analytical purposes. The reason for this negligence is known - the claim that the study of 
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international politics should be "necessarily be based on the great powers." 214 Therefore, 
with the emergence of the bipolarity of the Cold War, the regional dynamics in Europe 
apparently lost analytical relevance. While it is perfectly understandable the 
methodological need to concentrate on great powers in order to explain broader patterns 
in international politics or, as Waltz put it, "a small number of big and important 
9 1 S 
things," it is also true that this approach misses a lot of important things of all sizes that 
happen below the great-power game. Regional patterns of interactions were important 
before and continued to be important after the emergence of the modern international 
system. 
THE REGIONAL SUBSYSTEM AS AN ADDITIONAL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS 
At the same time that neglecting the importance of regional patterns of interaction 
in the name of an overwhelming present international system seems analytically faulty, 
recognizing the existence of regional subsystems, with dynamics of their own, should not 
negate the effects of the broader international system on the behavior of states. This is 
why the prefix "sub" is used, since it purports to convey the idea that it is a system within 
a dominant system. With the emergence of the modern international system, previous 
compartmentalized regional systems became regional subsystems. It is not that the 
modern international system is the sum of the different regional subsystems, but they 
operate with diverse logics. The regional subsystems can be seen as "a complement to the 
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global nature of the overall international system." The way to interpret this analytically 
is to acknowledge the fact that systemic pressures under which states are subjected 
coexist alongside and interact with subsystemic pressures at the regional level. But while 
systemic pressures, as Waltz makes clear, explain more international politics than foreign 
policy, regional subsystemic pressures are more useful to explain the outcome of 
particular foreign policies followed by states.217 In other words, while, in accordance with 
neorealism, systemic pressures explain general patterns of state behavior in an anarchic 
environment, regional subsystemic pressures may be more helpful in explaining specific 
state actions and their outcomes without the necessity of having to make reference to unit 
attributes. 
The international system and the regional subsystems are not just two different 
levels of a system. They are, in fact, two different types of system. In his General 
Systems Theory, the biologist Ludwig von Bertanffy, considered a pioneer in applying the 
concept of system scientifically, described two kinds of systems: closed and open 
systems. The basic differentiation here is between the system and the environment in 
which the system exists. While open systems are characterized by the possibility of 
interaction between its internal elements and the environment, closed systems are a 
limited case wherein the environment has no significance, that is, the system does not 
interact with its environment.218 The international system, as Lake and Morgan remark, 
can be analytically treated as closed systems, whereas regional systems "are inherently 
open. The global system, other regional systems, and even 'outside' states can have a 
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major impact on a region. In open systems, the constraints and processes of the system 
are only partial explanations of behavior."219 This caveat is important in order to 
underscore the fact that the focus on regional subsystems should not be intended to offer 
a complete explanation for the behavior of states, since outside factors must be taken into 
account. Nonetheless, regional subsystemic dynamics should be understood as an 
important part of the analysis. 
Moreover, the fact that the international system is a closed system while regional 
subsystems are open generates different possibilities for research. If the international 
system comprises the total set of interactions across the globe, the notion of an 
environment in which the international system exists is problematic. Fred Riggs, for 
example, characterized the international system as "a power structure in which the weight 
of external pressures approaches the vanishing point," which is equivalent to saying that 
it is a system with no environment. Rosenau attempted to solve this issue by making a 
distinction between political and non-political forms of interaction, the latter comprising 
the environment of the "international political system."221 Gilpin refers to the 
"environmental conditions" of the international system when describing things such as 
economic factors and military and transportation technologies which are directly 
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connected to the possibility of system change. For Waltz, there should be a 
differentiation between the "environment of states," which would be the international 
9 9 ^ 
system, and the "environment of the system." Waltz rejects the use of the term 
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"environment" to refer to the international system and uses instead the notion of 
structure. The problems in using the notion of environment to refer to international 
systems are so evident that in a book dedicated to the application of this concept to the 
study of international politics, Harold and Margaret Sprout claimed that the solution 
should be dropping the concept altogether to describe the international system.225 On the 
other hand, since regional subsystems are open systems, the notion of an external 
environment seems to make more sense and the interaction between the subsystem and 
their environment can be more easily detected. As a matter of fact, one could conceive of 
the environment of regional subsystems as being the international system as well as other 
subsystems. The regional subsystems themselves constitute what Mouritzen called the 
• 996 
"salient environment" for the states members of the subsystem. 
Even though the international system and the regional subsystems consist of 
different types of systems, the variance that is being explained by reference to the 
regional subsystems is indeed systemic, but it relates to what was referred to above as the 
interaction level more than to the structural level. To use Wendt's terminology, the 
regional subsystems approach is inherently "micro-structural" rather than "macro-
structural." While the first sees structure from the point of view of agents, and thus 
patterns of interactions can be uncovered, the second sees it from the point of view of the 
system. Like the unit level, the interaction level explains foreign policy rather than 
international politics, but unlike the unit level, the interaction level incorporates a 
systemic dimension. Assuming the relevance of regional subsystems as an analytical tool 
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involves the acknowledgment that there are variances in the pattern of interactions among 
states along spatial lines, which implicates in tandem, as mentioned earlier, the 
acknowledgment of the importance of space, or of geography and territoriality in the 
realm of international relations. While the focus given on patterns of interactions means a 
shift away from mainstream neorealism, the emphasis given on territoriality means a 
similar shift away from some of the constructivist literature. The notion of regional 
subsystem used here is thus one that emphasizes concomitantly the importance of 
material conditions and territoriality as well as the importance of ideational conditions. 
From the point of view of a regional subsystemic approach, geographic location is 
considered to be the material base that influences - but do not determine - the production 
and reproduction of patterns of interactions. Geography is then one "independently 
• 99R 
existing physical reality" that regulates interaction among states. In a certain sense, 
this means bringing together the ontological dispute between the neorealist literature with 
its stress on material structures and the constructivist literature with its stress on social 
structures. This double focus on interactions and territory also makes clear why the 
concept of regional subsystem is well-suited for the purposes of this research. The term 
region is more static as it implies a focus on geography and does not highlight the notion 
of patterns of interaction. On the other hand, using just the term subsystem without any 
qualifier would be incomplete since other criteria for the identification of subsystems can 
be devised, as shown at the beginning of this chapter. Therefore, the term regional 
subsystem, by underlining the effects of space on the interactions in the international 
level, is compatible with the objectives of this research. As already mentioned, the 
literature on international relations has focused on either domestic or systemic structures 
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as the main variables affecting interests of states, thus neglecting the role of regional 
subsystemic structures. This is one important gap that this research intends to fill. 
Accordingly, the focus on regional subsystems means the introduction of an 
additional level of analysis between the nation-state and the international system, which 
constitutes the traditional way of thinking in international relations. As Singer described, 
the level-of-analysis problem is a central conceptual issue to be resolved by any research 
• 99Q 
in the discipline. Singer argued that choosing each level entails advantages and 
disadvantages. Taking the international system as a level of analysis means the analyst 
will be able to offer a comprehensive approach at the cost of sacrificing a more detailed 
description, whereas taking the nation state as the level of analysis would entail the 
opposite problem. Moreover, the international-system-as-level-of-analysis approach 
usually results in an "inaccurate homogenization" of subsystemic actors, while the 
nation-state-as as-level-of-analysis results in "a marked exaggeration" of their 
9^0 
differences. In one well-known attempt to synthesize these two levels, Robert Putnam 
argued that international relations should be understood as a "two-level game" where 
both international and domestic factors interact to produce policy outcomes, and therefore 
every policy-maker should deal with pressures emanating from both sides.231 While the 
boundaries of domestic politics can be cleared defined, it is not clear what would 
constitute the international level in Putnam's analysis. If it consists of "the totality of 
interactions which take place within the system and its environment", as Singer describes 
Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations." 
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the international level, then any analysis of specific foreign policy outcomes would 
constitute a herculean task. One way of overcoming this complexity is considering the 
international level itself as a two-level game: global and regional. The regional subsystem 
as level of analysis allows the student to concentrate on interactions restricted in space, 
instead of having to consider the totality of interactions comprising the international 
system. When regional subsystems are brought to the picture, the analytical toolbox at the 
disposal of the analyst increases by one additional level, thus converting the study of 
international politics into a "three-level game." 
In the same way that taking the nation state as level of analysis provides 
explanations for foreign policy behavior that may be different than the one offered by the 
international system as the level of analysis, focusing on regional subsystems may also 
produce specific sets of explanations as well as generate distinct research questions. For 
example, in his celebrated study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham Allison looks into 
the nation state to provide three conceptual models for the actions of governments.233 He 
is interested in answering, for example, why the Soviet Union decided to place missiles in 
Cuba and why the United States chose to respond with a blockade. He explains these 
actions through three different models he presents - the rational actor model, the 
organizational behavior model, and the governmental politics model, all of them of little 
or no consideration to systemic pressures at work outside the nation state or beyond the 
scope of US-Soviet bilateral relations. This absence may be explained by Allison's 
conception of international relations as a mere "overlap" of "intra-national games."234 On 
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the other hand, to remain with the same example, a systemic approach to the Cuban 
Missile Crisis would probably refer to US and Soviet preoccupations with the global 
balance of power of the Cold War in order to explain their respective actions. This 
systemic approach would likely be unable to answer why the United States chose to 
respond with a blockade rather than other options, but would explain the US concerns 
with the Soviet action in the first place. A regional subsystemic approach would probably 
follow the same line of reasoning as the systemic one, but, in order to understand how 
regional subsystemic pressures work, one would have to ask what would US actions and 
ensuing outcomes would be demonstrated if the missiles been placed a few miles away, 
let's say, in Venezuela. Would other actors, like Brazil, weigh in, and would that affect 
the outcome in any way? Obviously, the answer to this question is only speculative, but 
what we know is that both the nation state and the international system as level-of-
analysis are largely unable to offer a complete account for this putative regional variance. 
Likewise, the same is true in explaining foreign policies of South American states in 
relation to the United States. If one takes the systemic approach, the explanations for the 
behavior of states in South America would be based on concepts such as US hegemony 
and the presumed effects of it, whereas the regional subsystemic approach that considers 
South America as a distinct subsystem would include other notions, such as the 
functioning of a regional balance of power and the role of regional powers. 
One important way to explore what possible explanations the regional 
subsystemic point of view could offer is by looking to the historical record. This 
dissertation will look at different historical periods in order to argue that the analytical 
framework offered by the regional subsystemic approach illuminates important aspects of 
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United States-South America relations that are obscured by alternative outlooks 
traditionally used to study that relationship. For example, if the traditional systemic 
approach concludes that the Monroe Doctrine was a relatively homogenous policy 
adopted for all Latin America, the regional subsystemic alternative reevaluates and 
reinterprets the true scope and actual outcome of the this policy. If traditional systemic 
approaches understand US actions in Chile in the sixties and seventies as following the 
same pattern of intervention in the rest Latin America during the Cold War, the regional 
subsystemic alternative unveils the profound differences in the Chilean case. If traditional 
systemic approaches saw the launch of the Free Trade Areas of the Americas as the 
confirmation of US global preponderance in the nineties, with which all Latin America 
would be inevitably fated to go along given the disparities in power, the subsystemic 
alternative helps to explain its ultimate outcome. The case studies selected for this 
dissertation will explore each of these three historical examples. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE SOUTH AMERICAN REGIONAL SUBSYSTEM 
As seen in the previous chapter, there are only two sufficient and necessary 
variables needed to identify a regional subsystem: geography and patterns of interactions. 
Both of these criteria justify the existence of two relevant regional subsystems in the so-
called "Western Hemisphere" - a South American and a North American subsystem. 
This chapter makes the case for the existence of a distinctive South American subsystem 
based on the criteria established earlier. It demonstrates that, in addition to geography, 
there is a pattern of conflict and cooperation in South America that is distinct from the 
rest of Latin America. The chapter also addresses the usual explanations for US relative 
absence in South America and explores why they do not provide a completely 
satisfactory explanation for this fact. Finally, by stressing the role of Brazil in the South 
American subsystem, this chapter lays out the framework for the subsequent case studies 
by arguing that Brazil is a status quo regional power that has sought to affect the structure 
of costs and benefits of US involvement in that regional subsystem. 
THE CASE FOR A SOUTH AMERICAN SUBSYSTEM 
The division between a North and a South American continent is part of the 
"standard seven-part continental scheme employed in the United States," 5 which would 
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immediately provide evidence that the geographic criterion for the establishment of a 
regional subsystem is fulfilled. But dividing and labeling the globe into continents 
implies a great deal of arbitrariness, and in much of Latin America, for example, North 
and South America are grouped as one "American" continent, which was indeed the view 
prevalent among geographers until the nineteenth century.236 In any case, even though 
there is a degree of arbitrariness in any geographic division, from the point of view of a 
pure spatial analysis, when one looks at "the massive triangles of North and South 
America, tenuously linked by the Panamanian isthmus,"2 7 it becomes clear that if one 
intends to divide the Americas in two parts, common sense would advise the line to be 
drawn at the Panamanian isthmus rather than at the Rio Grande. In fact, in a study of 
South American geopolitics, Philip Kelly described North America and South America as 
"two largely disconnected American continents" which are "widened by great distances, 
• 9^8 
sometimes harsh climates and topographies." Ronald Steel notices that "New York is 
closer to Paris than it is to Lima; closer to Athens than to Buenos Aires. Seattle is nearer 
to Tokyo than it is to Santiago. Geographically, most of South America might as well be 
in another hemisphere, which indeed it is." In sum, this brief geographical digression 
is just to make obvious that if the only criterion used to divide the Americas was 
geographic proximity, the notion of Latin America would probably not subsist. 
What this discussion is meant to make clear is that the concept of Latin America 
is not based on spatial geographical considerations - even though it is often used as a 




 Ibid., 2. 
2J8
 Philip Kelly, Checkerboards & Shatterbelts: The Geopolitics of South America (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1997), 161. 
239 Ronald Steel, Pax Americana (New York: Viking Press, 1970), 186. 
89 
research to challenge the assumption of cultural homogeneity in Latin America, but 
rather to present a critique of the use of cultural variables as the primary factor for 
regional classification.240 If culture is assumed to be the central variable for the 
identification of regions for the purposes of international relations analysis, several - if 
not all - other conventional regions of the world would have to be reclassified. 
Additionally, a case would have to be made as to what cultural aspects matter the most 
for the purposes of identification of regional subsystems. If it is assumed to be, for 
example, religion and language, then it makes as much sense to disassociate the United 
States from Mexico as it makes disassociating France from England, Egypt from Israel, 
and India from Pakistan and locating them in different regional subsystems. Nevertheless, 
very few international relations scholars would make the case that it is practically and 
analytically useful to do so. In fact, the implicit reason why it would not be helpful to do 
so is exactly because France and England, Egypt and Israel, and India and Pakistan are 
proximate and interacting states and this is what really matters when analyzing their 
international relations. 
Nevertheless, some would say that even though it is proper to conclude that Latin 
America does not fit the geographic criterion, it might very well suit the criterion of 
patterns of interaction. Before evaluating this claim, it is necessary to clarify the idea of 
patterns of interaction. In its broader sense, interaction is understood as being the result of 
reciprocal responses of action and reaction. In international relations, forms of 
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interaction may include, for example, diplomatic, political, social, economic, cultural, 
949 • 
and personal interactions. Likewise, the instruments of interaction can be diplomatic, 
psychological, cultural, economic, or military. These interactions can range in a 
spectrum from conflictual to cooperative. Conflictual interactions include events such as 
war, intervention, blockade, clandestine actions, embargoes, covert intelligence activities, 
etc. Cooperative interactions consist of, for example, trade, capital investment, aid, 
military grant, arms transfers, personnel exchanges, etc. These different interactions 
"may exhibit regularities, or patterns, in space and through time, both in the foreign 
policies of particular states and in political relations of two or three or many states." 245 
Therefore, by examining the spectrum of interactions through space and time in a given 
area of the world, certain regularities may be uncovered and general patterns can be 
identified. Some states will exhibit a higher degree of interactions with particular states in 
comparison with others. More often than not, neighboring states will tend to exhibit a 
relatively high degree of interaction, which is why geography matters. This relatively 
high degree of interaction is likely to create all sorts of interdependencies among states. 
States are considered to be interdependent "when the outcome of an interaction for each 
depends on the choices of the others."246 For example, states have security 
interdependence when they are linked "together sufficiently closely that their securities 
cannot be considered separate from each other." 247 In contrast, the lower the degree or 
intensity of interaction, the lower the interdependence, the extreme case being 
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indifference. A regional subsystem is then characterized by a higher degree of interaction 
- and thus of interdependence - among the states in the subsystem relative to states 
outside the subsystem. Detecting these patterns of interaction across space and time helps 
the analyst to draw the boundaries of different regional subsystems. 
Yet the issue remains of how to operationalize these patterns of interactions in 
order to assess the degree of interactions and locate them within the spectrum varying 
from intense contacts, or interdependence, to infrequent contacts, or indifference. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, this is an obviously difficult task that apparently 
has not been completely resolved by the literature. Among the few who present some 
evidence of interaction patterns, the main shortcoming is focusing only on a narrow 
aspect of interactions. For example, Haas and Lemke concentrate on the military aspect, 
Buzan and Waever on security patterns, and Wallace on international organizations 
membership. This research does not intend to dwell upon interaction in order to 
unravel this operationalization issue because our main concern is not the analysis of the 
South American subsystem per se, but how it interacts with and affects the outcomes of 
US foreign policy. In any case, a few remarks must be made in order to make the case for 
our assumption of the existence of a South American subsystem in terms of patterns of 
interaction. Along with these remarks, a suggestion on how to operationalize patterns of 
interaction will be proposed. 
The first prerequisite for operationalizing patterns of interactions is that it should 
be made in such a way as to cover at least one aspect of each end of the interaction 
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spectrum, which means including variables that account for both conflict and 
cooperation. Moreover, it would be useful to include different forms and instruments of 
interaction, such as economic, military, and political. It would also be noteworthy if the 
data required were easily available in order to make this operationalization effort 
attainable. Taking into consideration these qualifications, three variables could be used in 
order to evaluate patterns of interactions: wars and/or armed conflicts, trade, and regional 
organizations. Although far from reflecting all possibilities of interaction among states, 
these three variables characterize three important kinds of interstate interaction within the 
range between conflict and cooperation. Wars and armed conflicts represent conflictual 
interactions, while trade and regional organizations correspond to cooperative 
interactions. Moreover, these three variables cover military, economic, and political 
instruments and forms of interaction. Finally, data collection for these variables is readily 
available. 
An additional advantage of using the three variables suggested above is that they 
have gone through extensive examination throughout the years, and therefore there is 
currently little significant debate in regards to definitional issues. Interstate war and 
armed conflicts are the classic object of international relations. Although determining the 
point in which a conflict becomes a war is far from being an uncomplicated task, scholars 
at least since the late sixties seem to agree on the 1,000 battle-connected deaths 
threshold.249 Therefore, a war can be defined as comprising "sustained military hostilities 
between the regular armed forces of two or more states, resulting in 1,000 or more battle 
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fatalities." An armed conflict can be understood in the current parlance as a 
"militarized interstate dispute" short of war and it has been defined as "a set of 
interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of 
military force, or actual uses of military force." Therefore, when a militarized interstate 
dispute results in more than 1,000 battle-connected deaths, it can technically be 
considered a war. The expectation of this research is that any detailed examination of 
militarized interstate disputes and wars in the Americas would probably reveal a pattern 
following the subsystemic perspective explored here. 
The trade variable is pretty straightforward, and in fact, within the literature on 
interdependence, trade has been used almost as a synonymous with interdependence, or at 
least economic interdependence, with occasional addition of capital flows as a 
supplementary variable.252 One could begin, for example, by looking at individual 
countries and assessing what percentage of the value of their imports and exports comes 
from each of the subsystems in the Americas. In any case, this research would expect that 
an analysis of trade patterns would reveal a higher concentration of trade within each of 
the subsystems in the Americas, rather than a coherent Latin American pattern of trade. 
Finally, membership in regional organizations is a classic measure of the level of 
regional integration and it has been widely used in the literature on regionalism.253 One 
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possible good criterion for selecting the organizations for purposes of identifying patterns 
of interaction in the Americas could be those in which at least two countries in the 
Western Hemisphere participate. Counting the number and membership of regional 
organizations is a quantitative endeavor that can be accomplished without much 
complication. However, it would be relevant if a qualitative analysis was also pursued, 
that is, one that would assess the trajectories and the actual effects of each of these 
organizations. Mentioning the moribund Latin American Parliament as a Latin American 
organization on par with, for instance, Mercosur or CACM, means ignoring the profound 
differences in substance and importance between these institutions. Therefore, alongside 
an investigation of the number and geographic concentration of the regional 
organizations in the Western Hemisphere, an analysis of their quality would be pertinent. 
This research would expect that the number and relevance of regional organizations in 
the Americas would reveal the existence of a South American regional subsystemic 
pattern that would be more salient than a supposed Latin American pattern. 
As mentioned, it is not the aim of this research to conduct an extensive 
investigation of patterns of interaction in the Americas, but, by using the approach 
suggested above, we can at least indicate evidence that there are two different patterns in 
Latin America which justify treating it as two distinct regional subsystems. A number of 
authors have made mention to wars in Latin America to justify patterns of interaction at 
the conflictual end of the interaction spectrum. Cantori and Spiegel, for example, argue 
that what they identify as the Latin American subsystem was at that time characterized by 
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a low level of conflict, but they except the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia, as 
well as "a variety of disputes which include Peru vs. Ecuador, Chile vs. Peru and Bolivia, 
Argentina vs. Chile, and Argentina vs. Brazil."254 The fact that all exceptions mentioned 
by the authors are in South America seems to have escaped their analysis. Atkins 
mentions a number of "inter-Latin American" disputes and conflicts to express 
conflictual patterns of interaction and makes reference to the Chaco War, conflicts 
between Peru and Ecuador, Colombia and Peru, Ecuador and Peru, and Argentina and 
Chile. It is true that, contrary to Cantori and Spiegel, he at least mentions other conflicts 
outside South America, such as disputes between Haiti and Dominican Republic in the 
thirties and the war between El Salvador and Honduras in the sixties, as well as a variety 
9SS 
of "Central American conflicts" during the eighties. Similarly, Robert Burr talks about 
"intra-Latin American rivalries" adding that "above all, the Latin American nations are 
concerned with rivalries among themselves." He mentions rivalries between Argentina 
and Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, Chile, Peru and Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, 
Dominican Republic and Haiti, Guatemala and other Central American countries, and 
9S6 
Mexico and Guatemala. What becomes obvious from this picture is that what is 
termed by these authors as "inter-Latin American" conflicts are not exactly inter-Latin 
American, but inter-South American, inter-Caribbean, or inter-Central American. This is 
because there is no way to provide evidence that there is a pattern of conflict in Latin 
America; instead, the patterns of conflict have followed the subsystemic division 
proposed here. The obvious reason for this pattern is that in most of these conflicts -
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particularly in South America - there was some kind of territorial dispute involved. This 
is an unquestionable example of geographical proximity affecting patterns of interaction 
and of the fact that geography is the main factor contributing to the durability of regional 
subsystems. 
Patterns of conflict are especially important because they determine one key 
systemic characteristic: because a system is defined by the interaction among the units, a 
change in one unit tends to cause changes in others. This means, for example, that an 
arms race caused by higher defense spending in one state of the subsystem that is not a 
global power tends to be confined within the regional subsystem. If Honduras suddenly 
decided to acquire new weapons to modernize its army, it is conceivable that Bolivia or 
Argentina would not be as concerned as El Salvador or Nicaragua, for example. As a 
matter of fact, in 2007, there were reports about an arms race in South America that did 
not spill over to other places in Latin America. At the same time Venezuela started 
acquiring military equipment from Russia, Brazil announced an increase in defense 
9S7 
spending. When Chile started upgrading its armed forces, Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina 
reacted.258 This example shows clearly that, as Robert Pastor noticed, the "principal 
geopolitical concerns" of the countries in the South American subsystem "are with each 
other. Many have fought each other; some have lost territory to another." 5 In fact, one 
scholar examined the works of sixteen South American writers in the field of geopolitics 
and concluded that one common theme among them was that "their geopolitics pertain to 
257
 Andrew Downie, "A South American Arms Race?," Time, December 21, 2007. 
258
 Alex Sanchez, "Chile's Aggressive Military Arm Purchases Are Ruffling the Region, Alarming in 
Particular Bolivia, Peru and Argentina," Council on Hemispheric Affairs, August 7, 2007. 
http://www.coha.org/chile%E2%80%99s-aggressive-military-arm-purchases-is-ruffling-the-region-
alarming-in-particular-bolivia-peru-and-argentina/ (accessed September 17, 2010). 
2
 Robert A. Pastor, Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean, Princeton 
Studies in International History and Politics. (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 24. 
97 
960 
South American regional and subregional affairs." This makes evident the 
interdependence aspect that is characteristic of a regional subsystem. 
But demonstrating the absence of any serious conflict that is truly "inter-Latin 
American" is a relatively straightforward and uncomplicated task that, once examined 
with more careful attention, becomes self-evident. Nevertheless, patterns of trade could 
reveal a different picture. A comprehensive investigation of the patterns of trade would 
require looking at every individual country and assessing the percentage of exports and 
imports with every other country in the hemisphere across a reasonably long period of 
time. Although this investigation is beyond the scope of the present dissertation, evidence 
suggested by other studies seems to indicate that if this task was to be completed, it 
would reinforce the notion of two different subsystems in the Americas and these would 
not be Latin America and North America, but South America and North America. For 
example, in his classificatory effort in the seventies to identify regions, Russet, when 
using only the criterion of economic interdependence based on trade, concluded for the 
existence of a South American and a North/Central American region. Indeed, he observed 
that the major discrepancy in the western hemisphere was on trade "where the 
hemisphere was split into two components, a North and Central American aggregate, and 
one for South America."261 Because Russet's book was published in 1975, the data he 
used went only up until the seventies. Later, Gordon Mace and Louis Belanger examined 
trade patterns in the western hemisphere using data from 1975 to 1994. Using a variety 
of statistical tools, the authors concluded that the "pattern clearly reveals the relative 
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weakness of the Southern Cone's relationship with North America, as well as its 
969 
remarkable lack of economic ties with Central America and the Caribbean." 
Additionally, when looking at the four last years of their data, they detected a pattern 
showing that "the Southern Cone is developing a distinct regional trading structure" and 
that the "Southern Cone's integration into the region as a whole is relatively weak." 2 3 
Similarly, Jeffrey Schott, when analyzing trade patterns in the Americas, observed that 
"[t]he trade profiles of Western Hemisphere countries differ markedly from one side of 
the equator to the other," with the countries in the northern half of the hemisphere 
generally far more dependent on the United States. Mace and Belanger's conclusion is 
particularly relevant for the purposes of this research and deserves to be quoted in full. 
They see 
a growing concentration of commercial relations around two main centers: In the 
northern part of the hemisphere, Canada, Mexico, and the countries of Central 
America and the Caribbean are coalescing around the United States, which acts as 
the central magnet. A similar situation is developing in South America around the 
96S 
Brazil-Argentina axis. 
For the authors, the future of any hemispheric integration scheme will be 
determined by how these two centers interact. Chapter 7 of this dissertation will explore 
the significance of this notion in more detail. 
Beyond conflictual relations and trade patterns, the separation between the South 
American subsystem and the North American subsystem can also be demonstrated in 
political terms. Traditional analyses of the emergence of the so called Inter-American 
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System that culminated with the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS) 
begin by distinguishing two phases: before and after 1889.266 The reason is that only after 
1889, with the First Pan-American Conference, the conferences summoned were truly 
inter-American in the sense of including most Latin American countries and the United 
States. Before that year, there were four Hispano-American conferences - thus with 
limited participation and not including both the United States and Brazil - with few 
concrete results: in 1826, 1847, 1856, and 1864. The usual historiography informs that 
these first conferences helped to establish the "fundamental rules of national behavior 
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destined later to become basic features of inter-American cooperation," thus giving 
the impression that the Inter-American system was the result of the absorption by the 
United States of patterns of interaction that had been previously established among Latin 
American states. However, closer examination again indicates the existence of two 
regional subsystems from the political interaction point of view, even at that early stage. 
For example, by focusing on the Hispano-American conferences, these analyses overlook 
that, in 1888, one year before the First Pan-American Conference, Argentina and 
Uruguay summoned a "South American Congress of International Private Law" in 
Montevideo which was attended also by Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, and Chile. 
Commenting on the fact that the conference included only South American states, the 
Foreign Minister of Argentina justified it on the basis of "their close bonds of political 
and commercial interests and even of neighborliness. The other states of North and 
Central America either would not come or would come late, and perhaps one of them 
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would assume a disturbing role of supremacy." This short sentence expressed the two 
main components of the South American subsystem - distinct patterns of interaction 
given especially their "neighborliness," and a certain wariness regarding the potential 
influence of the United States in the region. 
Like most analyses on the emergence of the Inter-American System, those who 
concentrate on the establishment of regional institutions to demonstrate the level of 
political interaction in Latin America often overlook the existence of a double pattern. 
Cantori and Spiegel claim that "Latin American relations are characterized by 
cooperation of the alliance variety, as is evidenced in LAFTA and the Central American 
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Common Market." Again, what the authors present as evidence of a Latin American 
subsystem actually confirms the notion of two different subsystems, the first organization 
basically a very limited South American scheme of integration that included Mexico, 
while the second was exclusively Central American. To reinforce the notion of Latin 
American political cohesiveness, the authors add that Latin American leaders had "met 
with President Johnson at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in April 1967 and declared their 
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intention to create a region-wide Common Market by 1985." While this meeting 
actually took place, when one goes beyond a declaration of intentions and examines what 
actually happened afterwards, one will again detect that regional subsystemic pressures 
seem to have contributed to keep South America a separate subsystem. Following the 
meeting with President Johnson, Central American states issued a separate invitation to 
the Unites States for a "Central American Summit Conference," and what actually 
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happened in 1985 was the initial push for the creation of a Southern Common Market, 
when Brazil and Argentina signed a cooperation agreement that would eventually 
develop into the Mercosur. Indeed, as Atkins observed, the "actual practice of Latin 
971 
American, integration favored the subregional approaches." The author mentions 
several integration schemes from the fifties to the nineties, all basically organized around 
979 
two areas: "Circum-Caribbean" and "South American." It is curious, though, to notice 
that Atkins refers to NAFTA - the North American Free Trade Area - as a "hemispheric" 
97"5 
arrangement, even though it is clearly a North American arrangement. However, as 
some authors have remarked, NAFTA in North America and Mercosur in South America 
can actually be seen as "competing models" of integration in the hemisphere. 
Therefore, evidence indicates that in all three variables considered here to 
measure interaction among states, it is possible to detect two different patterns of 
interaction in the region referred as Latin America. From this point of view, it makes 
little sense to think about a Latin American subsystem, since Latin America, as a 
Brazilian scholar has recently put it, is "separated not only by the Panama Canal, but it is 
actually divided by divergent interests, economic links, and conflicting geopolitical 
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factors." On the other hand, by any criterion of actual interactions, Mexico, for 
example, "would appear to be entirely North American."276 The same would also be true 
for Central American and Caribbean states. Nevertheless, by focusing on other variables, 
a significant portion of scholarship has given little attention to the actual patterns of 
interaction in the Americas, which has led to frequent errors of judgment, analyses, and 
policies. It is true that when studies focusing on regions resurfaced after the Cold War, 
the analytical disadvantages of treating Latin America as a coherent unit of analysis 
became more evident, as shown in chapter 2. Even though there seems to currently be a 
more widespread acceptance that South America comprises a distinct subsystem, its 
implications have to be considered more deeply than has been the case thus far. 
Acknowledging that there are analytical and empirical grounds to treat South America as 
a distinct regional subsystem in its own right opens up unique possibilities for research 
that are usually neglect by the customary approaches to studying international politics of 
Latin America. 
Obviously, drawing precise boundaries of a regional subsystem just on the basis 
of geography and patterns of interaction may be a problematic task, since not every state 
in a given regional subsystem may conform to these patterns. In South America, some 
borderline cases would include Venezuela and Colombia, for example. Because of their 
geographic position, these countries can be considered as having a "dual nature of being 
Moniz Bandeira, "O Brasil como potencia regional e a importancia estrategica da America do Sul na sua 
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both Caribbean and South American."277 This is also reflected by their patterns of 
interaction, particularly in regards to their trade profiles. Nevertheless, especially after the 
second half of the twentieth century, they can be increasingly considered part of the 
South American subsystem because of the main factor that contributes to hold the 
subsystem together - the role of Brazil. 
BRAZIL AND THE SOUTH AMERICAN SUBSYSTEM 
Comprising about half of South America's territory, GDP, and population, 
sharing borders with every South American country except Ecuador and Chile, and 
having the second largest economy of the Americas, Brazil stands out as the backbone of 
the South American regional subsystem and is the key country for explaining it. Because 
of its size, population, and economy, Brazil is the country with the greatest capability of 
affecting patterns of interaction in the region. It also is the country that connects the "hard 
core" of South America - the Southern Cone - with the northern part of the continent, 
thus giving a certain level of coherence to the subsystem. Brazil connects the La Plata, 
the Andes and the Amazon region, and it could hardly be ignored by any South American 
country. This combination of factors means that "Brazil's looming, at times threatening, 
presence seems to imprint strongly on the foreign policy of the other republics" in South 
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America. As Buzan and Waever argue, even though the differences between the 
southern and the northern part of South America could be "striking enough to justify 
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seeing them as distinct subcomplexes, Brazil remains the linchpin that holds the South 
97Q 
American" regional subsystem together. 
This is why it is justified to include the northern countries of South America in 
the regional subsystem, particularly after the seventies when Brazil began to be more 
concerned about developing and populating its northern part. A clear example of Brazil's 
"looming" presence imprinting on the foreign policy of northern South American states 
was the fact that, by the early seventies, when Brazil's military government had laid 
down the plans to develop the Amazon region, the Venezuelan president visited six 
countries in South America and suggested a Spanish-American alliance against 
"Brazilian expansionism" at the same time he initiated efforts to develop Venezuela's 
southern region as a response. 280 Likewise, the 1969 Andean Pact, signed by Bolivia, 
Chile, Ecuador, and Colombia, and joined by Venezuela in 1973, was motivated in part 
981 
by a desire "to counter growing Brazilian power" in the region. In 1976, Brazil 
proposed a treaty of cooperation with the members of the Andean pact as an effort "to 
989 
reduce fears of Brazilian imperialism," which were "particularly [evident in] Peru and 
Venezuela." The Amazon Pact was finally signed in 1978 after Venezuelans and 
984 
Peruvians were reassured of the inexistence of "Brazil's expansionist intentions." In 
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fact, as John Martz argues, Venezuela has historically been interested in Central America 
and the Caribbean, especially because of economic interests, but "territorial integrity and 
national security necessarily lie at the core of foreign policy interests," thus the 
importance of neighboring South American countries of Brazil, Guyana, and Colombia in 
98S 
the formulation of its foreign policy. Obviously, the opposite is also true. For example, 
in its annual report of 1956, the Brazilian army noted that "the impetuous development of 
Venezuela requires special attention" adding that the possibility that Venezuela would 
986 
become a military power should "demand closer vigilance." 
The focus on Brazil for the purposes of studying the South American regional 
subsystem is also justified for theoretical reasons. If the traditional systemic approach to 
international relations should be "necessarily based on the great powers," the regional 
subsystemic approach should likewise be based on the regional powers. According to 
Robert Gilpin, the international system's focus on the major powers is justified because 
the system generally tends to reflect the interests of the most powerful actors, which have 
"determined the patterns of international interactions and established the rules of the 
system." 288 In a passage that could be better applied to the regional subsystemic than to 
the international systemic approach that he makes the case for, Gilpin argued that: 
The boundaries of the system are defined by the area over which great powers 
seek to exert control and influence [...] geographic boundaries do matter, in that 
they affect which other actors and considerations a state must take into account in 
the formulation of its foreign policy. 289 
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This same theoretical position generally used to analyze the international system 
can be applied to regional subsystems. As Donald Hellman remarked: 
The regional subsystem is seen not only in terms of its relationships to the global 
system, and the local (regional) patterns of international politics, involving 
conflict as well as cooperation, but in terms of the actions and capabilities of the 
major regional powers. 
Hence, it is unlikely that any analysis of the South American regional subsystem 
that neglects the role of Brazil will be entirely successful. The history of South America 
also shows that Argentina and Chile could play the role of regional leaders. Contrary to 
Brazil, these countries are limited by their geographic position which tended to confine 
their concerns to a more restricted area. Recognizing the role of Brazil as the key to 
understanding the South American subsystem does not imply considering Brazil as a 
regional hegemon with power to dictate the course of the subsystem as it pleases. In fact, 
as David Myers observed, for reasons of domestic and regional considerations, "Brazil is 
far from being a regional hegemon." But Brazil is and has consistently been a regional 
power, and even if only because of its size, population, and geographic circumstance, this 
is a fact to be taken into consideration by the other states' foreign policies. Likewise, 
Brazil's foreign policy choices and behavior are definitely important to determine the 
dynamics of the subsystem. "A stable Brazil tends to stabilize the continent," writes 
Kelly, and any radical transformation of Brazil, such as breaking up in smaller 
909 
independent countries, would radically transform the South American subsystem. 
Correspondingly, had Brazil, like the Spanish-American republics, had its territory 
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fragmented when obtaining its independence from Portugal, the history of the South 
American subsystem would most likely be considerably different. 
A central characteristic of the South American regional subsystem is that not only 
must the other states of South American necessarily take Brazil into consideration in 
matters of conflict and cooperation, but also, as will be explored later, Brazil has 
historically considered South America as its privileged area of influence. This assumption 
by Brazilian policymakers is one key factor determining the boundaries of the subsystem. 
If the boundaries of the international system, as Gilpin argues, can essentially be "defined 
by the area over which great powers seek to exert control and influence," the same 
should be true for the boundaries of a regional subsystem, which could be then defined by 
the area over which regional powers seek to exert influence. According to Moniz 
Bandeira, it is the "geopolitical" notion of South America that has effectively guided the 
foreign policy of Brazil, and not the "ethnic" concept of Latin America, which "is not 
consistent with its actual economic, political, and geopolitical interests." 294 For this 
reason, a former Brazilian foreign minister mentioned "the South American component" 
as a central aspect of Brazil's "international identity." Thus, if US policymakers have 
occasionally seen the whole of Latin America as its sphere of influence, their Brazilian 
counterparts have seen consistently throughout history the hemisphere's two halves in a 
different way - a South American half, where Brazil would strive to exert influence, and 
a North American half that constituted the sphere of influence of the United States in 
which Brazil would thus abstain to be seriously involved. By the same token, Brazil 
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would attempt to limit US influence in South America. Because of the centrality of this 
argument for the present research, I will return to it later in this dissertation. 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOUTH AMERICAN SUBSYSTEM 
Focusing on the most important powers in the system is also vital to detect and 
understand potential processes of systemic change. In his prominent endeavor to study 
political change in international politics, Gilpin distinguished between three types of 
international change: system change, systemic change, and interaction change. While the 
first entails a change in the nature of the most important actors that compose the system -
for example, from nation-states to empires or multinationals - the second is a change 
within the system in which the focus is the relative changes of power culminating with 
906 
"the replacement of a declining dominant power by a rising dominant power." The 
third type of international change described by Gilpin involves modifications in the 
patterns of interaction and may presage systemic changes. In fact, Gilpin comments that 
both systemic and interaction changes involve changes in "the rules and rights embodied 
in the system." 7 We can adapt this framework originally created for the study of 
international systems to the study of regional subsystems. According to Gilpin's 
approach, the central factor to understand the destabilization of the system and systemic 
change is the rise of new powers and the consequent redistribution of relative power in 
the overall system. What is central in his argument is the idea that the power of the 
members of the international system changes at different rates, and thus this "differential 
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growth in power of the various states" is the most important factor in explaining systemic 
908 
change. This theory can also be applied at the regional level, but while Gilpin 
considers the international system as whole and thus must find the sources of power 
redistribution exclusively within the system, the regional subsystem approach allows for 
a second source of power redistribution which comes from outside the subsystem. 
In the case of the South American subsystem, the main candidate for changing the 
regional distribution of power from the outside is the United States, which seems to be 
the only actor that could incorporate the South American subsystem in an all-
encompassing American system. If the United States acted in South America the same 
way it has done in the rest of Latin America, the concept of a South American regional 
system would indeed lose much of its analytical muscle as the North American country 
would absorb most of their regional interactions. There is little doubt that the United 
States has possessed the capabilities to change the subsystemic status quo in South 
America and to effectively affect the distribution of power in the subsystem through 
direct action either in the form of military intervention or action of some other kind that 
Cantori and Spiegel called "politically significant involvement," which, as quoted in 
chapter 2, 
is expressed by the possession of a colony; economic or military aid producing an 
alteration in the balance of power in the region; formal alliance, troop 
commitment, or any agreement which causes the external power to act in ways 
which resemble the types of actions that would ordinarily be taken by a country 
indigenous to the region.299 
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For Gilpin, the international system tends toward stability as long as no state 
judges that it is profitable to change it. Adapting Gilpin's framework to the study of the 
regional subsystem, if US policy makers at some point concluded that the benefits of 
transforming the South American subsystem's status quo would outweigh the costs, they 
could have attempted to do so through significant political involvement. The argument of 
this dissertation is that Brazil has affected this calculation by either increasing the costs or 
reducing the benefits of subsystemic change for the United States. Therefore, the stability 
of the South American subsystem must be explained not only in reference to geography, 
but also through the interaction between the United States and Brazil, which has 
contributed to maintaining the United States as an "absent empire" in South America in 
contrast to other regions of Latin America. From this follows that the present, past, and at 
least the near future of the South American subsystem depends largely on the relationship 
between the United States and Brazil, a theory which is in line with the discussion 
mentioned in the previous chapter of the relationship between agents and structure. In 
other words, the structure of the South American subsystem affects the outcomes of US 
foreign policies but does not determine them, and, depending on how the interactions 
between the United States and Brazil develop, this structure can be changed, whether 
because the United States may be willing to pay the costs of change or because Brazil 
may be unwilling to affect US calculations. 
Therefore, the patterns of interaction aspect of the South American subsystem is 
characterized both by distinct patterns of cooperation and conflict within the subsystem 
as well as by a relative US absence in comparison to the rest of Latin America. Both of 
these factors are interrelated and contribute to keeping South America as a separate 
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regional subsystem. While the first has already been emphasized, this research will focus 
on the latter. The main goal is to demonstrate that the resulting interaction between the 
United States and the South American regional subsystem has not led to a subsystemic 
change in South America, which would mean its outright incorporation into either a Latin 
American or an American subsystem. In other words, this dissertation aims to explain the 
remarkable degree of stability of the South American subsystem and to make the case for 
the analytical strength of treating South America as a separate regional subsystem in 
order to assess, and possibly predict, the outcomes of given US foreign policies initiatives 
toward the region. If it is true that the outcomes of interaction "have an inherently 
systemic dimension," a refinement of the understanding of a given system - in this case 
the South American subsystem of the international system - holds the promise of 
generating better explanations. 
It is true that many authors have noticed the relative US absence from South 
America in comparison to the rest of Latin America. These authors focus generally on the 
most evident aspect of this difference - the lack of direct unilateral US military 
intervention south of Panama. Two basic sets of explanations are usually provided to 
account for this difference - South America is too far away or it has little strategic 
significance, and South American states are more stable than other countries in Latin 
America. Typically, the combination of these two factors - proximity and political 
instability - is used to explain the abundance of US military involvement in Central 
America and the Caribbean in contrast to South America. For example, Pastor argues that 
Central America's and Caribbean's "proximity, vulnerability, and instability" are the 
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics: 149. 
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three characteristics that "make the region of special concern to the United States." 302 
For Harold Molineu there are "obvious security interests" that arise "out of the region 
nearness." Ronald Steel asserts that, while the Caribbean is of immediate interest, 
some nations in South America "are twice as far from the United States as Europe" and 
therefore they could be considered "irrelevant" for the security of the United States.304 
David Myers sees South America as less subjected to US influence in general because of 
the "greater difficulty of projecting North American military, diplomatic and economic 
O A C 
power into an arena that is larger, more populous and geographically remote." The 
notion of "geographic proximity" as "the most important factor" in explaining US 
involvement in Central America and the Caribbean is also present in more recent 
• ^06 • 
studies. David Healy and Thomas Leonard single out the "search for stability" as the 
^07 
main characteristic of US actions in Central America and the Caribbean. Likewise, for 
Molineu "the constant seeking of stability for its own sake may be the common 
denominator in understanding the definition of U.S. interests in Latin America." 308 Louis 
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Perez Jr. remarks that American officials saw US presence in the Caribbean as necessary 
to bring "political stability and fiscal responsibility." 309 
From the perspective presented by the present research, there are three main 
aspects of these approaches that deserve particular consideration. The first is that, by 
focusing on how geographical proximity affects interactions between the United States 
and the two different subsystems in Latin America, the approaches implicitly 
acknowledge the existence of a North American subsystem distinct from a South 
American subsystem. However, because this is just implicit, the research is unable to 
explore the consequences of this separation and to go beyond an overemphasis on Central 
America and the Caribbean. In fact, it seems apparent that the overwhelming majority of 
the works on "United States-Latin America relations" are works on the relations of the 
United States with Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, with occasional 
references to one or other South American state just to give the impression of covering 
the whole region. Because South America is considered too far away, too irrelevant, or 
relatively stable, it does not deserve any deeper analytical treatment by specialists in US 
foreign policy. In other words, studying a region where the United States has been an 
absent empire is far less interesting than looking at the instances where the imperial urge 
has been very present. Thus, the result of US relative absence from South America results 
in an absence of South America in the study of US foreign policy. 
The second aspect that deserves consideration is closely related to first. As 
mentioned, geographic proximity and instability are often mentioned as the main reasons 
for why the United States has been less involved in South America in comparison to the 
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rest of Latin America, but with the overemphasis on the "unstable" Central American and 
Caribbean states, little attention is given to the supposed stability of South American 
states. While geographic distance is self-explanatory, the sources of stability or instability 
are not an unchangeable and permanent fact of nature and must therefore be explained. In 
addition, while geographic distance is definitively a sound explanation for the lack of 
involvement in South America until around the first two decades of the twentieth century 
- when the United States lacked actual power projection in the region and had to compete 
with a strong European presence there - it becomes less compelling after the United 
States became a global power. After all, geographic distance did not restrain the United 
States from occasionally employing imperial policies in different parts of the globe. 
Finally, the third aspect of the explanations mentioned above is that, at best, they 
can explain a supposed lack of U.S. interest towards South America. Nevertheless, the 
explanatory power of those approaches is unequipped to account for the instances when 
the United States demonstrated a clear interest in South America and yet the actual 
outcome was relative absence. Lacking an adequate theoretical approach to explain these 
cases, authors frequently attempt to fit their interpretations within the usual "United 
States-Latin America" framework, where dissimilar events in what are actually two 
distinct regional subsystems are seen as equivalent. This is clearly evident and especially 
relevant in one case in which the United States clearly demonstrated an interest in South 
American events and that turned out to be definitely the most mentioned event by any 
scholar trying to demonstrate a supposed coherent pattern of US intervention in Latin 
America as a whole - the 1973 Chilean military coup. By making reference to the 
Chilean case along with a number of US interventions in Central America and Caribbean, 
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those who propose to analyze US foreign policy towards Latin America feel satisfied and 
relieved that he or she was able to find a case to demonstrate a consistent pattern for the 
whole region, and therefore are free to concentrate on aspects considered more important. 
Therefore, the next chapters will attempt to address these three aspects from the 
regional subsystemic perspective in order to tackle their shortcomings. First, by providing 
a framework for the study of the international relations of South America, this research 
aims to bring attention to an important region of the hemisphere that is commonly 
neglected by the majority of the studies on United States-Latin America relations for the 
fact that the United States has not been as active in South America as it has historically 
been in other regions of Latin America. In other words, by providing explanations for the 
relative US absence from South America, this research seeks to overcome the relative 
absence of South America in US studies on Latin America. This is especially relevant 
given the rising interest in Brazil as an important power in the evolving configuration of 
the international system. Second, by considering reasons beyond the mere geographic 
remoteness and lack of interest, this research intends to provide alternative explanations 
for US absence, as well as to address the question of apparent "stability" of South 
America as compared to the other regions of Latin America. And lastly, by focusing on 
particular case studies when the US policy makers demonstrated a clear interest in South 
America, this dissertation intends to offer explanations for the actual outcome of US 
initiatives. In his pioneering study on regional subsystems Binder compared extra-
regional power to rays of light that were "refracted" when projected into regional 
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subsystems. In the same way, the goal of this research is to help to understand how US 
power is "refracted" when projected into the South American subsystem. 
Perhaps the major casualty brought about by the regional subsystemic 
perspective as applied to South America is the usual framework of US "hegemony" in 
Latin America as multipurpose explanation for the international politics of the Western 
Hemisphere. In terms of interpretation, this approach equates, for instance, the 1954 
Guatemalan coup with the 1973 Chilean coup as equivalent events, both being examples 
of countries that "were unable to break away from U.S. dominance." 312 In terms of 
analysis, the US hegemony approach would predict, for example, that the regional 
integration model set by NAFTA would inevitably be extended to all Latin America 
T I T 
"because of U.S. power." The traditional focus on the United States is reminiscent of 
the conventional global systemic approach to international relations. Nevertheless, 
outside the boundaries of the North American subsystem - i.e., in regional subsystems 
where the United States is an external power, and not an integral member - a 
disproportionate focus on US actions often leads to neglecting the dynamics of the 
regional subsystemic game that is being played simultaneously. Obviously, in some 
circumstances the distinction between the United States (or any other great power, for 
that matter) as an external power or as an integral member is blurred - the United States 
in Western Europe in the fifties, for example, comes to mind. Yet, even in those extreme 
situations, regional subsystemic pressures are at play, and geography makes sure that 
states will remain concerned about their neighbors and attempt to manipulate external 
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powers for their own advantage in order to achieve a better position in the regional 
chessboard. 
For the reasons aforementioned, the role of Brazil as a regional power will be 
emphasized in order to explain the interaction between the United States and the South 
American regional subsystem. This does not mean to negate the role of the United States, 
or to assume that Brazil has "more power" or "more influence" than the United States in 
South America, or that somehow there is a balance of power between Brazil and the 
United States in that subsystem. What it does mean, is that the supposed hegemonial role 
of the United States in South America has not been exercised as it could have been 
because of the particular dynamics of the South American subsystem in which Brazil has 
played a central role by manipulating the cost-benefit structure of subsystemic change. If 
the United States has acted occasionally as an empire in other regions of Latin America, 
in South America it has been an absent one, even though it has had the required 
capabilities to be a present one. Geographic distance obviously plays an important role, 
but it is far from being a sufficient explanation - the regional subsystemic perspective is 
thus required in order to allow us to detect alternative reasons. 
BRAZIL, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE SOUTH AMERICAN SUBSYSTEM 
An important assumption of this dissertation is that, as a regional subsystem 
develops, regionally influential states value their position in the subsystem and thus they 
have an incentive to maintain the integrity of the subsystem by reducing opportunities for 
outside penetration, which could at the limit promote subsystemic change if the regional 
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distribution of power was substantially affected. Because their main focus is usually 
regional rather than global, regional powers tend to concentrate their attention primarily 
on their own regional subsystems. Accordingly, at the same time these states adopt 
strategies to maintain their influence within the subsystem, they work either to limit 
influence from outside or to shape that influence in accordance to their interests. The 
capacity of regional powers to restrict outside penetration is obviously limited by the 
power relationship between them and the external powers, but they can be successful if 
they create conditions that reduce the incentive or the opportunity for outside penetration, 
thus affecting the structure of costs and benefits of subsystemic change. Correspondingly, 
they may also be unable or inefficient to affect the structure of costs and benefits, in 
which case outside penetration can lead to subsystemic change. Weaker states within the 
subsystem may also bargain with outside powers to improve their own positions but they 
generally have little to gain by completely ignoring the pressures of more powerful 
neighboring states. 
The assumption stated above helps to explain the role of Brazil in the South 
American subsystem and the relative absence of the United States. Because of its 
privileged geographic situation in South America, Brazil has been a "quintessential status 
quo power," which means it has had a lot to gain by maintaining the stability of the 
subsystem. The argument proposed here is that Brazil, which has historically displayed 
"a strong vested interest in regional stability,"315 has successfully manipulated the 
structure of costs and benefits of subsystemic change for the United States in two main 
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ways. First, it has reduced the benefits of subsystemic change by acting as a 
•J 1 /T " 5 1 7 • 
"subhegemonic state" or a "hegemonic stabilizer" at the regional level, thus 
preempting the role that could potentially be played by the United States, and 
consequently reducing the opportunities and incentives for US interference. Because, like 
Brazil, the United States has also been a status quo power when it comes to Latin 
America in general and to South America in particular, there has been "a congruence of 
US-Brazilian interest in stability in the region," 318 in spite of occasional divergence of 
interests. Thus, while standard explanations for the relative stability of South America 
would argue that "American hegemony mutes a real conflict," this research takes a 
different approach. As one observer put it in the late seventies, 
Not U.S. intercession, but Brazilian power diplomacy seems most responsible to 
date for preventing the outbreak of violence in the region. If this is true, there may 
exist some basis for beginning to think of South American relations in terms of a 
regional balance of power (in which Brazil plays the role of balancer) rather than 
in the more conventional framework of North American hegemony. 
Therefore, Brazil has played in South America - although essentially through 
other means - a similar role as the United States has played in other parts of Latin 
America, which explains in part why the US military interventions on behalf of a "search 
for stability" could be regionally restricted to the north of Panama. On the other hand, 
Brazil has attempted to increase the costs of subsystemic change by increasing the 
incentives for other states in participating in the subsystem and at the same time avoiding 
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openly playing the "subhegemonic" role. This is both a conscious decision by Brazilian 
policymakers as well as a reflection of Brazil's limited means to be a hegemonic power. 
Both strategies - decreasing the benefits and increasing the costs of subsystemic change -
have often been used simultaneously to affect the profitability of change, but the first was 
more evident during the Cold War, while the second became preeminent after the 
eighties. The cases selected for study in the next chapters will better explore these 
arguments. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the fact regional subsystems are subsets of 
the broader international system means that they cannot be studied in complete isolation. 
A complete analysis of regional subsystems can only claim to be satisfactory if it includes 
references to the international system that constitutes the environment of the regional 
subsystems. For this reason the next chapters are arranged in accordance with different 
configurations of the international system. The first period, which goes from the time of 
the independence of the American states until the first decades of the twentieth century, is 
considered by many analysts as being multipolar, but this multipolarity was essentially 
restricted to the European context. In the Western Hemisphere the United States was the 
major power and its foreign policy had basically a regionalist orientation, from which the 
Monroe Doctrine is the clearest example. The second period under study is the Cold War, 
when an actual international system came about, together with a bipolar configuration of 
power. During this period, the United States adopted a global orientation in its foreign 
policy, focused mainly on the European continent, at the same time it reached the peak of 
its influence in Latin America. The Cold War is a particularly relevant period for the 
purposes of this study because it was when the United States had clearly both the 
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incentive and the capability to become a "present empire" in South America. Finally, the 
last period under consideration goes from the end of the Cold War until the present days, 
when the disappearance of the Soviet Union left the United States as the "lonely 
superpower."321 For each of these configurations of the broader system, a corresponding 
role for Brazil in the South American subsystem is identified. For the purposes of the 
present study, the first period will be characterized as the "unwritten alliance" with the 
United States; the second will be termed as the "regional imperialist" phase; and the third 
as the "leader of a South American bloc." The juxtaposition of these three factors - the 
configuration of the international system, the role of the United States, and the role of 
Brazil will be the basic framework to analyze the three periods under study. It is the 
expectation of this research, that this framework is a better alternative to understand US 
foreign policy towards South America than the ones offered by the existing literature. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE EARLY DEVELOPMENTS OF A SOUTH 
AMERICAN SUBSYSTEM 
As previously mentioned, any research that aims to address patterns of interaction 
is inevitably fated to address historical processes. How far back in time it is necessary to 
reach is a choice of the analyst. In the case of the interactions among American states, 
this choice is comparatively easier since most of these countries have been independent 
for only about two hundred years, which allows the researcher to identify the beginning 
of their interaction processes among those nations as formal actors of international 
politics without great difficulty. 
In fact, an appropriate year to start the analysis is 1823, when the independence of 
the American states was recently completed and the United States issued the doctrine that 
is probably the most resilient of its history: the Monroe Doctrine. Aiming specially at the 
European states that then constituted the Holy Alliance - composed of Russia, Prussia, 
Austria, and France - which entertained plans to help Spain regain their lost colonies in 
America, President Monroe declared that "the American continents, by the free and 
independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be 
considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers" and that if they 
attempted to do so, this would be interpreted "as the manifestation of an unfriendly 
^99 
disposition toward the United States." The Monroe Doctrine was thus a unilateral 
Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907, The Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History, 
1937 (Gloucester, Mass.,: P. Smith, 1966), 3. 
declaration by the United States instituting a separation between Europe and the 
Americas through the commitment to actively oppose any new European colonization 
attempts in the Western Hemisphere. 
This chapter examines the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine beyond its original 
promulgation in 1823 in order to demonstrate that the development of the interactions 
between the countries in the hemisphere made it progressively clear that, rather than 
being a policy directed to be homogeneously applied in all Latin America, the Monroe 
Doctrine and its offshoots—such as the Roosevelt Corollary—were explicitly Caribbean 
or, to use the terminology employed by this dissertation, restricted to the North American 
subsystem. In South America, the doctrine acquired a rather different character. The 
chapter argues that both distance and the relative stability of key South American 
countries allowed for this development of an embryonic South American subsystem 
organized around Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. The chapter also shows that Brazil in 
particular considered itself as a guarantor of the Monroe Doctrine in South America and 
thus it pursued an "unwritten alliance" with the United States, meaning that each country 
would take care of its respective regional subsystem. Although this was not entirely 
reciprocated, the understood alliance was relatively convenient for the United States as 
Brazil was a friendly country and because it would allow the United States to concentrate 
its actions in the Caribbean. As Chile's power declined and Argentina adopted a foreign 
policy with a strong anti-US orientation, Brazil's position became even more relevant. 
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ACTION AND REACTION: DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE 
Those who concentrate on the Monroe Doctrine only as it was promulgated in 
1823 may conclude that no differentiation should be made between the two halves of the 
Americas. After all, at no point in Monroe's speech was this differentiation made. 
Nevertheless, the Monroe Doctrine was "not an event but a historic development," 323 and 
consequently it should be studied taking into consideration a broader historical 
perspective in terms of how it developed through time. In other words, what should be 
determined is how the process of interaction among the American states shaped the actual 
outcome of US policies following the 1823 declaration. When this is done, the first signs 
of the configuration of two different regional subsystems in the Western Hemisphere 
become evident, illustrates both by geography and by the way the interactions among the 
American countries unfolded. 
Because there was no previous significant interaction among the independent 
countries in the Western Hemisphere, the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, given its 
presumed hemispheric reach, can be considered as equivalent to a "first social act" which 
"creates expectations on both sides about each other's future behavior" thus setting in 
motion a process of action and reaction that would lead to the creation of "intersubjective 
meanings," which would eventually determine important aspects of the patterns of 
relationship in the Western Hemisphere. In fact, the first reactions when Monroe's 
message reached the Latin American states seems to have varied from indifference to 
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enthusiasm. The indifference aspect is explained by the fact that many governments in 
Latin America were still more connected to Europe than to the other countries in the 
Americas and tended to look to Great Britain more than to the infant United States as a 
source for protection, but the possibility of being able to rely on a second power in 
their own hemisphere to ward off the European powers could not be completely ignored 
by the newly independent Latin American states. Alejandro Alvarez notices that four 
countries took special interest in the doctrine: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and 
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Mexico. Dexter Perkins adds that also in Chile "the message was better received than 
in any other part of Spanish America."327 All of these countries, recently independent and 
fearful of possible attempts of reconquest by Spain or Portugal, became interested in 
finding out more about US intentions and indeed they "asked point-blank what means the 
^98 
United States intended to use for their protection." The Empire of Brazil "was the first 
-390 
South American government to take notice of the Doctrine" and within two months 
requested a defensive-offensive alliance with the United States. A similar call for an 
alliance was made by Mexico and by Simon Bolivar's Colombia. A few years after 
Monroe's message to the US Congress, the Argentinean government called for the 
application of the Doctrine in a conflict against Brazil because, according to the 
Argentinean president at the time, of the "obvious connection between Europe and Brazil, 
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more especially of Portugal." The US response was basically the same in all cases. To 
the Colombian government, Secretary of State Adams replied that "the fear of 
intervention by the Holy Alliance in the countries of the New World had practically 
disappeared," and therefore there was no need for a formal alliance. In the case of 
Brazil, the United States government was cool towards the request for an alliance and 
"excused itself, believing this compact unnecessary,"333 and later on the two countries 
signed a more limited commercial treaty. The Argentinean government was informed by 
Secretary of State Clay in 1828 that the request for intervention against Brazil was 
unfounded, and that "the United States did not consider itself obliged to intervene in 
defense of the Monroe Doctrine at every request of interested parties." To leave no 
doubts about his views, Clay added that "[e]ven if Portugal and Brazil had remained 
united, and the war had been carried out by their joint arms, against the Argentine 
Republic, that would have been far from presenting the case which the message 
contemplated." Similarly, to the Mexican President, Clay explained that the Monroe 
Doctrine did not mean that the United States had contracted any kind of legal obligation 
to maintain it. But in contrast to the South American countries, Mexico would soon 
learn that the Monroe Doctrine was silent about the United States' own ambitions. 
331
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Obviously, given the fact that during the most part of the nineteenth century the 
European powers were more capable than the United States to project power in South 
America, it could hardly be conceivable that US statesmen would be willing to take any 
significant action in a region that was far from their borders. By the 1840s, Secretary of 
State Daniel Webster felt it necessary to make clear that the Monroe Doctrine "did not 
commit us, at all events, to take up arms at any indication of hostile feeling by the powers 
of Europe toward South America," adding that it would be a "very different case" if any 
European power "landed on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, and commenced a war in 
our immediate neighborhood." While in the 1860s the United States was so concerned 
about the French presence in Mexico as to plan to use all means necessary to force their 
withdrawal, when Chile went into conflict with Spain at about the same time, Secretary 
of State William H. Seward offered no more than "the moral support of a sincere, liberal, 
and, as we think it will appear, a useful friendship." In summary, the actual actions of 
the United States made clear that, as the Monroe Doctrine acquired the contours of a 
policy rather than a declaration of intentions, a clear separation between the North and 
the South American part of the American continent was beginning to take shape. 
During this process of action and reaction between the United States and the Latin 
American governments, the actual scope of the Monroe Doctrine became progressively 
more delineated. In a message to Congress in 1845, US President James Polk had already 
" Hart, The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation: 92. 
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"formally confirmed the geographical limitations of the Doctrine" when he declared 
that it would 
apply with greatly increased force should any European power attempt to 
establish any new colony in North America [...] The reassertion of this principle, 
especially in reference to North America, is at this day but the promulgation of a 
policy which no European power should cherish the disposition to resist.... It 
should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy that no future 
European colony or dominion shall with our consent be planted or established in 
any part of the North American continent." 
This explicit declaration by President Polk demonstrated categorically that instead 
of having a true hemispheric scope, the Monroe Doctrine was in actuality "essentially a 
Caribbean doctrine, affirming the vital interest of the United States in the tranquility of 
what it considered to be its inland sea." 341 The repeated allusions to "North America" in 
lieu of hemispheric references continued to be made throughout the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. In making the case for the annexation of Santo Domingo as "an 
adherence to the Monroe Doctrine," President Grant stated in 1871 that he believed that 
"we should not permit any independent government within the limits of North America to 
pass from a condition of independence to one of ownership or protection under a 
European power." 342 
Perhaps the only exception to this overall concentration "within the limits of 
North America" was during Venezuela's boundary dispute with the British colony of 
Guyana, but in this case it appears that the personal characteristics of Secretary of State 
Richard Olney played a significant factor. The Venezuelan government had been 
disputing the Guyana boundary with Britain since the 1880s, but until 1895, when Olney 
J
 Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars : United States Intervention in the Caribbean, 1898-1934, Rev. ed. 
(Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 21. 
340
 Hart, The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation: 114. 
341
 Steel, Pax Americana: 195-96. 
Hart, The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation: 114. 
succeeded Walter Gresham as Secretary of State, the United States "pursued a most 
cautious and circumspect course." 343 It was only after Olney became Secretary of State 
that the United States decided to take a firm stand on the issue by forcing Great Britain to 
accept US arbitration, and making reference to the Monroe Doctrine as "the accepted 
public law of this country."344 In what appears to be an effort to extend the geographical 
scope of the doctrine as it had been tacitly defined until then, he added that the American 
states "South as well as North, by geographical proximity, by natural sympathy, by 
similarity of governmental constitutions, are friends and allies, commercially and 
politically, of the United States."345 This was not only a matter of friendship, the 
Secretary of State observed, but also the reality of the growing American power. As 
Olney famously put it: "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this 
continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." It 
must be recalled that Monroe's original message referred explicitly to new European 
colonies and not existing ones, which means that Olney's application of the Monroe 
Doctrine as a justification for US intervention in a boundary dispute was a singular 
interpretation that led the British government to respond, in astonishment, that even 
though admitting that "the Monroe Doctrine in itself is sound," the "disputed frontier 
with Venezuela has nothing to do with any of the questions dealt with by President 
Monroe. It is not a question of the colonization by a European Power of any portion of 
America." The note, written by Prime Minister Lord Salisbury, concluded that Olney's 
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interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was a "strange development."347 Albert Hart, 
whose book provided the aforementioned quotes, commented that "[n]o previous 
President or Secretary of State had ever taken such a broad and sweeping ground" and 
that Olney's interpretation was "little related to the doctrine of 1823." In fact, the 
Venezuela-Guiana boundary dispute seems an isolated case within an overall pattern, but 
while Hart concentrates on the question of the application of the Monroe Doctrine to an 
issue apparently unrelated to the original declaration, for the purposes of this research, 
the relevant aspect is the fact that the Venezuelan case was perhaps the only instance 
when the Doctrine was actually invoked to justify US actions south of Panama. Indeed, 
Secretary Olney himself declared in the following year, when the Cuban insurrections 
occupied the minds of American statesmen, that the United States was in fact "interested 
in any struggle anywhere for freer political institutions, but," he added, "necessarily and 
in special measure in a struggle that is raging almost in sight of our shores."34 Once 
again, the actual practices forced the confinement of the geographical application of the 
doctrine. 
Evidently, as the true scope of the Monroe Doctrine became clear for Latin 
Americans, reactions differed radically from the almost unanimous support received right 
after it was first promulgated. In particular, the United States' expansion into Mexican 
territory after 1848 made clear to Mexico and to the nearby Central American and 





designs of the United States itself"350 When a "policy of hegemony" came to be 
considered as a "natural complement of the Monroe Doctrine" by US statesmen,351 it is 
not a surprise that some countries, Mexico in particular, began to develop "a great 
aversion to the Doctrine, for they look upon it ordinarily no longer under the aspect 
which it had in 1823 but under the new aspect which has been given to it." 5 During the 
Spanish-American War in 1898, when the United States took at once Guam, Puerto Rico, 
and the Philippines, this notion was greatly reinforced. Predictably, by the beginning of 
the twentieth century, a Mexican President stated publicly his opposition to the Monroe 
Doctrine, because, from his point of view, it "attacks the sovereignty and independence 
of Mexico and would set up and establish a tutelage over all the nations of America."353 
The growth in US power and the relative decline of Europe changed the initial view that a 
number of Latin American states initially had of the Monroe Doctrine as a guarantee 
against intervention. The question which now dominated several of the Pan American 
Conferences was how to deal with the major power in their own hemisphere. As Gordon 
Connell-Smith remarks, "a system which was promoted to prevent extra-continental 
intervention became at once concerned with the question of intervention by the 
promoting power."354 After the Spanish-American War and a number of interventions in 
Central America and the Caribbean throughout the first decades of the twentieth century, 
it would become evident that the notion of a homogeneous US "Latin American" policy 
350
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was in fact far more restricted in its geographical scope. Having defeated a decadent 
European empire at the turn of the century, and still living in a world of empires, the 
United States flirted with imperial solutions for itself.356 Nevertheless, the scope of this 
American "empire" rarely reached the countries south of Panama. As will be seen below, 
because of their different experiences with US power, the South American countries by 
and large developed a very different outlook than the one developed by the rest of Latin 
America, which can be clearly illustrated by the cases of Mexico and Brazil. 
THE EARLY DEVELOPMENTS OF A SOUTH AMERICAN SUBSYSTEM 
The strategic importance of the Caribbean area in comparison to South America is 
just one dimension of the explanation for the US lack of involvement further south in 
these first years of interaction among the independent American states. The other 
dimension must be found in the simultaneous development of a "continental South 
American system of power politics" around the core formed by Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile. Geographic distance allowed this system to develop during the nineteenth 
century, before the United States was actually capable of effectively projecting power in 
the Southern Cone of South America. Therefore, when the United States eventually 
Martin Sicker counts thirty-four US interventions in Central American and the Caribbean between 1890 
and 1928. Martin Sicker, The Geopolitics of Security in the Americas: Hemispheric Denial from Monroe To 
Clinton (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002). In contrast, as G. Pope Atkins observes, the United States 
"never landed its troops in the Southern Cone." Atkins, Latin America and the Caribbean in the 
International System: 143. 
3 6
 See, for example: Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy : The Emergence of America as a Great Power 
(Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1991); Richard E. Welch, Imperialists vs. Anti-Imperialists: The Debate 
over Expansionism in the 1890's, Primary Sources in American history (Itasca, 111: F. E. Peacock 
Publishers, 1972); David Healy, US Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s (Madison,: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1970). 
357
 Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force; Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830-1905 
(Berkeley,: University of California Press, 1967), 3. 
acquired the capabilities for transforming the Monroe Doctrine into an authentic 
hemispheric doctrine beyond its Caribbean scope, it had to deal with a regional 
subsystem that had already been reasonably advanced in a way that was considerably 
different than in the rest of Latin America. 
In contrast to other former Spanish colonies, Argentina and Chile managed to 
develop early in their independence relatively stable governments. Despite some 
moments of political precariousness - especially in the case of Argentina - none of these 
two countries experienced the kind of political upheaval that prevailed in Mexico for 
example, in which "between 1821 and 1848, there were six or seven different 
governments." Brazil was a different case in which contrary to Spanish America, it 
had not been fragmented into parts and experienced no great political ruptures when it 
achieved independence from Portugal. It is suffice to say that the first ruler of 
independent Brazil, Dom Pedro I, the Portuguese Prince, ruled as Emperor of Brazil for 
nine years. The second ruler, Emperor Dom Pedro II, was Dom Pedro I's son and ruled 
for forty-eight straight years until Brazil became a Republic in 1889 - again with no 
bloodshed. Contrary to what his long reign may suggest, far from being a typical Latin 
American caudillo, Dom Pedro II was an erudite and liberal statesman who allowed 
freedom of press and speech, and invested heavily in education. 5 Because of a 
functioning and active parliament, "with solid and competitive parties," one author 
even characterized the Brazilian Empire as "a crowned democracy." After meeting 
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Dom Pedro II, British Prime Minister William Gladstone referred to him as "a model to 
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all sovereigns of the world." When Dom Pedro II died, the New York Times wrote an 
extremely flattering obituary - which was a relatively unusual deference for any Latin 
American leader in the late nineteenth century - making reference to Gladstone's 
remarks, adding that Dom Pedro II was "one of the most enlightened monarchs of the 
century [...] a liberal patron of letters, arts, and sciences," and commenting that "Dom 
Pedro made Brazil as free as a monarchy can become."363 The following day, the US 
newspaper referred to him as a "genial philosopher" and - what is really surprising in 
light of Monroe's original idea of separation between the European and the American 
systems of government - questioned the wisdom of establishing a republic in Brazil, 
saying that "it is doubtful whether a republic meets the requirements of Brazil so well as 
a monarchy."364 In fact, the popularity that the Brazilian Emperor enjoyed was so 
substantial that the most renowned statesman of the early years of the Brazilian Republic 
was the Baron of Rio Branco, a diplomat during the Empire and son of another prominent 
statesman during Dom Pedro IPs reign. Rio Branco was the Brazilian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs under four different administrations, from 1902 to 1910. Therefore, along with 
Brazil's sheer size, this relative continuity of policies and stability, with no significant 
breaks or political upheavals, provided the country with the basis for its consolidation as 
a regional power in South America. 
As one author observes, by the beginning of the twentieth century, Argentina, 
Chile, and Brazil "represented at the time literally the only group of historically mature, 
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constitutionally stable, traditionally peaceful, and physically secure sovereign states to be 
found anywhere in the world." This unique condition allowed for a development of a 
regional subsystem early on in the international life of those states. Because of the 
existence of three countries in geographical propinquity with the potential for playing the 
role of regional powers as well as the relative absence of the United States during the first 
years of their independence, states in South America were less concerned about the 
overwhelming power of the North American country than about themselves, which was 
clearly the opposite situation in relation to the countries in the northern half of the 
hemisphere. Robert Burr describes the development of a system of power politics in 
South America throughout the nineteenth century, first with two relatively separate 
regions - the Plata and the Andean region - which eventually joined in a single 
"continental" system by the 1860s. Therefore, South American statesmen, at least since 
the second half of the nineteenth century, "tended to think is terms of a continent-wide 
balance-of-power system," and used to make constant references to a "South 
American equilibrium." 368 As Burr argues, by the end of the nineteenth century, "the 
idea of a balance of power had become an accepted part of the international life of South 
America."369 Nevertheless, the notion of a separation between South and North America 
was manifest in the minds of South American statesmen at least as early as 1840. For 
example, when internal problems in Mexico indicated that an attempt to summon a 
365
 Glen St John Barclay, Struggle for a Continent: The Diplomatic History of South America, 1917-1945 
(London,: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1971), 27. 
366
 Burr, "The Balance of Power in Nineteenth-Century South America: An Exploratory Essay."; , 
The Stillborn Panama Congress; Power Politics and Chilean-Colombian Relations during the War of the 
Pacific, University of California publications in history, (Berkeley,: University of California Press, 1962); 
, By Reason or Force; Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830-1905. 
36
 , The Stillborn Panama Congress; Power Politics and Chilean-Colombian Relations during the 
War of the Pacific: 113. 
368
 Ibid., 17,29. 
369
 , "The Balance of Power in Nineteenth-Century South America: An Exploratory Essay," 59. 
136 
conference among American states that year was about to fail, the Chilean government 
suggested that "it would perhaps be well for the South American plenipotentiaries to 
meet together ... without awaiting the arrival... of their Mexican and Central American 
colleagues" adding categorically that "[t]he republics of South America and the Brazilian 
Empire form a compact system whose ties with Mexico and Central America are 
comparatively weak." 
While their distance from the United States put the South Americans countries 
outside the actual scope of the Monroe Doctrine and made them less preoccupied about 
the possibility of US intervention, as the relative strength and stability of Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile became clear by the end of the nineteenth century, policymakers in the 
United States began to entertain new possibilities for the application of the Monroe 
Doctrine and the maintenance of stability in the Americas. Although this is barely 
mentioned in the literature, it would become a key feature of the separation between the 
North and the South American regional subsystems in these formative years - the United 
States would take direct responsibility for its area of immediate strategic interest in North 
America, while it would seek to involve the stronger South American countries in the 
affairs of the South American continent. Indeed, this prospect was already mentioned by 
the end of the nineteenth century when President Grant considered intervening in the 
dispute between Chile and Peru. Leaving aside the unilateral phraseology commonly used 
when dealing with Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, the US President 
mentioned the possibility of intervention by stating that the United States "would hold 
itself free to appeal to the other Republics of this continent to join in an effort to avert 
370
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consequences which cannot be confined to Chili [sic] and Peru." Nevertheless, the 
notion of a possible entente between the United States and some South American 
countries took shape by the time the most famous extension of the Monroe Doctrine was 
promulgated - the "Roosevelt Corollary," which was officially announced in 1904. 
Indeed, Theodore Roosevelt, who famously brandished the "big stick" to maintain order 
in the Caribbean area, is perhaps the first US president to explicitly consider the 
advantages of shared responsibilities for the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine in the 
southern half of the hemisphere. 
ROOSEVELT, WILSON AND THE SOUTH AMERICAN SUBSYSTEM 
In a chapter of his autobiography entitled "The Monroe Doctrine and the Panama 
Canal," Roosevelt starts out by acknowledging that the Spanish-American War left the 
United States "with peculiar relations to the Philippines, Cuba, Porto Rico, and with 
"XT) 
immensely added interest in Central America and the Caribbean Sea," therefore clearly 
establishing the boundaries of the US sphere of influence at the time, as many of his 
predecessors had done. A few lines later, he makes clear the differentiation in the 
Western Hemisphere between that area and South America, when he adds: 
The great and prosperous civilized commonwealths such as the Argentine, Brazil, 
and Chile, in the southern half of South America have advanced so far that they 
no longer stand in any position of tutelage toward the United States. They occupy 
toward us precisely the position that Canada occupies. Their friendship is the 
friendship of equals for equals. My view was that as regards these nations there 
1
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was no more necessity for asserting the Monroe Doctrine than there was to assert 
it for Canada.373 
Roosevelt concludes that if some European nation attempted to occupy one of 
these countries, the United States would provide assistance, but "the initiative would 
come from the Nation itself, and the United States would merely act as a friend whose 
help was invoked." Evidently, as he immediately recognizes, the situation would be 
"widely different" in the case of "the states in the neighborhood of the Caribbean Sea."374 
Roosevelt's reasoning for the often overlooked double standard for the 
enforcement of his famous corollary to the Monroe Doctrine seems to be based on two 
pillars. The first is strategic-military. Already by 1901, the General Board of the Navy 
had produced a report that clearly stated: 
Whether the principle of the Monroe Doctrine, so far as it is the policy of this 
Government, covers all South America, including Patagonia and the Argentine, is 
not for the consideration of the General Board, but only the fact that the principles 
of strategy and the defects in our geographical position make it impracticable 
successfully to maintain naval control by armed force beyond the Amazon, unless 
• • » ^7S 
present conditions are radically changed. 
This view was shared by the prominent strategist Captain Alfred Mahan, who 
believed "that United States security concerns ended at the Amazon River, making it 
•>76 
unnecessary to apply the Monroe Doctrine south of it." 
To this strategic-military aspect Roosevelt added a second pillar, based on the 
notion of state capacity, that is, the states requiring US intervention would be the ones 
that proved incapable "to do their duties to outsiders or to enforce their rights against 
373
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outsiders."377 In his original message to Congress which gave birth to the Roosevelt 
Corollary, Roosevelt famously mentioned that "wrongdoing or impotence" would be the 
causes for US intervention in the hemisphere, adding that if the countries in the 
Caribbean area had the same "progress in stable and just civilization [...] which so many 
of the republics in both Americas are constantly and brilliant showing, all questions of 
interference by this Nation with their affairs would be at an end."378 Later, Roosevelt 
explicitly singled out "Brazil, the Argentine, Chile," which, he said, 
have achieved positions of such assured ... progress, of such political stability and 
power and economic prosperity,... it is safe to say that there is no further need for 
the United States to concern itself about asserting the Monroe Doctrine so far as 
these powers are concerned. 
In another occasion, Roosevelt remarked that 
There are certain republics to the south of us which have already reached such a 
point of stability, order, and prosperity, that they themselves, though as yet hardly 
consciously, are among the guarantors of this Doctrine ... If all the republics to the 
south of us will only grow as those to which I allude have already grown, all need 
for us to be the special champions of the Doctrine will disappear, for no stable and 
growing American Republic wishes to see some great non-American military 
• ^80 
power acquire territory in its neighborhood. 
This notion that the more stable South American republics could be the guarantors 
of the Monroe Doctrine led one scholar to comment that Roosevelt viewed some 
countries like Argentina and Brazil "as junior partners that would help enforce the 
Corollary." 381 Another author stated that "[i]n a burst of enthusiasm," Roosevelt "is 
reported to have told Chile that, had Santo Domingo been in the Pacific, he would have 
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called her to police the island." When he was already out of office, Roosevelt 
confirmed this view of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile as partners that could enforce the 
corollary, in a letter to his son, when he wrote that 
it would be mere folly, the silliest kind of silliness, to ask Mexico [fallen into 
revolution], Venezuela, Honduras, Nicaragua, to guarantee the Monroe Doctrine 
with us. It is eminently proper to ask Brazil, the Argentine and Chile to do it...; 
but to ask the other countries I have named to guarantee it would be about like 
asking the Apaches and Utes to guarantee it.383 
What the above quotations intend to make evident is that, if Theodore Roosevelt 
is often associated with the pursuit of an US "empire," his views about how South 
America would fit in his scheme should serve to reinforce the notion that in the Western 
Hemisphere this imperial urge was geographically limited.384 
Part of this "growing recognition in the United States that not all of Latin America 
was disorderly or backward,"385 seems to be the work of Roosevelt's Secretary of State 
Elihu Root, who was the first sitting Secretary of State to visit South America (or any 
foreign country for that matter), where he was warmly received. Like his predecessors, 
Root is quoted as acknowledging that "as one passes to the south and the distance from 
the Caribbean increases, the necessity of maintaining the rule of Monroe becomes less 
-186 
immediate and apparent." Like Roosevelt, Root believed that this was so not only 
because of geographic distance, but because of the different level of organization that he 
attributed to key South American states. For Lars Schoultz, "Elihu Root's specific 
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contribution to inter-American relations was to disaggregate the nations of the region into 
two different classes - one the turbulent Caribbean region, the other the stable, 
"?87 
progressive countries of southern South America and Mexico." In one instance, Root 
claimed that he wanted to help Central America to go "along the road that Brazil and the 
Argentine and Chile and Peru and a number of other South American countries have 
travelled - up out of the discord and turmoil of continual revolution into a general public 
T O O 
sense of justice and determination to maintain order." These statements by both 
Roosevelt and Root plainly contradict some observations regarding the Roosevelt 
Corollary at that time (and since) that pointed to the fact that US statesmen "seem to be 
blind to actual conditions in the largest and most important parts of Latin America, such 
as Brazil, Argentina, and Chile." This kind of interpretation tends to assume that the 
Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary applied homogenously to Latin America. 
The approach set forth by Roosevelt and Root was picked up by another 
champion of intervention in Latin America - President Woodrow Wilson. Like 
Roosevelt, "Wilson wanted to think that the stables states of South America might play a 
role in bringing order to the unstable ones around the Caribbean." 390 Indeed, for Wilson, 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile were the centerpieces of his "Pan American" approach.391 
The instance when it became most evident was during the confrontations between the 
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United States and Mexico in the midst of internal instabilities in the latter country after 
the Mexican Revolution in 1910. The Wilson administration started considering 
intervention, but sought the mediation of the abovementioned South American countries 
in order to, in the words of a US official, "give a Pan American tone" to the issue and 
"gain the lasting sympathy of the rest of Latin America." Later, when intervention 
seemed imminent, the State Department considered alternatives for a "joint action" with 
the three South American countries aiming to "reduce the cost and divert ill will." 393 The 
US envoy to Argentina in 1915 suggested that if it "finally becomes necessary under the 
terms of the Monroe Doctrine that the United States intervene, I would suggest that we 
invite Argentina or Brazil or some other American country to join with us" adding that 
with this attitude the doctrine would "cease to be unilateral, which is today its one great 
defect." 394 In the end, the mediation did not have any significant impact, the Carranza 
government in Mexico was recognized by the United States and the Latin American 
countries in 1915, and no joint intervention occurred.395 Nonetheless, Wilson's efforts to 
work together with the South Americans "earned acclaim as a precedent and as a useful 
guide for the future" on both sides.396 
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BRAZIL AND THE "UNWRITTEN ALLIANCE" 
As Schoultz remarks, the "disaggregation" of Latin America in two regions was 
not only supported by the United States, but by South American countries as well.397 
However, there is more to this support than Schoultz's observation that the South 
American countries were indeed willing to "let the United States dominate the Caribbean 
region." As mentioned earlier, a system of power politics had developed in South 
America that had little relation to North America, so that South American countries were 
less concerned about Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean than they were about 
their own regional subsystem, whose core was then composed of Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile. If proximity from the United States led nearby countries to generally fear US 
power, geographic distance and regional power politics provided South American states 
with a different perspective. Contrary to the general assumption, their policy towards the 
United States was generally "subordinate" to their "South American policy,"399 which 
means that they tended to look to the United States mostly in terms of their own regional 
situation. The same was true for smaller South American countries, which were generally 
more concerned about their own neighbors. For example, Arthur Whitaker shows that 
prominent Uruguayan statesman Luis Alberto de Herrera saw US friendship as 
"exceptionally important to Uruguay because (and he recorded this comforting thought 
twice in three pages) a mere hint from 'that great power' would be enough to 'call our 
neighbors to order' and 'restrain Argentina's pretensions in the Plata estuary'." For 
Herrera, who was the Uruguayan envoy to the United States in the early 1900s, the 
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United States "would continue to expand, but not south of Panama, and it would not 
intervene in South America 'in this century', for 'no urgent interest calls the Colossus 
here'." He therefore concluded that the Monroe Doctrine "is no threat to us."400 Around 
the same period, an Argentinean author observed that "in the two opportunities that called 
for" the application of the Monroe Doctrine in the case of Argentina, the United States 
did not act: during the imbroglio with Great Britain involving the Falklands Islands, and 
during the Anglo-French blockade of Buenos Aires. He therefore concluded that 
South America was "out of reach of Monroeism" and could develop itself as an 
independent center of international politics. As a matter of fact, one author remarked 
that by the early twentieth century there was in Argentina an "awareness of the fact that 
[Roosevelt] had distinguished between Central and South America," and when he visited 
Buenos Aires as an ex-president in 1913 "he received ovations wherever he went" and 
reinforced once again that "the Monroe Doctrine is not intended to apply to 
Argentina,"403 implying that Argentina had the means to protect itself. 
No country in South America had a more favorable view of the Monroe Doctrine 
and of US policies at the time than Brazil, which, after Root's visit to the country in 
occasion of the third Pan American Conference, changed the name of the building where 
the sessions were held to "Monroe Palace." Indeed, the interpretation of the Monroe 
Doctrine given by Brazil was very similar to the notion expressed by Theodore Roosevelt 
himself. One possible reason for this is that, contrary to Mexico, which had good reasons 
400
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to be suspicious of US power, for Brazil, US interventions in the North American half of 
the Western Hemisphere not only did not threaten its national interests but apparently it 
"raised the matter of whether Brazil might be able to manifest greater influence, greater 
hegemony, on its borders as well."404 This notion that Brazil would acknowledge the 
hegemony of the United States in North America while hoping that the United States 
would respect Brazilian pretensions of having its own sphere of influence in South 
America was the basis of what E. Bradford Burns famously called the "unwritten 
alliance" between the two countries. 5 Brazil, which had been the "only Latin American 
nation sympathetic to the United States during the Spanish-American War," 406 gave its 
own "multilateral interpretation" of the Monroe Doctrine as a "responsibility of the 
hemisphere." 407 Thus, whereas other Latin American countries stressed the unilateralist 
aspect of the Monroe Doctrine, Brazil emphasized its "collectivist nature" instead. 408 
As such, the new Republic of Brazil saw the Roosevelt Corollary with very clear 
eyes. One example can be found in the following sentence: 
If those countries do not know how to govern themselves, if they do not possess 
those elements necessary to avoid continual revolutions and civil wars that follow 
one another ceaselessly, they do not have a right to exist and ought to give up 
their place to a stronger, better organized, more progressive, and more virile 
nation.409 
What sounds like a statement coming from the mouth of Theodore Roosevelt 
himself is actually an excerpt of an interview from Rio Branco, the renowned Brazilian 
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Foreign Minister, to an Argentinean journalist. In fact, in stark opposition to the majority 
of Latin American countries, "Brazil was traditionally much less critical of forceful 
American diplomacy in Central America and the Caribbean region." 410 While this 
position can be "partly explained by the fact that Brazil had little political or economic 
contact with the area," 41' it also reflected the Brazilian view of South America and North 
America as two distinct systems that operated with different logics. For example, when 
the United States intervened in Cuba in 1902, Brazil "adopted a sympathetic attitude," 
but when the United States seemed to support Bolivia in a dispute with Brazil in the same 
year, the Brazilian government reacted by ordering the closure of the Amazon River to 
foreign shipping, which irritated the United States. Similarly, when Panama seceded 
from Colombia in 1903 with US backing, Brazilian official reactions "were generally 
favorable," and the public opinion was "indifferent."413 In contrast, Rio Branco "reacted 
energetically" when the United States attempted to favor Peru in a territorial dispute with 
Brazil 414 and threatened to break diplomatic relations with the United States when the 
Taft administration, in consonance with the "Dollar Diplomacy" that was then underway, 
issued an ultimatum to Chile to pay reparations in an issue involving a US private 
company.415 Commenting on the US interference in the case of the territorial dispute with 
Peru in a telegram to Joaquim Nabuco, the Brazilian ambassador in Washington, Rio 
Branco remarked that 
410
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I understand to be our right to operate in this part of the continent without asking 
for permission or to give explanations to this [US] government, as for the several 
proofs of our friendship we have the right to expect that they do not get involved 
to help our opponents on matters in which we are engaged. 
Moniz Bandeira interprets Rio Branco's notion of a special relationship with the 
United States as a view of "the transformation of the continent in a sort of condominium, 
where Brazil would have a free hand to exert its hegemony in South America" and 
therefore would "preserve its independence of action" in that regional subsystem, even if 
that occasionally meant confronting the United States.417 For Joseph Smith, Rio Branco 
used a "strategy combining firmness with friendliness" in the cases of border disputes 
with its neighbors in order to keep the United States out of South American affairs.418 
In the United States, for the most part, the view that Brazil could be responsible 
for enforcing the Monroe Doctrine in the southern part of the hemisphere seemed to find 
"a climate of opinion favorable to its claim of moral hegemony over South America."419 
One article in the newspaper The Washington Star about Root's tour to South America 
asserted that the purpose of the US government was "to arrange an informal - but none 
the less strong - alliance with Brazil, and to relegate to her the policy of the Monroe 
Doctrine in South America."420 Two years later, the New York Times commented that 
"The two republics [United States and Brazil] are working out on the Northern and 
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Southern Continents of America aims of substantially the same nature, by institutions and 
methods closely allied in principle" 
Another aspect of Rio Branco's strategy within the framework of an unwritten 
alliance with the United States was the organization of the South American space along 
with the other two regional powers, Chile and Argentina. If US statesmen treated the 
North American and the South American regional subsystems differently, this attitude 
was reciprocated by the South American leaders, particularly in Brazil. Like Roosevelt 
and Root, Rio Branco considered that Brazil, Argentina, and Chile had no reasons to be 
concerned about the Roosevelt Corollary, adding that "the Latin American republics that 
feel threatened by the US international police" should simply decide to "choose honest 
499 
and provident governments." Thus, in order to do its part in South America, Rio 
Branco conceived a pact that became known as the ABC, which would give Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile the responsibility for guaranteeing the maintenance of peace and order 
in the southern half of the Americas. For Burns, the purpose of the ABC pact was to 
establish a "moral policing by the large South American republics" with a purpose 
similar to Roosevelt's in North America, that is, "the maintenance of stable and 
responsible governments." One Brazilian scholar, who examined primary Brazilian 
sources during the initial formulation of the ABC treaty, concluded that Rio Branco's 
central objective was to establish a "shared hegemony" in South America among the 
signatories. Nevertheless, traditional regional rivalries hindered the formalization of 
the ABC treaty as conceived by Rio Branco in 1909. A few years later, however, on May 
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25, 1915, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile finally signed a formal treaty with a more limited 
scope than the original Rio Branco's conception and the aim of facilitating the solution of 
controversies among the three South American countries. The treaty was initially 
received with concern by the Wilson administration, which though it could "compete 
with the Pan American pact." 5 Although it was never ratified by the governments, the 
ABC Treaty represented an important diplomatic effort and consolidated the view of the 
three countries as the key to US policies in the Southern part of the hemisphere. 
FROM ABC TO B 
As for the relation between the ABC countries and the United States, some 
noteworthy changes occurred in the first decades of the twentieth century, which 
contributed to giving Brazil a central role in US foreign policy towards South America. 
The first change was the decline of the relative power of Chile, which had been one of the 
most powerful countries in the hemisphere. Two factors contributed to this decline: first, 
there were internal disorders that eventually led to a civil war in 1891426 and the growth 
of relative power by the other two South American powers, Brazil and Argentina, which 
now struggled for continental predominance. The second change that affected the 
relations between the United States and the three countries that composed the core of the 
South American regional subsystem was the foreign policy that was eventually followed 
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by Argentina during and after the First World War. Like Chile and Mexico, Argentina 
was neutral during the conflict, but, after the war, the Argentinean government adopted a 
posture that at times was frontally opposed to the United States. In fact, during the war, 
the Argentinean attitude was "regarded as a fully conscious challenge to United States 
leadership in the hemisphere."427 This posture was generally kept throughout the Second 
World War as well, and Argentina was one of the few countries refusing to make an open 
commitment to the war effort, which helped to undermine US attempts to implement the 
"Good Neighbor Policy" in that part of the hemisphere.428 When Argentina later joined 
the Allies in breaking relations with Germany and Japan - with WWII already practically 
over - its actions justified more in terms of sympathies towards Great Britain than 
because of any belief in hemispheric solidarity. In fact, the "Argentina problem" was a 
constant preoccupation for US policymakers when dealing with South America around 
the period of World War II.430 In his memoirs, Secretary of State Cordell Hull went as far 
as to call Argentina a "bad neighbor." ] This Argentinean approach to foreign policy 
would only change in the late eighties, when "Argentina developed a bond with the 
4 "3 9 
United States unlike it had ever had before." 
In a stark contrast, Brazil's policy was "as conciliatory and obliging as possible" 
A'l'i 
towards the United States. Rio Branco's conception of an unwritten alliance with the 
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United States - even if at times it was not reciprocated by the North American country -
was kept with impressive constancy. For example, by the time of the sixth Pan American 
Conference in Havana in 1928, Brazil sided with the United States against the criticism 
that the latter country was receiving because of the constant interventions in the 
Caribbean. Most importantly, Brazil was the only Latin American country with 
effective participation in both world wars. During the First World War, it was the only 
country in the hemisphere to cooperate militarily with the United States, and in the 
Second World War it even contributed with an infantry division that engaged in combat 
on the Italian front, again the only Latin American country to do so. One explanation for 
this Brazilian position, which was evident since the years of Rio Branco, was that US 
friendship provided "a value counterweight against any potential hostility from the 
Spanish-American nations."435 Therefore, whereas Argentina had, since the First World 
War, "flirted with Pan Hispanic alternatives" of integration, Brazil remained steadily 
supportive of US hemispheric approach, thus becoming the "pivot" of US policies in 
South America.436 
For the purposes of the present study, the important thing to observe in regards 
both to the Argentinean and Brazilian foreign policies was that they represented two 
different approaches with similar ends - to achieve a privileged position in their own 
regional subsystem. In this sense, the two countries' relationships with the United States 
434
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should be looked at beyond the mere bilateral framework, but especially within the 
context of their own regional subsystemic preoccupations. For example, when 
Argentinean officials - concerned about the military collaboration between the United 
States and Brazil - approached the United States during the Second World War, the 
Argentinean foreign minister asked his US counterpart if the United States would make a 
"gesture of genuine friendship" by sending armaments to Argentina in order "to restore 
Argentina to the position of equilibrium to which it is entitled with respect to other South 
American republics." 437 Because of Argentina's lack of collaboration in the war, this 
requested was promptly rejected by the United States, but it again serves to show that the 
main concern of Argentina was its relation to other South American countries. 
Conversely, Brazil's collaboration with the United States was intimately related to its 
"ambitions to be the leading power in South America," which in fact happened with US 
help when Brazil "was rewarded with economic and military benefits, especially in 
World War II when substantial U.S. Lend-Lease aid enabled Brazil to surpass Argentina 
• 4^8 
and become the leading military power in South America." As one author puts it, 
Brazil's "unwritten alliance" with the United States helped to advance Brazilian foreign 
policy goals such as "the neutralization of Argentine designs of regional leadership."4 
Indeed, Brazil saw the support of US foreign policies in regions other than South 
America as the better strategy to guarantee the Brazilian position in their own regional 
subsystem. For example, when one of the most prominent Brazilian diplomats, Oswaldo 
Aranha, was the ambassador in Washington, he commented to Under Secretary of State 
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Summer Welles in 1935 that "nothing explains our support to the United States in its 
Central American and world issues, without a reciprocal attitude of support to Brazil in 
South America."440 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The examination of the early interactions among the independent American states 
offers a good opportunity to detect the development of patterns of relationships between 
the United States and the different parts of Latin America that were functions both of 
geography and of the particular characteristics of some South American states. These 
factors reciprocally reinforced each other, as both distance and internal characteristics 
allowed South America to develop a system of power politics that was often just 
marginally connected with the United States and which evidently was not the case for 
Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. Nevertheless, in other to make these 
patterns more evident, it is necessary to reinterpret the policy that was definitely the most 
significant US initiative towards Latin America during these early stages - the Monroe 
Doctrine. While the original declaration of 1823 did not make any differentiation 
between the two halves of the Americas, the actual practices after 1823 increasingly 
made evident the Caribbean scope of the Monroe Doctrine. In fact, two of the most 
interventionist US presidents of the twentieth century in Latin America, Theodore 
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, explicitly made a differentiation between South 
America and the rest of Latin America. They were able to make this differentiation 
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because South America could be organized around a core of states - the ABC countries -
that were relatively stable and therefore could be counted on to stabilize their own 
neighborhood. This meant that the Roosevelt Corollary, commonly seen as a prime 
example of US unilateral and imperial disposition in Latin America, actually had a 
multilateral component that is often neglect by the literature. 
No other country in South America was more enthusiastic about the multilateral 
facet of the Roosevelt Corollary than Brazil. For the largest South American country, 
Roosevelt's approach to the Monroe Doctrine was a confirmation of Brazil's view of 
South America as its area of influence, which was the basis for the Brazilian policy of an 
"unwritten alliance" with the United States. This policy meant that while Brazil would 
support US designs in the North American subsystem, composed by Mexico, Central 
America and the Caribbean, it would expect the United States to support Brazilian 
aspirations in South America. This became increasingly evident as Brazil was often the 
lonely Latin American supporter of US actions in the North American subsystem, 
beginning with the Spanish-American War, while it reacted strongly against a number of 
US attempts to meddle in affairs that affected Brazilian interests in South America. The 
fact that Brazil was the main supporter of the multilateral view of the Monroe Doctrine 
became progressively more significant as Chile decreased in power by the end of the 
nineteenth century and Argentina adopted a foreign policy that was often confrontational 
towards the United States by the early decades of the twentieth century. 
Both Argentinean and Brazilian foreign policies basically sought to establish 
predominance in South America, but while Argentina believed it could achieve this by 
keeping the distance from the United States in order to show autonomy and lead the 
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Spanish-speaking countries, Brazil had a different perspective in which it saw the 
approximation with the United States as an important factor for its pretensions in South 
America. In other words, while one sought leadership through distancing from the United 
States, the other sought it through approximation. One author remarks that, in the end, 
both Brazil and Argentina had "the same independent policy" towards the United States, 
with the difference being "that Brazil publicly and privately at every turn assured the 
United States of its solidarity, whereas Argentina seemed to take pride in open 
confrontations with Washington." 
By reducing the benefits for the United States to change the subsystemic 
configuration in South America - or increasing the benefits for the maintenance of the 
status quo - the US-Brazilian unofficial entente contributed to hold the United States 
generally at arm's length in the southern part of the hemisphere. This relative absence 
meant that the foreign policies of South American states were primarily concerned with 
their own neighbors, and the relationship with the United States was subordinate to their 
regional subsystemic considerations. This assumption was and has been valid ever since, 
and it should be taken into consideration when analyzing both the foreign policy of the 
United States towards South America as well as the foreign policies of South American 
countries. Nevertheless, as time goes on and as states interact and the international 
system changes, other regional subsystemic dynamics may be uncovered. When the Cold 
War transformed the United States in a global superpower with concerns beyond the 
Western Hemisphere, it also greatly increased the incentives for the United States to 
become more actively involved in South America in order to stop the advance of 
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Communism. Brazil would have to review the earlier "unwritten alliance" strategy in 
order to affect the new structures of costs and benefits for US intervention. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOUTH AMERICAN SUBSYSTEM DURING 
THE COLD WAR 
With the end of the Second World War and the reconfiguration of the 
international system, the United States would take on new priorities in its foreign policy 
and turn its eyes mostly toward Europe, which meant that its policies in the hemisphere 
tended to be generally relegated to a second plan. As Whitaker remarks, after the forties, 
the main substance of the "Western Hemisphere Idea" with its emphasis on the separation 
between the American and the European continent, was basically lost since, from the 
point of view of US policy-makers, the world was now divided between communists and 
non-communists and Western Europe became a natural ally. The kind of interests the 
United States had when it was a regional power would thus be reframed to fit the new 
international environment in which it occupied a key position as a global power. 
The ideological aspect of the Cold War bipolar system was particularly important 
in US relations with Latin Americans countries, which meant that the central goal of US 
foreign policy during the Cold War - to contain the spread of communism - would 
strongly characterize the hemispheric approach of the United States. Even though the 
United States had essentially the same policy towards the whole of Latin America, the 
argument put forward by this dissertation is that the regional subsystemic perspective 
allows the analyst to uncover distinct regional dynamics of a policy that was global in 
Arthur Preston Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1954), 154-77. 
character. The objective of this chapter is to show that despite having now both the 
capabilities and the interest to shape new patterns of relationships in the hemisphere that 
would lead to a regional system change, regional subsystemic dynamics contributed to 
keep the stability of the South American subsystem. In other words, even during the Cold 
War, a case can be made that if the United States could now be characterized as a global 
empire, in the South American subsystem it remained a relatively absent one, which 
evidently does not mean that it was not a relevant player. 
Obviously, within the North American subsystem, the United States was anything 
but absent, despite often-heard claims of episodes of "neglect."444 US troops invaded the 
Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, and Panama in 1989, and although it did 
not send troops, the United States was actively involved in overt and covert operations to 
topple governments - including equipping and training armed groups - in Guatemala, in 
1958, in Cuba in 1961, and in Nicaragua in the eighties. These interventions - all of them 
north of the Panama Canal - were carried out under different administrations, when both 
Republican and Democrat Presidents occupied the White House. In fact, the period of the 
Cold War provides perhaps the clearest evidence of the existence of two different 
regional subsystems in the Americas, but typical analyses based on the notion of Latin 
America as a homogeneous entity in international politics coupled with a perspective that 
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neglects regional subsystemic pressures often overlook this reality. To help to make their 
case, these analysts commonly present as evidence of a pattern of relationships 
throughout Latin America the case of the military coup that overthrew the Salvador 
Allende government in Chile, in 1973. 
This chapter examines US participation in the overthrow of the Chilean 
government in 1973 in order to demonstrate that both the Johnson and the Nixon 
administrations were greatly concerned about the Chilean situation, and yet they stopped 
short of pursuing truly imperial policies that would have had a better chance to decisively 
affect the outcome of events. The chapter shows that the bulk of US actions was 
concentrated before Allende was elected in 1970 and were aimed towards avoiding him 
from taking office. Allende's ascension to the presidency in Chile is thus a clear 
illustration of the limitations of the kind of policies the United States pursued. 
Additionally, this chapter asserts that while there is no clear evidence of US direct 
involvement in the coup that eventually overthrew Allende, there are a number of 
indications pointing towards a Brazilian connection, which is little explored by the 
literature because of the lack of available documentation, especially when compared to 
the abundance of documents from the US side. It is demonstrated that Brazil's military 
regime's involvement in Chile can be largely understood as an extension of its overall 
policy in South America, both before and after 1973, which permitted the United States 
to limit its involvement in the region. In other words, Brazil's interventionist disposition, 
which could be termed as a sort of "regional imperialism," increased the benefits of 
subsystemic stability for the United States. The chapter claims that Brazil's position was 
not be subordinated by the US, but rather that its interests coincided with those of the 
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United States. To reinforce this point, the role of the United States in the 1964 military 
coup in Brazil is put in perspective. 
BUILDING A NARRATIVE 
The case of the military coup that overthrew the Salvador Allende government in 
Chile fits perfectly the common narrative of an American (or Latin American) regional 
subsystem in which US hegemony is exercised rather homogeneously in what is, after all, 
typically considered to be its "backyard." For example, in his otherwise insightful work 
on regions, Peter Katzenstein argues that, contrary to Asia and Europe, there are no 
regional powers in the American continent because the "overwhelming presence of the 
United States dwarfs all other states and has prevented the emergence of states both 
supportive of American purpose and power and central to the region's political affairs." 
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 The "region" that Katzenstein has in mind is a coherent entity composed by Latin 
America plus Canada, both uniformly subjected to US power, since they would be "close 
to the center of the American imperium." 446 In the case of Latin America, this 
overwhelming US presence would yield a particular kind of regionalism based on 
"informal rule, patron-client relations, coercive diplomacy, and military interventions." 
As evidence of this pattern of relationship, Katzenstein mentions US interventions in 
Central America together with the "deep U.S. involvement in the overthrow of the 
Salvador Allende government in Chile" as being both equally strong examples of "the 
Katzenstein, A World of Regions : Asia and Europe in the American Imperium: 226. 
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behavior of a traditional imperial power." Similarly, David Mares mentions that, 
contrary to Cuba, "Guatemala (1954) and Chile (1973) were unable to break away from 
U.S. dominance."449 Likewise, Cole Blasier puts US activities in Chile together with 
Guatemala, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic in the same level of US "interference" in 
Latin America.450 This narrative still remains strong. A recent book on United States 
relations with Latin America argues that the United States "has shaped Latin American 
history, intervening at key moments (Guatemala 1954; Chile 1973; Nicaragua 1979; El 
Salvador 1979-82)."451 
The examples above suggest that, by bundling together US actions toward Chile 
with interventions elsewhere in Latin America, an impression of cohesiveness is created. 
The problem with this approach is that it not only neglects fundamental differences 
between the US participation in the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile and, for 
example, the overthrown of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, but also overlooks the 
important role played by external forces other than the United States in the South 
American case. One reason for these analytical simplifications may be the use of 
approaches that are excessively US-centered, coupled with the lack of a theoretical 
framework able to offer explanations for moving beyond the domestic-
system/international-system dichotomy. This dissertation maintains that the regional 
subsystemic perspective can fill this gap and provide a distinctive narrative for the 
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Chilean case in particular, and for South America in general. This alternative narrative 
would relativize the role of the United States by stressing regional subsystemic pressures. 
Obviously, in the Cold War environment of the time, successive US 
administrations were concerned about the situation in Chile, Brazil, and elsewhere in 
South America where regimes that were perceived as being sympathetic to communism 
coming to power. This concern was indeed translated into policies that actively sought to 
prevent these regimes from coming to power, or to negatively affect them subsequently. 
To expect the United States to stay on the sidelines during the Cold War whenever there 
was a perception of increased Soviet influence in Latin America would be unrealistic. 
However, putting unilateral armed interventions in Central America and the Caribbean 
under the same category of the kind of actions the United States undertook in South 
America is confounding an imperial policy with a great power policy. The objectives of 
the United States were the same in all Latin America, as they were in the rest of the world 
during the Cold War: to contain the spread of communism. Nevertheless, it can be argued 
that the outcome of these policies varied according to the particular configuration of 
distinct regional subsystems. In the North American subsystem, both during and before 
the Cold War, the United States often acted as an empire, sending its own troops or 
training and equipping mercenary armies in order to pursue its objectives. In the South 
American subsystem the same measures were not taken - not necessarily because the US 
could not or did not want to, but mainly because, as will be shown below, it did not need 
to. Treating Latin America as a coherent regional subsystem where US influence is 
exercised homogenously blurs this distinction and oversimplifies the analysis with 
detrimental consequences for policy-makers and academics alike. 
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THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY COUP AND US INFLUENCE 
Because the role of the then Brazilian military government is central for the 
argument developed in this chapter, it is necessary first to address the extent of US 
influence in the Brazilian case. As in the case of Chile, the coinciding of the US foreign 
policy establishment's wishes and the actual unfolding of events is often interpreted as 
evidence of a causal relationship. For example, Jan Black saw US influence as a 
"significant contributing factor" to the 1964 military coup in Brazil 452 and interpreted 
this and the subsequent coups in South America as evidence of the "the consolidation of 
U.S. hegemony, or dominance, over the furthermost reaches of the South American 
continent." 453 In a study of US interventions after World War II, William Blum 
contends that in the case of the military coup in Brazil, the "American Embassy had been 
intimately involved." 454 In his well-known CIA Diary, former CIA officer Philipp Agee 
wrote from Uruguay in an entry one day after the Brazilian coup that the overthrow of the 
civilian regime was "without doubt largely due to careful planning and consistent 
propaganda campaigns dating at least back to the 1962 election operation," when the US 
government financed opposition candidates in Brazil.455 Agee reaches this post-factum 
conclusion even though there is barely any mention of CIA activities in Brazil earlier in 
his diary, the first entry of which goes back to 1956. Therefore, as in the case of Chile, 
the political outcome in Brazil in 1964 is also commonly mentioned as evidence of a 
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uniform dominance of the United States over Latin America, even though there seems to 
be an acknowledgment that the extend of US involvement in the Brazilian case was far 
less significant than in the Chilean coup of 1973. 
Basically, two kinds of evidences are frequently presented to make the case for 
US influence on the Brazilian military takeover of 1964. The first and most recent, which 
was uncovered several years after the coup, is the fact that the United States government 
had prepared a "contingency plan" to intervene in Brazil and support the plotters in the 
case of a prolonged civil war. The second relates to the period before the coup, when the 
United States on one hand supported opposition candidates and anti-communist forces, 
and on the other made efforts to indoctrinate the Brazilian military. As for the first 
evidence, the support is usually offered through quotes from US officials and the so 
called "Operation Brother Sam," which consisted of a plan for providing equipment and 
especially petroleum to the coup plotters. In fact, official documents declassified in 2004 
show President Lyndon Johnson saying over the phone that "we ought to take every step 
that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need" to support the overthrow of 
Brazil's civilian government. These documents also show the arrangements made for the 
shipment of weapons, ammunition, and oil to Brazil. 5 Although then US ambassador to 
Brazil Lincoln Gordon later remarked that the coup plotters "knew nothing whatever 
about the 'Brother Sam' task force," 457 other analysts dispute this information. One recent 
study on the "Operation Brother Sam" by the Brazilian historian Carlos Fico, who 
examined a number of official US and Brazilian declassified documents, maintains that 
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Brazilians were, in fact, aware of the operation. Indeed, one of the most active coup 
plotters stated that he had actually asked the US military attache Vernon Walters if the 
United States could supply petroleum in case the coup led to a prolonged fight, which in 
turn would have led to the "Operation Brother Sam."459 It should be noted that this 
passage is the only reference made to US participation in the long interview he gave to 
the book editors. In fact, it is hard to find any mention of decisive US participation or 
influence in the memoirs published by the Brazilian officers who participated in the coup. 
In any case, the best conclusion that can be reached by analyzing the currently 
available documentation is that it demonstrates an "interventionist disposition" of the 
United States.460 Johnson's statement on being "prepared to do everything we need to do" 
was made on March 31, 1964, and Brazil already had a military government on the next 
day without a civil war or significant disorder. Likewise, preparations for "Operation 
Brother Sam" began in late March and, as Gordon points out, "was still ten days' sailing 
time away when Goulart abandoned the presidency." ' The fact of the matter is that all 
US planning proved unnecessary, as the coup went forth without any help from the 
United States. Indeed, it is clear that "Brazil's military leaders resolved to act, with or 
without Washington's approbation."462 As Phyllis Parker remarked, [a]ll planned U.S. 
support was of a marginal nature" and the United States was not involved in the coup 
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"because there was no need to be." When the Johnson administration decided it should 
help the coup to come about, it was already too late. Although occasionally underplaying 
the extent of US knowledge about the coup, the evidences to date seem to corroborate 
Ambassador Gordon's confirmation "that we welcomed the overthrown of Goulart is 
well known. But there was no American participation in his removal by military 
force."4 4 What would have happened had the fight been prolonged and a civil war 
ensued is a matter for speculation, but the obvious fact is that actual intervention should 
not be confused with potential or desired intervention. "Operation Brother Sam" is a clear 
example of US willingness, interest, and capability to intervene in South America. Its 
outcome is a clear example of its needlessness. 
The second argument presented for making the case for US influence on the 1964 
military coup in Brazil asserts that the United States was actually not too late because it 
had helped to create the conditions for the coup through earlier covert operations 
designed to strengthen anti-communist forces and through its supposed indoctrination of 
Brazilian military officers. This is the line with the argument made by Agee immediately 
after the coup, when he attributed it to US "careful planning and consistent propaganda 
campaigns." 465 Likewise, Jan Black and Ruth Leacock mention US assistance to 
opposition candidates in the Brazilian 1962 elections as having played a central role.466 
Leacock points out that the United States funded "some of the anticommunist literature" 
in Brazil and provided an opposition candidate for governor in the Northeast state of 
463
 Phyllis R. Parker, Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964, Texas Pan American series (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1979), 104. 
Gordon, Brazil's Second Chance : En Route toward the First World: 64. 
Agee, Inside the Company : CI.A Diary: 362. 
Black, United States Penetration of Brazil: 66-67; Ruth Leacock, Requiem for Revolution: The United 
States and Brazil, 1961-1969, American Diplomatic History (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 
1990), 119. 
167 
Pernambuco with "anticommunist films, comic books, and pamphlets."467 The author 
regards such activities as examples of "extensive American interference."468 
Nevertheless, the results of aforesaid US support were virtually fruitless since the US-
funded opposition gubernatorial candidate mentioned by Leacock lost the election to an 
openly pro-communist candidate and the general outcome of US support to the 
opposition 1962 was extraordinarily unimpressive as it did little to alter the balance of 
political forces prevailing before the 1962 election. In fact, in that election, leftist forces 
gained more space in the Brazilian political landscape.469 Moniz Bandeira remarks that 
the money spent to influence Brazilian elections "were not good for the CIA." 470 As 
Robert Wesson notices, "[t]he concrete actions taken [by the United States] seem to have 
been trivial in their effects."471 
If the support for opposition candidates was anything but effective, on the other 
hand there is the argument that at least the United States was successful in indoctrinating 
the Brazilian military into anti-communist ideology and teaching them the intricacies of 
counterinsurgency tactics. Here, the role of the Brazilian ESG - Escola Superior de 
Guerra (commonly translated to English as Superior School of War) is regarded as 
central, since many of the coup plotters attended that institution, which was inspired by 
the National War College in the United States. For Leacock, "under American guidance," 
the ESG "stressed anticommunism and the American view of the Cold War."472 Black 
also emphasizes the US influence in that institute and thus over the coup plotters and 
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concludes that support of, association with, and training by the U.S. military reinforced 
the anti-democratic biases of the Brazilian military elite." 473 A more careful examination 
would demonstrate that such allegations seem exaggerated at best. Besides the fact that 
Black presents no evidence that association with the US military would reinforce the 
supposedly "anti-democratic biases of the Brazilian military elite," which sounds 
somewhat counterintuitive, a more important question is whether the Brazilian military 
needed to be educated by the United States as to the alleged perils of communism. After 
all, the army in Brazil was concerned about communism even before the Cold War. One 
Brazilian diplomat argues that anticommunism in the Brazilian army dates back at least 
to 1935, when military officials linked to the Brazilian Communist Party staged a revolt 
in order to overthrow the president and establish a communist government.474 This 
episode led to the persecution of individuals associated with communism in Brazil, and 
was used as a justification for giving dictatorial powers to President Getulio Vargas in 
1937. By 1939, the Chief of Staff of the Brazilian army exteriorized concerns with the 
"Bolshevik menace."475 Interestingly enough, in view of what later happened in the 
United States in the fifties, US ambassador to Brazil Adolf Berle Jr. asked in 1945 for an 
end to the persecution of communists in Brazil. 7 Against the advice of US Secretary of 
State George Marshall, Brazil was the first country in the western world to break 
relations with Moscow, and a Brazilian General is reported to have criticized the Truman 
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administration for its "excessive tolerance" of communism. When Truman visited 
Brazil, it was Brazilian President Dutra who asked him to put anti-communism at the top 
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of his agenda.478 By 1951, the Brazilian army had produced a report entitled 
"Communism in Brazil" in which it expressed special worries about communist 
infiltration in the army. 7 Hence, when the United States became concerned with the 
advancement of communism in Latin America in the early sixties, after the Cuban 
Revolution, the Brazilian Generals needed no indoctrination. In fact, the Brazilian 
Army's annual report in 1961 already expressed concern with Cuba and its "subversive 
ideas" as well as with communist activities in Brazil.480 As had been the case with 
Truman years earlier, when the Nixon administration developed the policy of detente, 
some in the Brazilian military criticized the US President for being too "soft" on 
communism. 81 
However, it could be argued that even if there was no need to teach anti-
communism to the Brazilian army, "American guidance" and "training," particularly 
through the ESG, would constitute central factors in the development of the 
counterinsurgency strategy that was employed to fight domestic subversion. Here again, 
closer examination of domestic dynamics put these allegations under perspective. 
Brazilian General Cordeiro de Farias, who was responsible for the organization of the 
ESG during its initial years - in the late forties, it should be noted - recounts the episode 
when the US government sent three military officers to provide advising for the 
establishment of the school, which was, after all, inspired by the National War College. 
According to Farias, the US officers 
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came in with the statute of the National War College and tried to make us adopt it 
without restrictions, claiming that what had worked in the United States would 
work for Brazil. I fought against them but I could not convince them. I defended 
the proposition that the ESG, as a center of studies, could not be disconnected 
from our national concerns. 
General Farias concludes that after he took the US officers on a trip throughout 
Brazil, they were finally convinced of the need to adapt the school to the particularities of 
the country. In fact, as Alfred Stepan remarks, the Brazilian institution had two 
fundamental differences in relation to its US model. The first was that, because of 
Brazil's condition as a developing country, "the question of a strong armed force could 
not be separated from the question of economic development" and therefore there was the 
need to put greater "emphasis on internal aspects of development and security." 483 It 
should be noted that the United States would only incorporate the notion of development 
in the concept of security by the sixties. Hence, when the Kennedy administration came 
up with the Alliance for Progress linking instability with poverty, it was not launching a 
revolutionary new idea but answering to a demand that existed previously. The second 
difference between the National War College and the Escola Superior de Guerra relates 
to the first. Because of the central focus on development, in contrast to the largely 
military-oriented National War College, civilian participation would be a key aspect in 
the Brazilian institution.484 
As for US training of Brazilian officers in counterinsurgency strategies, this is 
also an argument that loses some of its appeal when the researcher is curious enough to 
investigate its actual validity. When one examines the origins of the so called 
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"counterrevolutionary theory," the original contributions of the French become evident. 
While in the United States the notion of "counterinsurgency" acquired relevance only 
with the war in Vietnam, the French, who had already fought and been defeated in 
Indochina, had by then developed the notion of "guerre revolutionnaire," and were 
48S 
applying it in the Algerian war during the fifties. It is revealing that when US 
Lieutenant-Colonel Donn A. Starry drew attention in 1967 to the fact that the United 
States had only been giving serious consideration to the problem of "wars of liberation" 
since 1961, he entitled his article as "La Guerre Revolutionnaire." In comparison to 
the French approach, John Shy and Thomas Collier regard the US counterinsurgency 
strategy developed during the Vietnam War as "shallow" with an inadequate "almost 
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purely military approach." Armand Mattelart remarks that although the US military 
had to deal with counterinsurgency strategies before, it had not been translated into a 
formal doctrine, since the "strategic consciousness" in the United States 
was totally absorbed in deterrence and the debate between partisans of 'massive 
retaliation' and those who favored 'flexible response' [...] There was a prevailing 
belief in technological determinism, conductive to viewing the future from the 
perspective of nuclear apocalypse. 488 
This is the basic reason why the Brazilian army did not look for inspiration in the 
US strategy in Vietnam, which did not fit the domestic reality in Brazil, but to the French 
experience in Algeria. The libraries of the Brazilian army were indeed filled with French 
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literature on the Algerian War. Commenting on the development of counterinsurgency 
strategies in ESG, a Brazilian General singles out the "French military literature" as a 
decisive influence.490 Certainly, Brazilians Generals had no problems reading in French, 
as many of them attended schools in France, including the first president of the military 
regime, Castelo Branco. The inauguration speech of General Gois Monteiro as Chief of 
Staff of the Brazilian army in 1937 is permeated with quotes from French Generals, all in 
the original French. A Brazilian military officer commented that "the boasted 
American influence" in the doctrines adopted by the Brazilian army was "practically 
null" and adds that "the future historian, in a serene examination of this episode, will 
certainly find a certain French influence." 
The French influence was not only restricted to Brazil. Ernesto Lopez 
demonstrates that the biggest foreign influence in the development of the Argentinean 
National Security Doctrine also came from France. Several translations to Spanish 
from books written by French generals were published in Buenos Aires,494 and the French 
Colonel Patrice de Naurois wrote several articles for the magazine of the Argentinean 
Escuela Superior de Guerra.495 Thus, the problem of revolutionary war and the strategies 
to fight it were in the minds of Brazilian as well as Argentinean militaries before the 
Kennedy administration shaped its counterinsurgency doctrine in the sixties. While 
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Lopez points out that by 1958 the Argentinean military was already in the final stages of 
the development of its counterrevolutionary doctrine,496 Stepan observes that "[e]ven 
before the emphasis in the cold war shifted in the United States from atomic to 
revolutionary warfare, the ESG became the center of ideological thought concerning 
counterrevolutionary strategy in Brazil." 
Although the CIA collaborated with Brazilian intelligence services, there is no 
evidence of any US official who participated in torture sessions in Brazil. Indeed, the 
most noteworthy case of a relationship between foreign torturers and the Brazilian 
dictatorship was during 1973 when the French government sent to Brazil General Paul 
Aussaresses, a prominent leader of the repression and torture operations in Algeria.498 By 
that year, the School of the Americas, regarded by many as a center for indoctrination of 
Latin American military coup plotters, had received about 30,000 students, with just a 
little over 300 from Brazil.500 Obviously, as Stepan observes, "the United States, as the 
major anti-Communist country, was viewed as a natural ally," 501 and Brazil sought as 
much collaboration as it could - and the United States was willing to provide it, 
particularly after the Cuban Revolution. This was true only to the extent that it was 
understood by the Brazilian military government to serve Brazilian interests - when the 
Carter administration in 1977 required a report on human rights performance by the 
recipients of military assistance, the Brazilian government interpreted it as constituting 
interference in its domestic affairs, and it simply revoked a military assistance agreement 
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that it had with the United States since 1952, virtually ending any formal military 
collaboration between the two countries. Brazil and United States would only sign 
SOI 
another military agreement in 2010. 
BRAZIL'S "REGIONAL IMPERIALISM" IN THE COLD WAR 
The above discussion is pertinent because it helps to understand a reality that is 
repeatedly overlooked by those who neglect the regional subsystemic perspective and 
interpret every episode of the Cold War from the point of view of Washington or 
Moscow. This reality is that the advancement of communism in the world - or what was 
perceived as such - threatened the interests of the United States as a global power, but the 
advancement of communism in South America also threatened the interests of Brazil as a 
regional power, and this had been true even before the inauguration of the military 
regime in 1964, as suggested above. Even President Janio Quadros, whose resignation in 
1961 originated the crises that led to the overthrow of his vice-president Joao Goulart in 
1964, is described as being "viscerally anticommunist."504 In 1961, Quadros considered 
the possibility of annexing Guyana because of what he saw as communist infiltration in 
that country.5 The fact that Quadros famously received Che Guevara in Brazil and 
bestowed a medal of honor on him has equivocally been interpreted as a signal of 
sympathy for communism by those who tend to reason in binary terms, thus failing to 
understand Brazilian political intricacies. These and other symbolic gestures became part 
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of Quadros' foreign policy, which was termed "independent" and it was seen in many 
ways an alibi for his "reactionary" domestic policy.506 In summary, understanding the 
role of Brazil in the South American subsystem during the Cold War begins by 
deconstructing the myth that anticommunism was exclusively a US cause that was 
somehow incorporated by its "client" states through diligent work from Washington. 
Because the typical analyses of the relationship between the United States and 
South America neglect the fact that - for economic, security, and political reasons - the 
advancement of governments that were seen as identifying with communism in South 
America were perceived as a threat to Brazilian interests, the existence of overlapping 
interests is confounded with mere subordination. This interpretation is undoubtedly 
reinforced by the fact that the majority of the declassified documents available for 
research comes from US sources, since much of the Brazilian and South American 
sources remain classified or are simply unavailable because, for example, not many South 
American presidents kept records of their conversations. Without this discernment 
between subordination and overlapping interests, it becomes difficult to understand how 
regional dynamics influenced the extent of US involvement in South America, in 
comparison to elsewhere in Latin America and other parts of the world, beyond the 
argument that it was somehow a matter of lack of interest or neglect. If there is anything 
that the official declassified documents and the sheer amount of money spent in trying to 
influence the political landscape in South America show is that lack of interest is a weak 
explanation. The United States did try to help a coup succeed in Brazil and, as will be 
shown below, actively planned a coup in Chile, but the fact was that the planning was 
never translated into decisive action, that is, the kind of action that the United States as a 
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global power could easily have taken, as it did so many times in Central America, the 
Caribbean, and other parts of the world during the Cold War. The United States did send 
money and equipment, provided training, moral support, and helped anti-communist 
forces throughout South America in order to defend its interests, but it was just supplying 
an existent demand and never went beyond that relatively modest role of supplier, which 
is a far cry from an imperial policy, particularly in its own "backyard." This chapter's 
argument is that one reason for this imperial absence during the Cold War is that the 
United States did not need to adopt a costly imperial policy in South America because its 
major interests coincided with those of Brazil, a country which was willing to actively 
prevent the emergence of governments associated with communism in the South 
American subsystem. 
The reasons for this Brazilian willingness can be found in a combination of rapid 
economic growth with the authoritarian character of the military regime. According to 
Bandeira, this combination allowed Brazil to take an "offensive, imperialist" posture in 
South America.507 Similarly, Wesson notices that Brazilian "economic muscle" in the 
seventies "permitted Brazil to indulge in a little imperialism of its own." Indeed, the 
Brazilian military regime was heavily influenced by a geopolitical view that stressed the 
role of Brazil in South America. The role of the United States was described by the most 
prominent geopolitical theorist of the Brazilian military regime as being part of a 
"barganha leal" or "fair bargain" with Brazil: Brazil would support the United States in 
the global East-West conflict and the United States would support Brazil to fulfill its own 
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"manifest destiny" in South America. This geopolitical perspective, not very different 
from the old idea of an "unwritten alliance," led to the development of the notion of 
"ideological frontiers" and the "encirclement theory." Together, these conceptions meant 
that the advancement of communist regimes in South America would isolate Brazil, and 
thus the challenge should be to "reverse the wave of international subversion" on its 
borders.510 In 1971 Bolivia "got the first stab" 5 n after leftist General Juan Jose Torres 
took power in 1970, the same year Salvador Allende became president in Chile and the 
Brazilian consul in Uruguay was kidnapped by the Tupamaros, a Marxist guerrilla 
organization that operated in that country. 
The coup that toppled Torres in Bolivia counted with "logistical, political, and 
ideological support from Brazil, both in the planning stage as well as in the process of 
execution."5 Brazil helped the coup plotting with "money, arms, aircrafts, and even 
mercenaries" as well as by providing "open logistical support" for the coup itself. 
Brazilian airplanes landed in Bolivian airports to bring equipments without concern of 
concealing its identification. As James Dunkerley observes, "Brazil's intervention was 
scarcely discreet."514 In case the coup failed, the Brazilian government is thought to have 
considered the possibility of direct military intervention.515 The Bolivian coup was also 
supported by the United States and, to a lesser degree, by the Argentine military 
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government. The Bolivian Minister of Interior during the Torres government refers to 
Argentina and Brazil as the "two proimperialist partners," but focuses mostly on the US 
and Brazilian participation, which he defines as a "dark organization of the political 
police in Brazil and the CIA." A few days after the coup, the Brazilian government 
granted Bolivia ten million dollars in credit and an average of forty-six million for the 
following years. To Brazil, the successful coup in Bolivia represented "the end of its 
regional isolation" and led to a "reverse Domino Theory" in South America - Uruguay 
and Chile would come next.519 
In Uruguay, US and Brazilian concerns with the guerilla groups in that country 
became more salient after the head of the US Public Safety program in Uruguay, Dan 
Mitrione, and the Brazilian Consul Aloisio Gomide were kidnapped by the Tupamaros in 
the early seventies. While Gomide was released after seven months, Mitrione was 
executed after the US and Uruguayan government refused to comply with the guerilla's 
demands. Therefore, when the leftist coalition Frente Amplio gained ground in the 1971 
elections, both countries were apprehensive, especially in the view of the victory of the 
Unidad Popular in Chile a year earlier. For the United States a victory of the Frente 
Amplio would represent a dangerous trend in South America, while for Brazil it would 
confirm the view of the "encirclement theory," in addition to representing more 
immediate threats of subversion along its strategic southern border. US documents 
declassified in 2002 make clear the concern of US officials with the situation in Uruguay, 
but do not show any direct involvement or plans to intervene in that country in order to 
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avoid a victory of the Frente Amplio. One of the documents is a secret telegram of the 
State Department to US embassies in Brazil and Argentina asking for their likely reaction 
to a strong showing of the Frente Amplio and mentioning speculations of the Latin 
American press about the "possible Brazilian plan for action in Uruguay to frustrate the 
Frente from taking over, including use of armed force." Another relevant document is 
a "Preliminary Analysis and Strategy Paper" on Uruguay recommending US action in 
five areas: psychological, economic assistance, political, labor and security. However, 
this paper was explicitly written for the subsequent 1972-1976 period, "based on the 
premise that the Frente Amplio will not win the 1971 elections." The major concern of 
the paper was how the United States should proceed to work with the new government 
and to "increase support for the democratic political parties in Uruguay and lessen the 
threat of a political takeover by the Frente." In the security area, the analysis suggested 
that it would be "especially desirable that such neighboring countries as Argentina and 
Brazil collaborate effectively with the Uruguayan security forces and where possible we 
should encourage such cooperation." 
The US documents released to date thus show a combination of concern with the 
situation in Uruguay, and hope that Brazil, or perhaps Argentina, would ultimately take 
action. These US concerns are in line with the expectation of this chapter that the role 
played by Brazil allowed the United States to limit its involvement in South America 
during the Cold War. In fact, the most notorious document released on this issue show 
President Nixon at a meeting with British Prime Minister Edward Heath commenting that 
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"[fjhe Brazilians helped rig the Uruguayan election," in a reference to the supposed fraud 
that would have happened in the 1971 election, won by the incumbent party. The 
Brazilian government was clearly satisfied with the outcome of the elections and the then 
recently elected president of Uruguay immediately declared that he had "ideological 
affinities" with Brazil.523 
What the Nixon administration did not know, besides speculations in the South 
American press, was that the Brazilian army had in place a plan to invade Uruguay in 
case the Frente Amplio won the elections. This plan was called "Operagao Trinta Horas" 
("Operation Thirty Hours") in reference to the time frame estimated by the Brazilian 
military to take over the country.524 As noted above, the unavailability of declassified 
documentation pertaining to the Brazilian military period complicates the task of the 
investigator. Therefore, the evidences must generally be sought in testimonies by people 
involved in the operation or through researchers who had access to them.5 5 Perhaps the 
most explicit testimony from someone directly involved in the plans to invade Uruguay 
came from Brazilian Colonel Dickson Grael, who was a supporter of the 1964 coup but 
later became disillusioned with the course of the military regime. Grael participated in the 
formulation of the plans to invade Uruguay and he makes clear how closely the Brazilian 
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army was from actually intervening. He further claims that Brazilian military units were 
mobilized and put in alert, just waiting for the result of the Uruguayan elections "to 
execute the plan". 6 It is noteworthy that while Brazil explicitly took into consideration 
the Argentinean reaction to a possible invasion of Uruguay, it apparently made no 
mention to the United States'.527 Indeed, a report from the State Department expressed 
that the major concern for the United States in relation to the situation in Uruguay "may 
well not be the outcome of Uruguayan election" but the deterioration of relations between 
Brazil and Argentina or a major change in the regional balance of power in the case of a 
unilateral action from any of them in Uruguayan affairs.52 
CHILE AND THE "BRAZILIAN CONNECTION" 
It is within the context exposed above that Brazilian attitudes toward Chile should 
be understood. Brazil's clear disposition to intervene in Uruguay and Bolivia denoted a 
low level of tolerance for regimes that were identified with communism, both for reasons 
of ideological incompatibility as well as because of a spillover of the domestic repressive 
apparatus. The coincidence in goals with those expressed by US foreign policy during the 
Cold War meant this Brazilian "regional imperialism" allowed the United States to exert 
what one could call a sort of "soft imperialism" in South America.529 Although it is 
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commonly ignored in many studies, the United States was not the only country in the 
hemisphere concerned with Allende's ascension to power in Chile, and Brazilian 
involvement may provide an important part of the explanation when it comes to assessing 
the role of foreign influences in the 1973 coup. Here again, the problem of insufficient 
records on the Brazilian side contrasted with abundant documentation on the US side 
may create the impression of a monologue when there may be in fact more voices 
present. While circumstantial evidence already strongly suggested a "Brazilian 
connection" in the military coup that overthrew Allende, documents declassified in 
2009 present the clearest evidences to date corroborating these suspicions. But before 
analyzing these documents, a brief overview of US actions in Chile is needed. 
Undoubtedly, the best account of US involvement in Chile up until the 1973 coup 
is the 1975 US Senate "Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities," also known as the "Church Report" 
since it was chaired by Senator Franck Church of Idaho.531 Although it was produced 
only two years after the fall of Allende, no new information since then has significantly 
changed the assessments of the Church Report, which remains as the main source of 
information for the majority of the analyses of US activities in Chile. A more recent 
report by the CIA produced in 2000, known as the "Hinchey Report," after US 
concept of imperialism, which, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, is distinct from the argument 
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Congressman Maurice Hinchey of New York, basically corroborates and complements 
the findings of the 1975 Senate report, adding little new information that would 
drastically transform what is currently known about the actual extent of US involvement 
c o o 
in Chile in the events leading to the downfall of Allende. These two reports offer a 
detailed and comprehensive account of US activities in Chile and will thus be used as the 
basic sources for the analysis that follows. 
There are at least two aspects of the US actions in Chile that deserve careful 
consideration in order to produce an accurate analysis. The first is the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of the money spent in covert action in Chile - more than ninety 
percent - was in propaganda, including support for mass media and for political parties. 
From the analyst's point of view, the problem with this kind of strategy is that, in spite of 
some assumptions equating investment in propaganda with actual influence, it is 
obviously complicated to assess its real impact on the overall political process. 
Nevertheless, while it is hard to infer a perfect causal relationship when there is a 
coincidence between the political outcome and the objectives of propaganda action, if the 
first differs from the latter it seems reasonable to assume that the latter was unproductive. 
As mentioned earlier, CIA support for opposition candidates in Brazil's 1963 elections 
was largely fruitless, which made evident the limits of such kind of assistance. Likewise, 
the CIA spent more money in Chile in the period between 1964 and 1969, during the 
Johnson administration, and despite this support the Chilean left gained ground during 
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these years. One could argue that had the United States not helped with money, the left 
would have made even more gains, but, aside from this speculation, the reality shows that 
the actual results could hardly be considered a case of success, as will be further explored 
below. The second aspect of US actions in Chile that deserves special attention is the fact 
that the bulk of CIA activities in Chile, including an attempt to encourage a military 
coup, was concentrated in the period before Allende became president in 1970 and were 
thus aimed to prevent him from taking office. Consequently, the eventual inauguration of 
Allende as the President of Chile is another indication of the actual effectiveness of the 
operations undertaken by the United States in the South American country. 
As noted above, the peak of US propaganda actions in Chile was during the 
period between 1964 and 1969. In spite of the high investment, it is hard to conclude that 
the results were satisfactory. The Church Report remarks that CIA help in 1964 "enabled 
Eduardo Frei to win a clear majority in the 1964 election, instead of merely a plurality," 
but adds that it is not clear "why it was necessary to assure a majority, instead of 
accepting the victory a plurality would have assured." The same report also notices 
that, in the years between 1965 and 1969, the portion of the vote of the CIA-backed 
Christian Democrats fell from forty-three to thirty-one percent. CIA efforts were not only 
concentrated on political parties, but also on influencing Chilean institutions, particularly 
those related to labor and peasants. The CIA evaluation of these projects, according to the 
Church Report, concluded that they were "rather unsuccessful in countering the growth 
of strong leftist sentiment and organization among workers, peasants and slum 
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dwellers." All in all, the most optimistic definition would characterize the outcome of 
CIA covert operations in Chile during the period between 1964 and 1969 as a limited 
success, but a case could also be made that the outcome was largely ineffective. 
In 1970, the CIA spent around one million dollars to affect the outcome of that 
year's election by "undermining communist efforts to bring about a coalition of leftist 
forces which could gain control of the presidency" and "strengthening non-Marxist 
political leaders and forces in Chile in order to develop an effective alternative to the 
Popular Unity coalition in preparation for the 1970 presidential election."5 5 On the other 
hand, the Church Report indicated that "the Cubans provided about $350,000 to Allende's 
campaign, with the Soviets adding an additional, undetermined amount."5 The Soviet 
figures were later disclosed by KGB senior archivist Vasili Mitrokhin, who had access to 
extensive documentation in the USSR that reveals a close and regular association 
between Allende and the Soviets, picturing him as "the most important of the KGB's 
confidential contacts in South America." The documents, which are part of the so 
called "Mitrokhin Archive," show that "Allende made a personal appeal [...] for Soviet 
funds" and that the KGB provided the Chilean Communist Party with $400,000 plus a 
"personal subsidy of $50,000 to be handed directly to Allende" and $18,000 to persuade a 
left-wing senator to remain within Allende's coalition and not to stand as presidential 
candidate in order to prevent splitting the leftist vote. Additional funding, including 
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The fact that Allende won a plurality - though a very narrow one - of the 1970 
election made obvious that US efforts to prevent a leftist coalition from gaining a 
plurality of the votes "did not succeed." Indeed, if one seeks to attribute every political 
outcome of 1970 Chile as a result of foreign influence, the conclusion should be that it 
was the KGB who was successful, and in fact, "[i]n its report to the Central Committee, 
the KGB claimed some credit for Allende's victory."540 By the time Allende was elected, 
"little was left of the CIA-funded propaganda apparatus."541 Yet, Allende's victory was a 
significant blow to US foreign policy in an age of Cold War and President Nixon decided 
not to let him come to power. Nixon informed the CIA that "an Allende regime in Chile 
would not be acceptable to the United States,"5 and it was decided that "a more 
aggressive covert action initiative" was necessary, which included a plan to form a coup 
to prevent Allende from actually taking office.54 In order to block Allende's accession to 
the presidency, the Nixon administration considered taking action in two different 
"tracks." "Track I" included political, economic, and propaganda activities "designed to 
induce Allende's opponents in Chile to prevent his assumption of power," while "Track 
II" went a step further and included actions "directed toward actively promoting and 
encouraging the Chilean military to move against Allende."544 Because Allende had won 
a plurality, but not a majority, of the votes, the Chilean constitution required that he 
should be confirmed as president by the Congress. "Track I" failed to gather support from 
5j9
 U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities., "Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973." 
540
 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World Was Going our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World: 
72. 
541
 U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities., "Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973." 
" i b i d . 
U.S. CIA. General Reports., "C.I.A Activities in Chile." 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Govei 






 . . . t . l t itt  t  t  rnmental Operations with Respect to 
187 
opposition forces to intervene in the Chilean political process in order to challenge 
Allende and also failed to generate an economic crisis strong enough to impact the votes 
in the Congress. Allende's victory was not only approved by the Congress, but was 
approved by such a wide margin - 153 to 35 - that labeling "Track I" as a complete 
failure may be an understatement. 
When it became clear that "Track I" was shipwrecking, "Track II" was 
intensified. The CIA made several contacts with the Chilean military in order "to 
convince them to carry out a coup" and met Chilean officers "who were actively involved 
in coup plotting."545 According to the Hinchey Report, the CIA met with three different 
groups of coup plotters and all of them indicated that the success of the coup required the 
kidnapping of Chilean Army Commander Rene Schneider, who favored Allende's 
confirmation as president. The CIA therefore provided arms and ammunition to one of 
the groups in order to abduct Schneider. However, the group that eventually kidnapped 
Schneider did not have the CIA's support and acted "independently of the CIA," which 
had concluded a few days before the operation that that particular group of plotters could 
not successfully carry out the coup.546 The weapons that the CIA had provided to its 
preferred group "were later returned unused to the Station."547 Schneider was mortally 
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wounded during the attack and his death "provoked a strong reaction in Chile," ruining 
the prospects for the execution of a coup against Allende, and making "Track II" as 
unsuccessful as "Track I." On November 3, 1970, Salvador Allende was inaugurated as 
545








the President of Chile, making it plainly obvious that "U.S. efforts, both overtand covert, 
to prevent his assumption of office had failed."5 
Hence, if the ultimate outcome of the 1970 Chilean elections demonstrates 
anything, it is the limits of US influence in certain areas of Latin America. Had a coup in 
Chile succeeded with significant CIA assistance, it would have represented an important 
challenge to the argument of this dissertation characterizing the United States as an 
absent empire in South America. However, the way things actually developed provides a 
clear demonstration of the limits of US influence in that regional subsystem, especially 
when compared to similar events in the North American regional subsystem. Despite the 
explicit orders by a US President to carry out plans to overthrow a Latin American leader 
seen as an important threat to US interests, Allende was inaugurated in accordance with 
the precepts of the Chilean Constitution. Perhaps the closest instance of a comparable 
failure is the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion in Cuba, but if in the case of Chile the US 
imperial toolbox included relatively "soft" measures such as propaganda actions and 
"encouragement" within the existent Chilean institutions for a military coup, the Cuban 
case could hardly be classified under the category of "soft imperialism." The Bay of Pigs 
was indeed an outright case of intervention through invasion, including the use of US 
aircraft and US trained and equipped mercenary army to invade Cuba and topple the 
government. While both are equivalent instances of failure, the Chilean case differs from 
the Cuban case in the relative timidity of the actions undertaken in order to fulfill similar 
objectives. If historians and political scientists want to classify both events under the 
same category of "US intervention in Latin America" to make the case for US imperial 
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thrust in the region, they may not be conceptually wrong depending on the definitions 
used for "intervention," but they surely miss distinctions that are not negligible. This 
dissertation expects to make these distinctions more discernible. 
When Allende was finally overthrown by a military coup, it was not the CIA who 
brought him down. There is a reasonable consensus that domestic factors played the 
biggest role in the fall of Allende, and he would probably have been overthrow at about 
the same time even "without the slightest encouragement from the United States."550 
When it comes to foreign influences leading to the 1973 coup, there seems to be strong 
indication that Brazilian actions played an important role, as will be explored later. 
Obviously, having actively tried to prevent Allende from taking office, it would be 
surprising if the Nixon administration made his life any easier, especially considering 
events during his first twelve months in office such as the expropriation of US copper 
companies with no compensation (in fact, these companies were told that they actually 
owned Chile money due to "excess profits") and Fidel Castro's highly publicized month-
long visit to Chile. Although covert operations continued to be undertaken after 1970, the 
major official action to influence the course of Chilean politics in that period was 
economic pressure. Nevertheless, Washington's actions to affect the Chilean economy 
after Allende was inaugurated president, in spite of claims of intervention, can be 
interpreted as being perfectly legitimate. Withholding support for loans, reducing 
investments, commercial credits and bilateral aid to a government identified as opposed 
to US interests and had actually taken steps in an anti-American direction could only be 
considered as intervention under the most vague of the definitions of the term. After the 
United States had badly lost the bet to prevent Allende from coming to power in Chile, it 
Whitaker, The United States and the Southern Cone : Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay: 415. 
would be unrealistic to expect it to finance the so called "Chilean path to socialism," 
which was the political platform of the collation that supported Allende. 
In fact, Allende's term as president was characterized by enormous economic and 
political difficulties. However, attributing which part of the difficulties was the direct 
result of US policies and which part lies within domestic factors and other international 
conditions is a challenging endeavor. It is beyond the scope of this research to conduct an 
extensive examination of Allende's management of the economy in order to assess its 
effectiveness, but, when it comes to international factors, it should come as no surprise 
that the socialist reforms carried out by Allende would scare some of the international 
investors, particularly in the United States. In addition, in terms of international 
conditions, perhaps more important than any individual US action was the drop in the 
price of copper in 1971, which has historically represented a significant share of Chilean 
exports. In terms of access to international credit, Paul Sigmund comments that Chile 
"had surprising success in securing loans from countries other than the United States-and 
these were by no means restricted to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China." 551 
Sigmund maintains that loans from communist countries, plus Canada, Argentina, 
Mexico, Australia and Western Europe "more than counterbalanced reductions from U.S. 
and U.S.-influenced sources" and that by August of 1973, "Allende had more short-term 
credits available to him ($574 million) than at the time of his election to office ($310 
million)." Likewise, Whitaker observes that cuts in loans and credits by the United 
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States were counterbalanced by alternative sources from other parts of the world. Juan 
Batista Yofre informs that, from Argentina alone, Chile had secured a line of credit of 
one hundred million dollars. Commenting on the US strategy of economic pressure, the 
Church Report noticed that while it could work on the long term, in the short term Chile 
"was not immediately vulnerable to investment, trade or monetary sanctions imposed by 
the United States."555 Indeed, the Foreign Minister of the Allende administration, 
Clodomiro Almeyda, commented that even though US economic actions may have 
contributed to the deterioration of the economic situation in Chile, "it cannot be said that 
they were the primary cause of these difficulties."556 These statements help to put into 
perspective the notion that the United States was responsible for all misfortunes of the 
Chilean economy during the presidency of Salvador Allende. In any case, the important 
theoretical question remains as to the effectiveness of external economic pressure, 
especially if exerted unilaterally, in order to bring about political change.557 The example 
of Castro's Cuba, which was even more economically dependent on the United States 
than Allende's Chile, seems to demonstrate the limits of such influence. 
But the state of the economy tells only part of the story, as Allende's political 
situation was not any better. Elected by a margin of around just one percent in relation to 
the candidate that came in second place, Allende presided over a divided country, and 
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Chilean political life became increasingly polarized as the economy floundered. His own 
coalition quickly came apart as the left and the "ultra-left" split, the latter reproaching 
Allende for being "more reformist than revolutionary."558 The economic problems, 
including shortages and growing inflation, exacerbated the political problems and 
brought unrest to several sectors of the country.5 As time went by, there was a growing 
notion that Allende was losing control of the situation and it was a common say in Chile 
that "the President does not govern." US covert support to the opposition - combined, 
incidentally, with the far less researched Soviet covert support to the other side - may 
have contributed to aggravating political tensions but it is implausible to assume they 
were the major factor in creating them. This assessment is identical to the one made by 
Allende's Foreign Minister, who remarked that "U.S. activities designed to destabilize 
the UP {UnidadPopular] Government - activities which the U.S. authorities have 
cynically acknowledged - did not create the factors which caused the UP Government to 
fall but rather increased and intensified the impact of those factors."561 The Chilean forest 
was burning and, while the United States threw in a few gallons of fuel, it definitely did 
not start the fire. 
As for direct US involvement in the military coup that eventually overthrew 
Allende, the evidences to date seem to be conclusive in indicating that there was no such 
participation. After extensive investigation, the Church Report found "no hard evidence 
of direct U.S. assistance to the coup, despite frequent allegations of such aid."562 
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Likewise, the Hinchey Report concluded that the CIA "was aware of coup-plotting by the 
military" but that it "did not instigate the coup that ended Allende's government on 11 
September 1973," given that "the consensus within the US government was that the 
military intended to launch a coup at some point, that it did not need US support for a 
successful coup, and that US intervention or assistance in a coup should be avoided." In 
fact, continues the report, after Allende was inaugurated president, "the US government's 
long term objective" was not a military coup but "to keep the opposition active in the 
hope that it could defeat Allende in the 1976 election."5 These conclusions corroborate 
US ambassador to Chile Nathaniel Davis' allegation that he "did not engage in coup 
plotting" and that he was "unaware of any of my U.S. colleagues having done so, 
including the personnel of the CIA station, the attache offices, and the Military Advisory 
Group." 564 As Whitaker observed, the responsibility of the United States in the coup that 
overthrew Allende seems to be very limited "to the disappointment, no doubt, of the 
makers of U.S. policy towards Allende who flattered themselves on their success." 5 
But if is true Davis did not engage in coup plotting, there are strong evidences that 
his Brazilian colleague in Chile apparently did not share the same behavior. While 
refuting the notion that the United States helped in coup plotting, Davis remarked that 
"there is no real doubt in my mind that allegations of a Brazilian connection are true."5 
Davis' predecessor in Santiago, Edward Korry, who served as ambassador from 1967 to 
1971, was even more explicit when he stated in 1981 that"[t]he CIA did not overthrow 
Allende [...] It played almost no role. The actual technical and psychological support 
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came from the military government of Brazil." Earlier, Korry had mentioned that the 
Brazilian support for the coup was a "well-kept secret" in Washington. Davis recounts 
an episode of March 1973, six months before the military coup, when the Brazilian 
ambassador to Chile met him and "made a series of leading suggestions (which I turned 
aside), trying to draw me into cooperative planning, interembassy coordination, and joint 
efforts toward the Allende government's demise."569 Indeed, there are several indications 
that "Brazil's complicity was, actually, more extensive than it appeared" 57° and that 
Brazilian ambassador to Chile, Camara Canto, was in fact actively involved in coup 
plotting. Yofre, who conducted extensive research on the Argentinean ambassador to 
Santiago during the Allende years, recounts the episode of a meeting between the 
Argentinean and the Brazilian ambassador in 1969 when they discussed the possibility of 
a coup in Chile in the case of an Allende victory in the following year. Yofre emphasizes 
that this meeting made evident the close connections between Camara Canto and the 
Chilean military. Likewise, Bandeira comments that Canto was "intimately related 
with those who conspired against Allende's ascension to the presidency of Chile."572 
Before Allende's election, Camara Canto was informed by Santiago that the army would 
not accept him as president, and when a coup failed to materialize, he attributed that to 
"the lack of a leader."573 The Argentinean ambassador reported to Buenos Aires that 
Brazil saw Allende's election as a "headache" and "a source of disturbances to all 
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countries in the Southern Cone." During a busy reception hosted by the Brazilian 
embassy in Santiago a couple of days before the decision for the coup was made, the 
main topic was the military coup that was about to happen. In fact, a week before the 
coup, the Brazilian Minister of War told the Paraguayan ambassador to Brazil that Chile 
was "already in military hands." A Brazilian Congressman close to Allende said that 
the Chilean president had told him two days before the coup that "the Brazilian embassy 
in Santiago was one of the main focuses of subversion against his administration, having 
a more ostensive activity than the US embassy" and that a week before the coup, Allende 
was actually preparing to denounce the "Brazilian connection" internationally.577 
Besides official governmental participation, there is also evidence that private 
sectors in Brazil helped with the coup. Marlise Simons, who interviewed Brazilian 
businessmen and politicians, reports that "private business and interests" in Brazil "gave 
money, arms and advice on political tactics" to coup plotters. Simons points out that the 
Brazilian businessmen helped to plot the 1964 military coup in Brazil "were the same 
people who advised the Chilean right on how to deal with Marxist President Allende," 
and that Chilean businessmen met with Brazilian businessmen to learn how "to prepare 
the ground for the military to move."5 Brazilian political advice included instructions on 
how to create chaos and mobilization, particularly in exploring the role of women in 
mobilizing society and marching through the streets. A Brazilian politician reportedly 
said that "we taught the Chileans how to use their women against the Marxists. Once we 
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saw Chilean women were marching, we knew that Allende's days were numbered." A 
member of Brazil's Anti-Communist Movement claimed that he took money to anti-
communist organizations in Chile and that the money came "from Sao Paulo and there 
was a lot of it." 5 In addition, there is strong indication that the experience of the 1964 
• « SRI 
coup in Brazil was used as a model for civilian and military sectors in Chile. One 
Brazilian historian interviewed by Simons commented that "[t]he first two days I felt I 
was living a Xerox copy of Brazil 1964. The language of Chile's military communiques 
justifying the coup [...] was so scandalously identical to ours, one almost presumes they 
had the same author." In sum, although far less documented than the US participation, 
these evidences indicate that Brazilian participation in the events in Chile also 
contributed fuel to the fire that was consuming the Chilean political forest. 
C O T 
Furthermore, while Argentina was "passive" during the coup, and there is no 
evidence that the United States was informed of the date beforehand,5 Brazil knew 
about the beginning of the coup with "several hours of antecedence." A representative 
of the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs said that "Allende's overthrown was not a 
surprise" for the Brazilian government. Five days after the coup, the first trip abroad of 
a Chilean official was to Brazil.587 General Augusto Pinochet, the chief of the military 
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still shooting when the [Brazilian] ambassador communicated the recognition."5 Indeed, 
Brazil was the first country to recognize the new government and Ambassador Camara 
Canto was apparently so pleased that he is reported to have answered the phone on the 
day of the coup with the phrase: "We won." Soon after the coup, Camara Canto 
"coordinated measures of support to the new authorities" and Brazil sent food and 
medication in addition to political and military help and a credit of $200 million to 
Chile.591 During the first year after the coup, Brazil provided $150 million in direct 
economic aid to Chile, more than the United States.592 When the Pinochet regime 
captured people accused of subversion, several accounts indicate that a number of the 
captors spoke Portuguese. One of the Brazilians tortured by the Chilean military 
regime reports that Brazilian agents wrote the questions, and the medicine he took had a 
label that stated "donated by the Brazilian Navy." 594 
In regional subsystemic terms, the Chilean coup d'etat, combined with the 
previous coups in Uruguay and Bolivia, meant an end to the feeling of isolation and 
"encirclement" in Brazil and indicated in fact "an enlargement of Brazilian regional 
influence." Undoubtedly, the Brazilian military government "was pleased with the shift 
to the right in the Southern Cone" since "it would remove many of the political obstacles 
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to Brazil's goals" in the region.596 On the other hand, Argentina, Brazil's main competitor 
for regional influence, became increasingly isolated, which was one of the contributing 
factors for the 1976 military coup in that country.597 In fact, after Allende was 
overthrown, Argentinean official communication reported that Brazil was "the biggest 
beneficiary" from the coup and expressed concerns about the balance of power in the 
region.598 
All the above evidence was already fairly well known and was by and large based 
on interviews, testimonies, and foreign governments' official communication. As has 
been suggested, the student interested in exploring the role of Brazil in Chile in detail will 
have to wait until Brazil makes available a larger part of the classified documentation 
related to its military period. Nevertheless, recently declassified documents in the United 
States present perhaps the strongest evidence to date of Brazil's official involvement in 
Chile. These documents, declassified in July 2009, refer to a meeting between US 
President Richard Nixon and Brazilian President Emilio Garrastazu Medici in December 
1971. The records of the meeting show that Nixon and Medici got along really well, 
shared basically the same views about hemispheric issues, and overall the meeting took 
place in a particularly friendly atmosphere. General Vernon Walters, who was then the 
US military attache in Paris and spoke several languages, served as interpreter for the 
meeting. Walters reports twice in the same memorandum that Nixon "was greatly 
impressed with Medici." He adds that the US president was "delighted at the personal 
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rapport they had established and the closeness of their views. With only very few chiefs 
of state had he developed so quickly a close relationship."599 The record of the meeting 
states that since Nixon had felt that he and Medici "had gotten along so well and found 
that their views were so close together, [...] it was important that they maintain close 
contact and have a means of communicating directly outside of normal diplomatic 
channels when this might be necessary."600 While Nixon appointed National Security 
Advisor Henry Kissinger as the representative for such private channels, Medici 
appointed Brazilian Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza. More importantly, and what is 
certain to make the life of the future researcher of the subject even more difficult, is the 
fact that, according to Medici, Barboza kept a "special file in which all items were 
handwritten, instructions or questions from the President and Gibson Barbosa's replies all 
handwritten, so that not even typists had knowledge of them." In his memories, 
Barboza made no reference to this episode, and asked years later about Brazilian 
involvement in Chile, he denied the file's existence. 
Nixon and Medici discussed several topics and basically agreed on all of them, 
topics ranging from the policy towards Cuba to the difficulty, expressed by Medici, in 
"dealing with and understanding the Spanish-American mentality." Subsequently, 
when Nixon asked Medici about the situation in Chile, the Brazilian president replied 
categorically that "Allende would be overthrown for very much the same reasons that 
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Goulart had been overthrown in Brazil." But the most relevant passage for the purposes 
of the argument made in this chapter came after Nixon asked Medici about his 
assessment of the capability of the Chilean armed forces to overthrow Allende. Medici 
replied to Nixon that not only did he think the Chilean forces were capable, but also that 
"Brazil was exchanging many officers with the Chileans." More significantly, Medici 
acknowledged that "Brazil was working towards this end." 605 This passage is of great 
importance because it is perhaps the first document to show an official confirmation that 
the Brazilian government was actively working to help Allende's fall. Nixon's response 
is also germane, since he remarked that "it was very important that Brazil and the United 
States work closely in this field" but added that the United States "could not take 
direction." Nixon continued, saying that "if the Brazilians felt that there was something 
we could do to be helpful in this area, he would like President Medici to let him know. If 
money were required or other discreet aid, we might be able to make it available." The 
Brazilian president expressed satisfaction in seeing "that the Brazilian and American 
positions and views were so close." This exchange is a perfect illustration of another 
major argument of this chapter - that the coincidence in US and Brazilian views coupled 
with Brazilian willingness to prevent the spread of governments associated with 
communism in South America altered the structure of costs and benefits of US 
involvement in that region and made it possible for the United States to "not take 
direction" and exercise a "soft imperialism" of, in the words of Nixon, "discreet aid" in 





communist governments, it is very unlikely, given the international environment of the 
Cold War, that the United States would remain so discreet. 
Further passages of the meeting report and other associated documentation 
reinforces the notion of Brazil's "regional imperialism" as a South American surrogate 
for US "imperialism" during the Cold War. The conclusion of the report on the White 
House meeting suggested that Medici "hoped that we could cooperate closely, as there 
were many things that Brazil as a South American country could do that the U.S. could 
not."607 In his memorandum to Kissinger, Walters noticed that "Medici wanted to do 
everything he could to lighten the President's burden" A CIA memorandum on the 
four-day visit of the Brazilian president to the United States mentioned that Medici 
"personally believes the Brazilian government must assume a greater role in defending 
neighboring, friendly governments" and that he had "proposed that the United States and 
Brazil cooperate in helping other democratic countries in Latin America counter the trend 
of Marxist/leftist expansion." The memorandum adds that Nixon "took great interest in 
this proposal and promised to assist Brazil when and wherever possible." A few 
months after Medici's visit to the United States, a National Intelligence Estimate entitled 
"The New Course in Brazil" concluded that 
Brazil will be playing a bigger role in hemispheric affairs and seeking to fill 
whatever vacuum the US leaves behind. It is unlikely that Brazil will intervene 
openly in its neighbors' internal affairs, but the regime will not be above using the 
threat of intervention or tools of diplomacy and covert action to oppose leftist 
regimes, to keep friendly governments in office, or to help place them there in 
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protection, others may work together to withstand pressures from the emerging 
giant.610 
Given the tone of these documents, it is somewhat astonishing that much of the 
repercussion in the media at the time of their declassification interpreted them as an 
attempt by the part of Nixon to "enlist Brazil in a coup" 6 n in view of the fact that 
"cultivation of Medici fits Nixon and Kissinger's pattern of recruiting conservative heads 
of state to the U.S. Cold War cause." However, these views should not be especially 
surprising since they merely reflect the traditional approach to the study of US-Latin 
America relationship during and beyond the Cold War. Without an alternative framework 
to interpret the relationship between the United States and South America, these analysts 
tend to shape the facts according to their preconceived notions in which the United States 
has virtually complete and homogenous control over the weaker countries south of the 
Rio Grande. Therefore, even though the aforementioned documents indicate that it was 
actually the Brazilian President who was "enlisting" or "recruiting" a very hospitable 
Nixon to the cause of fighting "the trend of Marxist/leftist expansion" in South America, 
the conventional international-system approach centered on the great powers hinders a 
more accurate analysis of those primary documents, thus reinforcing a cycle that affects 
the perception of researches who only had access to secondary sources. 
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SURINAME: A FORGOTTEN EPISODE 
On October 25, 1983, the United States conducted its first major military 
operation since the Vietnam War when eight thousand US troops invaded the Caribbean 
island of Grenada under the traditional Cold War rationale of preventing the spread of 
communism. Due to the nature of this operation - an open and armed intervention - the 
case of Grenada is thoroughly studied and mentioned in the literature as an example of 
US interventionist disposition in the Western Hemisphere. Nevertheless, a very similar 
case at about the same point in time and in a country only a few hundred miles from 
Grenada had a very different outcome, and because of that outcome it is virtually ignored 
by the literature. Like Grenada, Suriname was also a country governed by a dictator with 
affinities with the Castro government in Cuba. Like Grenada, Suriname was also 
regarded as in a strategic position due to its geographic location near the Caribbean Sea. 
Consequently, like Grenada, Suriname was also an important concern for the Reagan 
administration in the hemisphere. Unlike Grenada, Suriname shared a border with Brazil, 
and by the eighties it could be considered part of the South American regional subsystem. 
Examining how the case of Suriname unfolded in contrast to the case of Grenada 
provides a good illustration of how subsystemic factors contributed to avoiding a US 
military intervention in the South America subsystem, thus keeping the US absent. 
After 1980, when a military coup under the leadership of Desi Bouterse 
overthrew the government of Suriname and declared the country to be a Socialist 
Republic, the CIA started closely monitoring the situation in that country. In December 
1982, fifteen people who identified with the opposition were arrested and executed, 
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which drew world attention to Suriname and led the CIA to develop plans to invade the 
country. These plans and the events that followed were kept in secrecy by all the 
participants until recently. Perhaps the best source to date on this issue is Paul Kengor 
and Pat Clark Doerner's book The Judge: William P. Clark, Ronald Reagan's Top 
Hand. Kengor and Doerner describe the events in Suriname as "the best kept secret in 
Washington" at the time.614 They add that the participants "took almost no notes and kept 
few written records of their involvement."615 Therefore, in order to write the chapter on 
Suriname, Kengor and Doerner interviewed several of the participants in that event, but 
most importantly William P. Clark, who was one of the central figures in the first Reagan 
administration, serving as Deputy Secretary of State from 1981 to 1982, National 
Security Advisor from 1982 to 1983, and Secretary of the Interior from 1983 to 1985. 
Clark was a key participant in the Suriname case; he indicates that he was sent on a secret 
trip to Brazil and Venezuela inl983 to develop, as Ronald Reagan recorded in his diaries, 
a plan to "oust the dictator" of Suriname which "required their [Brazil and Venezuela] 
cooperation."616 
The case of Suriname illustrates the notion developed throughout this chapter that 
the role of Brazil in the South American subsystem affected the structure of costs and 
benefits of US action. The option to count on Brazil to deal with the situation allowed the 
United States to limit its participation in that subsystem, which is made even clearer 
when contrasted with the outcome in Grenada. As Kengor and Doerner point out, the 
main hope of Clark's secret trip to South America "was that the Venezuelans and 
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Brazilians could be encouraged to clean up their own neighborhood rather than face some 
form of U.S. military intervention."617 The first stop of Clark's trip was in Caracas, where 
the US plan to count on their cooperation was turned down. On the other hand, Clark's 
meeting with Brazilian President Figueiredo yielded very different results. While the 
Venezuelans were unwilling to help, in Brasilia Clark found "an extremely helpful and 
unheralded Brazil."618 With Venezuela out of the equation, Clark's main goal in Brasilia 
"was to persuade the Brazilians to take care of the Bouterse problem on their own, to 
make it unnecessary for the United States to organize and orchestrate a major 
deployment," and he presented the Brazilians with detailed scenarios for the invasion 
of Suriname. As Kengor and Doerner comment, the presentation of the plan had an 
important effect on the Brazilian Generals as "Brazil's brass was taken aback at the 
specter of U.S. forces crashing into South America." Following Clark's presentation of 
the issue, the Brazilians came up with a plan that did not include an invasion force, since 
Figueiredo "did not want a military operation, either Brazilian or American. Yet, he and 
his colleagues also dreaded a Soviet presence next door." 621 The Brazilian strategy 
included a package of assistance and cooperation, including military aid, in order to 
substitute Cuban and Soviet presence by Brazilian influence. The Reagan administration 
called this operation "Operation Giminich," in reference to the name of a horse that 
Figueiredo had given to Reagan after a meeting between them. As it turned out, the 
Brazilian proposal was "enough to keep Suriname from going Marxist and becoming a 
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Soviet-Cuban base of operation in the Atlantic." 622 As Bandeira argues, while Brazil 
developed its northern region during the seventies and the eighties, it sought to avoid the 
penetration of foreign powers in the Amazon region. Therefore, concludes Bandeira, 
"once it could not simply negate collaborating with the United States, the Figueiredo 
administration, in order to avoid the invasion of Suriname, which was already decided by 
Washington, took the responsibility to solve peacefully the issue." The whole deal was 
kept secret and both sides promised to maintain its confidentiality, which explains why 
this event is largely unaccounted for. 
One of the main participants in the Brazilian mission sent to Suriname to offer the 
package was diplomat Luiz Felipe Lampreia, who later became ambassador to that 
country under Figueiredo and eventually Foreign Minister between 1995 and 2001 
throughout the Cardoso administration. In 2010, Lampreia published his memoirs, which 
helped to bring additional information to the events in Suriname. Lampreia recalls that 
during the meeting between Clark and Figueiredo, the Brazilian President "refused the 
invitation" to participate in the invasion of Suriname, "but said that, since it was a 
neighboring country, Brazil considered that the situation in Suriname required an 
adequate and exclusively Brazilian reaction," because the Brazilian government 
"considered the issue to be their own responsibility." Thus, the plan to offer technical, 
economic, and material support in exchange for removing the Cubans - which, according 
to Lampreia, totaled fifty million dollars - was born. For Lampreia, Bouterse and the 
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Surinamese military were more opportunistic than ideological, and therefore the plan had 
a high chance of succeeding without the need for a military intervention. Indeed, even 
though Reagan was skeptical about the Brazilian proposal and offered US help "if you 
wish, and whenever you ask for it," he acquiesced to the Brazilian proposal and wished 
Figueredo luck. Fearing the possibility of a Brazilian invasion, Bouterse gladly 
accepted the plan, the Cuban presence in Suriname was greatly reduced, and the 
operation was deemed a success. "Not a shot was fired!" celebrated Clark in a 
memorandum to Reagan.627 As the Brazilian package was implemented in Suriname, the 
United States was ready to send troops to Grenada. 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The period of the Cold War provides perhaps the better opportunity to test the 
hypothesis of this research that the specific dynamics of the South American subsystem 
contributed to keeping the United States an absent empire in that part of the hemisphere. 
Because of the particular characteristics of the bipolar period, the incentives for the 
United States to intervene in countries in faraway places like Korea or Vietnam were 
much higher. Within this context, it is unlikely to expect that any US administration 
would tolerate countries in Latin America to fall in the hands of communist governments, 
especially given the symbolism that it would represent. Therefore, usual justifications for 
US relative lack of involvement or interest in South America, such as geographic distance 
or strategic irrelevance, have perhaps their weakest explanatory power during this period, 
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which was strongly characterized by an ideological confrontation that did not necessarily 
followed pure strategic calculations. Indeed, successive US administrations demonstrated 
great concern with the progress of events in South America, and at least two presidents 
came close to intervening and toppling South American governments that were perceived 
as being associated with communism. Such actions would come as no surprise, since they 
would replicate a pattern of behavior that had been pretty clear in Central America and 
the Caribbean. Nevertheless, in spite of the interest in South America and the disposition 
to intervene and resort to imperial solutions, the best the United States could do was to 
exert a kind of "soft imperialism." This difference between intentions and outcomes must 
be explained, and this chapter intended to offer an explanation by employing the regional 
subsystemic perspective 
Hence, following the theoretical framework laid out in chapters three and four, 
this chapter explains the United States' relative absence from South America during the 
Cold War by looking at how Brazil affected the structure of costs and benefits of 
subsystemic change for the United States in that period. In other words, Brazil's foreign 
policy objectives in the South American subsystem basically coincided with US 
objectives, thus raising the benefits for the United States for the maintenance of the status 
quo and likewise decreasing the incentives for resorting to imperial solutions, such as an 
invasion to topple particular governments. Brazil's economic growth at the time, 
combined with the authoritarian character of the military regime, created the conditions 
for a Brazilian "regional imperialism" that worked actively to contain the spread of 
governments associated with communism in South America. As this chapter intended to 
demonstrate, this policy was a result of Brazil's view of its national interests and was not 
directed from Washington. An important part of the argument made here was the 
deconstruction of the myth that anti-communism was a US prerogative that should 
somehow be incorporated by South American countries through the diligent work of 
indoctrination designed from offices in Washington. Obviously, the United States was 
willing to take action, but the actions taken did not go beyond supplying an existing 
demand for things like money, equipment and armaments. Because of Brazil's 
willingness to play a regional imperial role during the period under study in this chapter, 
as clearly demonstrated by the cases of Bolivia, Uruguay, and Suriname, there was no 
need for an imperial policy from the part of the United States in South America. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, Brazil has considered South America to be its area 
of influence, and this perception continued to be very much present during the period 
under study here. 
It is within this context that the case of the 1973 military coup in Chile should be 
understood. The Chilean coup is an especially hard case to test the hypothesis presented 
here because it is widely mentioned in the literature as following the same pattern of US 
interventions elsewhere in Latin America. To make a counterpoint to this view, this 
chapter examined the extension of US involvement in Chile. Because the United States 
worked to avoid Salvador Allende's ascension to power, and because he was eventually 
toppled by a military coup, the temptation to connected the dots and establish a causal 
relationship is high. This kind of temptation is helped by the usual framework of US 
hegemony in Latin America and, although it can explain with reasonable adequacy 
similar cases in Central America and the Caribbean during the Cold War, it does not 
provide a satisfactory explanation for the case of Chile. The puzzle presented by Chile is 
why the United States stopped short of an imperial solution, in contrast to what it had 
done in other places in the world. As this chapter proposed to show, every step taken by 
the United States - during both Democratic and Republican administrations - to prevent 
Allende from being elected and later to prevent him from taking office failed miserably. 
Given the outcome in 1970, if one wishes to offer an interpretation attributing it to the 
works of foreign intelligence agencies, the merit should probably go to the KGB and not 
to the CIA. The remaining explanation to link Allende's fall to actions taken by the 
United States, since there is no clear evidence of US direct involvement in the coup that 
eventually overthrew him, is the fact that the United States attempted to destabilize 
Allende's government through economic measures. This explanation has at least two 
main weaknesses: one is that it tends to attribute to the United States all misfortunes of 
the Chilean economy, which is debatable, and the other that it makes a direct connection 
between US economic actions and the political outcome in Chile, which is unclear. 
The overemphasis of US actions, which is greatly helped by the abundance of 
documentation available from US sources, blurs the focus on other countries that also 
may have played a role in Chile. Because of Brazilian foreign policy at the time, which 
was illustrated by its actions in Bolivia and Uruguay, one would suspect that Chile would 
also be a concern for the Brazilian military regime. Indeed, there are a number of 
circumstantial evidences - confirmed by two US ambassadors to Santiago - that states 
Brazil was actively working with coup plotters in Chile. The lack of documentation from 
Brazilian sources of Brazil's involvement in Chile, though, complicates the life of the 
researcher interested in demonstrating its extension. Nevertheless, recently declassified 
documents in the United States seem to provide the clearest evidence that Brazil was in 
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fact taking actions in order to help the overthrown of Allende. These documents refer to a 
meeting between Brazilian President Medici and US President Nixon which shows 
Medici acknowledging that Brazil was working to overthrow Allende, and Nixon 
demonstrating satisfaction that he could count on Brazil to limit US involvement in Chile. 
To put in terms of the theoretical framework developed here, the Nixon-Medici 
interchange is a clear demonstration of how Brazil successfully affected US cost-benefit 
calculations, which made the US less likely to resort to an imperial strategy in the South 
American subsystem. 
CHAPTER 7 
NEGOTIATING THE FTAA: THE SOUTH AMERICAN SUBSYSTEM AFTER THE 
COLD WAR 
The disintegration of the USSR and the end of the bipolar system that 
characterized the Cold War combined with the proliferation of democratically elected 
regimes in South America would once again create new opportunities for the 
development of new patterns of relationships in the Western Hemisphere, which could 
eventually lead to subsystemic change. With the United States as the sole remaining 
superpower in a reconfigured international system, and with the fears of a Soviet-
influenced communist takeover in Latin America out of policy makers' calculations, 
economic issues tended to eclipse the earlier predominance of security issues. Hence, the 
main prospects for the development of comparatively new patterns of relationships in the 
Americas in the immediate post-Cold War was through the establishment of an all-
encompassing trading regional bloc which would be relevant enough to create new 
patterns of trade and interdependence among the countries in the hemisphere and possibly 
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spill over to other arenas including political and security ones. 
Indeed, the nineties began with such promise, after the completion of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the beginning of the negotiations for a 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in 1994. But after many years of debate, the 
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FTAA never came into existence and, instead of the creation of radically new patterns of 
relationships, what actually happened was the reinforcement and deepening of previous 
patterns along regional subsystemic lines. In fact, the analysis of the process leading to 
the rise and fall of the negotiations over the FTAA presents yet another opportunity to 
observe the functioning of regional subsystemic pressures contributing to affect the 
outcome of US foreign policies toward South America. 
This chapter's choice in focusing on the FTAA negotiations as a case study does 
not mean that the political perspective that characterized the previous chapters will be 
abandoned in favor of a more economic approach based on trade analysis. Instead, in 
order to preserve a certain level of homogeneity across the chapters, this section will 
focus on the political dimension of processes of regional integration based on trade 
fS9Q 
liberalization. Therefore, the analysis will move away from the specific effects that the 
FTAA would have on patterns of trade in order to explore the political aspect of an 
increased economic interdependence that such agreement would likely generate, or, at 
least the policymakers' perception of such increased interdependence. The underlying 
assumption is that the conclusion of a free trade area in the Western Hemisphere would 
conceivably strengthen US political leverage, particularly in South America, since 
Mexico, the Caribbean states and Central America are by and large already dependent on 
the US market to a much higher degree than is the case in the rest of Latin America. In 
other words, the establishment of a Free Trade Area of the Americas could represent an 
The relationship between economic interdependence and political influence is explored in Albert 
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important step in merging the North and South American subsystems through the creation 
of new patterns of interaction. 
The main argument of this section is that the outcome of the negotiations 
concerning the establishment of a Free Trade of the Americas replicates the historical 
pattern exposed in the previous chapters in which the role of Brazil was key to 
understanding the relative absence of the United States in the South American regional 
subsystem. Although keeping with the overall theme of the United States as an "absent 
empire" in South America, there is no suggestion in this chapter that the institution of a 
free trade area in the Western Hemisphere should necessarily correspond to an "imperial 
offensive" by the part of the United States. As a matter of fact, both NAFTA and the 
FTAA could be understood more as push from Latin American states than as an exclusive 
US idea, since the first began as a Mexican initiative (and was approved by the US House 
of Representatives by a relatively narrow margin of 234-200) and the proposal for the 
latter was met with enthusiasm in most of the Latin American capitals. This caveat is 
important because it marks a difference in tone from the previous chapters, and the notion 
of absence becomes now more salient than the notion of empire as defined in the 
introduction of this dissertation. What matters for the purposes of the present chapter is 
the fact that the developments of the negotiations for a Free Trade Area in the Americas 
offer a good opportunity to investigate yet another instance when US policy makers 
demonstrated a clear interest in expanding its presence in South America - now in a 
completely different international environment from both of the periods analyzed earlier -
but again the outcome ended up being the same relative absence. 
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This chapter examines the origins of the FTAA proposal, showing that the idea of 
a hemispheric free trade area was launched at the same time that each of the regional 
subsystems in the hemisphere were consolidating their own regional institutions around 
core regional states: NAFTA in North America, and Mercosur in South America. It 
shows that the United States saw a hemispheric free trade agreement as an extension of 
NAFTA and consequently Mercosur was soon perceived as a nuisance by US 
policymakers. Likewise, Brazil demonstrated clear reservations regarding the 
establishment of a free trade area in the Americas since the beginning, a feeling that was 
not initially shared by its neighbors. Therefore, contrary to earlier periods examined by 
this research, the interests of Brazil and the United States now clashed, and given the 
disparities in power between the two countries, it would be reasonable to expect that the 
final outcome would favor the latter's view. Brazil's strategy was to lead the formation of 
a South American bloc, thus raising the costs for the United States to push for an 
agreement that could have the potential to affect the status quo in South America. This 
chapter argues that Brazil's strategy of leadership was facilitated by the United States' 
lack thereof. The chapter also shows that one economic crisis in each of regional 
subsystems in the Americas - Mexico in North America, and Argentina in South America 
- acted as catalysts that reinforced subsystemic dynamics and made it even more evident 
the separation between these two regional subsystems. The combination of these factors 
led to the eventual demise of the FTAA, with Brazil increasingly seeking to 
institutionalize the South American subsystem and the United States resorting to bilateral 
agreements with like-minded countries in that regional subsystem. 
NAFTA AND MERCOSUR 
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A few months after the United States signed a free trade agreement with Canada 
in the late eighties, Mexican President Carlos Salinas approached his US counterpart 
George Bush in the beginning of 1990 with the idea of a free trade agreement between 
the two countries. Initially, this proposal "came as a surprise" to the Bush 
administration, since its top trade policy priority was the conclusion of the so called 
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which would 
eventually lead to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In spite of the 
initial hesitation, the Bush administration soon embraced the idea, as an agreement with 
Mexico was seen from Washington's point of view as "part of an overall strategy of 
building" a "continental base" centered on the United States. Therefore, in August of 
1990, President Salinas "formally requested a free trade agreement with the United 
States." 33 The Canadians, who had just fought a fierce domestic battle over the 
conclusion of their own free trade agreement with the United States, did not initially want 
to get involved, but realizing that it had little to gain by staying on the sidelines, the 
Canadian government later decided that it would be better to participate and consequently 
they joined the negotiation in early 1991. Hence, what was initially a bilateral negotiation 
became a trilateral one, and thus was created the basis for the treaty known as North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). More than just a free trade agreement, at the 
political level NAFTA allowed the US government to reaffirm the principles of 
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international free trade "as a symbol and a reality of a new economic order ushered by the 
United States as part of its victory in the Cold War."634 Indeed, in the midst of the 
negotiations with Mexico, the Bush administration unveiled its Enterprise for the 
Americas Initiative (EAI), a hemispheric program of which one of the central aims was 
the extension of free trade to the whole of the Americas. Within the framework of a "new 
world order," NAFTA would thus be just a strategic "continental base" from which the 
United States would lead the post-Cold War world, beginning by reaffirming its 
leadership in the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, US interest in hemispheric integration 
could be interpreted as going beyond the notion of economic benefits given the 
"possibilities it offers for the reinforcement of the structural and ideological foundations 
of US hegemony, consistent with its parallel global strategies." 
The vision of a hemispheric free trade area put forth by President Bush was 
embraced by subsequent US administrations until its demise in the mid-2000s during the 
second President Bush administration. While the first President Bush launched the overall 
idea and initiated NAFTA, the Clinton administration wrapped up NAFTA and made the 
FTAA one of its top foreign policy priorities in Latin America, an approach that was 
followed by his successor. According to one of the participants in the initial stages of 
FTAA, there was a growing feeling in the Clinton administration in 1992 that a 
hemispheric summit "would be a logical follow-up to NAFTA." President Clinton had 
the expectation that the conclusion of NAFTA would enable the United States to "use the 
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Mexican precedent to go into the whole rest of Latin America." Accordingly, in 1993, 
the Clinton administration announced that a summit would take place in Miami in 
December 1994 to discuss a number of hemispheric issues. During the Miami Summit, 
which was attended by all countries in the hemisphere except Cuba, the participating 
countries announced the goal of a hemispheric free trade area to be established by the 
year 2005, thus marking the beginning of the negotiations of the FTAA. 
The year the Miami Summit convened was particularly relevant for matters of 
hemispheric integration. In January of 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
which had been approved by the US Congress in late 1993, came into force. In December 
of that year, a few days after the Miami Summit, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay signed in Brazil the Protocol of Ouro Preto, which complemented the 1991 
Treaty of Asuncion and established the institutional basis of the Southern Common 
Market (Mercosur) thus giving Mercosur legal personality of international law and 
providing it with effective actor capabilities in the international arena. On the first day 
of 1995, the four countries of Mercosur introduced a common external tariff covering 
about eight-five percent of the goods traded within the bloc, thus transforming Mercosur 
into a customs union, although an imperfect one given the fact that some of the goods 
were outside the scope of the tariff. From an economic standpoint, Mercosur has been the 
second largest trading bloc in the hemisphere after NAFTA in terms of combined GDP, 
and the fourth in the world behind the European Union, NAFTA, and the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Therefore, any meaningful regional integration in 
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the Western Hemisphere would have to accommodate the reality of Mercosur - to deal 
with it or to do away with it. From the point of view of the United States, hemispheric 
integration meant the absorption of Mercosur into an enlarged NAFTA with the United 
States at the center. In fact, members of the Clinton administration expressed a number of 
times that Mercosur was seen as "harmful" to the FTAA and "a threat to hemispheric 
regionalism." As pointed out above, the ideal design for the Clinton administration 
would be basically to extend the NAFTA model southward. Given US economic weight, 
such an arrangement could have the potential to eventually absorb the South American 
regional subsystem if it ended up creating new patterns of relationship in the hemisphere 
relevant enough to bring about a relative homogenization of a Latin American periphery 
arranged around a US center. 
Because of the prospects of altering the status quo in the South American 
subsystem, this scenario was feared by Brazil, which held suspicions regarding the 
establishment of free trade in the Americas since the beginning and saw it as an "obstacle 
to the designs of Brazilian leadership within the regional order" in South America.640 In 
fact, the Brazilian Foreign Minister during the Cardoso administration described the 
FTAA as a tool to consolidate US "economic preponderance in the continent" and as a 
"potential threat" to Brazil, therefore mirroring verbatim the Clinton administration's 
view of Mercosur. 41 When the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative was unveiled in 
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1991, Brazil was clearly "the least enthusiastic among the participating countries to move 
forward on hemispheric integration."642 In fact, Brazilian official position towards 
hemispheric free trade has been, like the US official position, considerably consistent 
through time, permeating four different administrations from different political outlooks. 
Basically, Brazil's strategy has been one of securing and reinforcing its position within 
the South American subsystem in order to avoid its absorption by an all-encompassing 
hemispheric subsystem. Within this context, the establishment of Mercosur with the 
Treaty of Asuncion in 1991 was a key strategic component. As soon as George Bush 
announced his Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the administration of Collor de 
Mello in Brazil responded that it would only negotiate a hemispheric agreement within 
the 4+1 framework, that is, the four countries of the recently created Mercosur would 
take a joint position when negotiating with the United States. 4 In 1993, the same year 
that NAFTA was approved by the US Congress, the administration of Itamar Franco 
made a proposal for a SAFTA - South American Free Trade Area.644 These early efforts 
demonstrate the Brazilian concern in securing a "continental base" for itself in order to 
counter the prospects of a US commercial offensive in South America. In fact, when 
Cardoso was the Brazilian Foreign Minister, he spoke about the notion of a "South 
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American platform," and later, as president, Cardoso referred to Mercosur as "a pole 
from which we will organize the South American space."646 Mercosur was thus seen as a 
hub from which Brazil would build an alternative pole of attraction in the hemisphere, 
and as a result would attempt to create obstacles for greater US penetration in the South 
American subsystem. As will be shown below, these efforts were continued and then 
deepened in subsequent Brazilian administrations. 
Brazilian official strategy towards hemispheric free trade was, not surprisingly, 
far from enjoying unanimity in South America. As a matter of fact, two of the biggest 
powers in the region, Argentina and Chile, were very enthusiastic about the possibility of 
coming to an agreement with the United States as early as possible, ideally before the 
2005 deadline. In a complete reversal of its historically contentious stance towards the 
United States, the Argentine government became one of its most fervent supporters 
during the greater part of the nineties. Distant and often confrontational towards US 
foreign policy initiatives during most of its history, Argentina undertook a complete shift 
in that historical position under the administration of Carlos Menen and sought to 
establish, in the now legendary words of Menen's Foreign Minister, "carnal relations" 
with the United States. Perhaps the best indication of this renewed relationship is the 
fact that Argentina dispatched naval vessels to the 1991 Gulf War, the only Latin 
American country to do so. In 1998, the United States reciprocated Argentinean 
cooperation by designating Argentina as a "major non-NATO ally," also the only Latin 
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American country to have this distinction. Within this context, a trade agreement with 
the United States was a logical extension of Argentinean foreign policy, which even 
entertained the possibility of an accession to NAFTA.649 However, Argentina could not 
freely sign a bilateral agreement with the United States without leading to the demise of 
Mercosur as a customs union and creating problems with Brazil, which was a more 
important market for Argentina than the United States: in 1994, the year before the Ouro 
Preto Protocol took effect, Argentina exported twice as much in value to Brazil than to 
the United States. Therefore, by locking in Argentina through Mercosur, Brazil could 
with reasonable success contain Argentinean initial enthusiasm during the early stages of 
the FTAA negotiations. On the other hand, Argentinean and other South American 
countries' eagerness for such an agreement was an important reason why Brazil could not 
simply negate to negotiate the US-proposed FTAA, as it would leave Brazil isolated in 
the region it aspired to influence. 
Conversely, the constraints that applied to Argentina were not valid for Chile. 
Chile was not part of Mercosur and the United States was a much more important market 
for Chilean exports than Brazil. Moreover, Chile has had a relatively open economy and 
international trade has been a key component of its development strategy. In fact, Chile 
had been seeking a free trade agreement with the United States since the early nineties, 
and after Mexico it was next in line to negotiate such an agreement. During the Miami 
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Summit in 1994, Chile was officially invited to join NAFTA and was hailed by the 
Canadian Prime Minister as the fourth "amigo" in the North American agreement.652 
Following the official invitation, negotiations for Chilean accession to NAFTA were 
formally initiated in 1995. Nevertheless, the Clinton administration had one important 
domestic obstacle after 1994 - the lack of the so called "fast track" authority to negotiate 
free trade agreements. This bureaucratic detail that, up until then, was little known 
outside the circle of trade experts, turned out to be the centerpiece of the problems facing 
the United States during the negotiations of the FTAA, and made it considerably easier 
for Brazil to enforce its agenda in South America. 
According to the US Constitution, it is the responsibility of the Congress to 
regulate matters of foreign trade. Because of the possibility that Congress may change an 
agreement previously signed by the executive to the point that it becomes entirely distinct 
from what was originally agreed upon by the parts, Congress may grant the President a 
special authority that became known as "fast track," which gives greater autonomy to the 
executive to sign free trade agreements, leaving Congress the possibility to either accept 
or reject it without amendments. Additionally, fast track rules require the Congress to 
vote within ninety days after the bill is submitted by the president. NAFTA was approved 
by the US Congress under fast track provisions, but that expired in 1994. For the 
remainder of his administration, President Clinton unsuccessfully tried to reinstate fast 
track authority after 1994 in order to promote the FTAA agenda. As it became clear the 
difficulty that the Clinton administration had in obtaining fast track, the agreement with 
Chile lost momentum and by 1996 Chile had all but abandoned any hopes of joining 
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NAFTA. The Chilean President Eduardo Frei was reported to have "considered the 
United States an unreliable ally." As the difficulties in joining NAFTA became clear, 
"Chilean advocates of expanding ties with the Southern Cone gained ground."654 Indeed, 
in October of 1996, Chile joined Mercosur as an associated member, as it became, in the 
words of Henry Kissinger, "tired of waiting for the long-promised access to NAFTA."655 
By 1997, after Chile had already signed free trade agreements with both Mexico and 
Canada, as well as with Mercosur and other South American countries, the Chilean 
Foreign Minister declared that NAFTA ascension no longer had "either the urgency or 
the importance it had in 1994."656 
Therefore, whereas Brazilian leadership was an important factor to explain the 
lack of an early agreement in the case of Argentina, in the case of Chile the main 
explanation should lie with US lack of leadership; not so much because of an 
unwillingness to lead, but more because of incapacity to do so due to domestic dynamics. 
It is this combination of Brazilian obstructionism and US inability to provide the 
necessary leadership that provides the better explanation for the failure of the FTAA. In 
other words, Brazilian strategy of leading a South American bloc was greatly facilitated 
by US lack of leadership in the process. The cases of Argentina and Chile during the first 
couple of years of FTAA negotiations provide a clear illustration of this claim. 
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LAUNCHING THE FTAA 
As indicated above, since the very beginning of the negotiations for the 
establishment of a Free Trade Area of the Americas two major views regarding the 
character of hemispheric integration clashed. These two views were represented by the 
two biggest economies in the hemisphere and the two major powers within their 
respective regional subsystems: the United States and Brazil. These different perspectives 
were rooted in the fact that the US view of the international system after the Cold War 
clashed with the Brazilian view of preserving its role in the South American regional 
subsystem. As noted above, while for the United States an expansion of NAFTA to the 
whole hemisphere formed the basis of its approach to hemispheric integration and was 
seen as part of the broader US view of a new world order, the Brazilian priority was to 
consolidate its position in the South American subsystem which, from the point of view 
of Brazilian policy-makers, would be jeopardized by a hemispheric free trade area. 
Brazil's concern about regional leadership was unsurprisingly not shared by the 
other South American countries, which, as exemplified by the cases of Argentina and 
Chile mentioned above, generally greeted the 1994 Miami Summit with great 
enthusiasm. In contrast, the Brazilian Foreign Minister signalized Brazilian skepticism 
regarding the Miami meeting and "warned that the region had overly high expectations of 
the summit." 57 These dynamics were already patently clear when US Vice-President Al 
Gore made a trip to Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil in 1994 to promote the Miami 
Summit, scheduled for the end of that year. Like Argentina, Bolivia also demonstrated 
great interest in the proposal for a hemispheric free trade area and even suggested that it 
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should be reached by the year 2000 instead of by the original 2005 goal. On the other 
hand, Gore's meeting with Brazilian representatives revolved around recognizing Brazil's 
"stature in hemispheric affairs" and "little discussion of the summit agenda as such." 5 
The themes that Gore discussed in Brazil evidently reflected what the true Brazilian 
concerns were at the time. 
As the preparations for the Miami Summit went forward, it became increasingly 
clear that accommodating the different views of the United States and Brazil would be a 
central issue in the negotiations for a free trade area in the hemisphere. Because it could 
not simply block the negotiations as it was in a relatively isolated position, Brazilian 
strategy was to "render the plan of action more modest in its ambitions, less exact in its 
objectives, less specific in its timetables, and less accountable in its implementation."659 
In fact, not only did Brazil actively participate in the negotiations, its delegation in Miami 
was second in number only to the United States, which is an indication of the interest that 
the Brazilian government had in the issue.660 According to one US negotiator, "the heart 
of the drama of Miami was Brazil's struggle to establish itself as the interlocutor for 
South America," and a major concern of Brazil was to introduce changes in the final 
text "aimed at lessening future US influence and leaving the integration process less 
carefully scripted."662 Contrary to most of the other countries, Brazil wanted to gain time 
in order to consolidate and enlarge Mercosur, in order to strengthen its own position vis-
a-vis the United States, and only then attempt to strike a "grand bargain between NAFTA 
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and Mercosur (that is, between the United States and Brazil)." In spite of Brazilian 
efforts to bypass the mention of a date certain, the Miami Declaration stuck with the 2005 
goal of hemispheric free trade, reflecting the view of the majority of the countries in 
Latin America. 
Therefore, by the end of the Miami Summit, even though the differences between 
Brazil and the United States were clear, it was the latter that got the upper hand and 
dictated the pace of the negotiations at the onset. This could obviously be understood as a 
logical corollary of the overwhelming disparities in all dimensions of power between the 
two countries, which seemed to offer support for the conventional analysis of US 
hegemony in Latin America predicting that "[bjecause of US power, NAFTA is probably 
a closer approximation to the evolving FTAA than is Mercosur." In fact, many studies 
that attempted to forecast the "economic and business outcomes of the FTAA" commonly 
accepted the apparently obvious premise that the FTAA "is going to build on the basic 
principles of NAFTA." 665 As soon as it was established, NAFTA was quickly presented 
even as a theoretical model of "hemispheric regionalism" as opposed to a "Latin 
American regionalism."666 However, the actual facts do not corroborate the assumption 
that US power would inevitably bring into being the US view of hemispheric integration. 
This gap between a proposed US policy and the actual outcome begs for an explanation. 
Evidently, one could once again concentrate only on domestic factors and conclude that 
this gap can be adequately explained by the troubles that the Clinton administration had 
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in obtaining fast track authority from Congress. Although one can be satisfied with this 
explanation - and domestic factors were certainly critical - it can also be argued that it is 
an incomplete one. Indeed, even when the Bush administration finally got the fast track -
then renamed "Trade Promotion Authority" (TPA) - between 2002 and 2007, thus 
including the 2005 deadline for the completion of the FTAA, still no hemispheric 
NAFTA came into being. Instead, the Bush administration used the TPA to negotiate a 
series of bilateral trade agreements with countries in the region, hence outside the scope 
of a comprehensive hemispheric framework. This dissertation argues that taking into 
consideration the regional subsystemic level can help explain this outcome. In order to do 
that, it is necessary to understand how interactions at the regional subsystemic level 
contributed to the developments of the FTAA negotiations after the Miami Summit. 
MEXICO AND ARGENTINA: THE TALE OF TWO CRISES 
A few days after the Miami Summit, on December 20, 1994, and following a 
series of political shocks during that year that "bruised public confidence in Mexico's 
political and economic stability," a sudden devaluation of the Mexican peso caused a 
profound economic crisis in that country, with impacts all over Latin America. 
Having just signed a free trade agreement with Mexico and with high stakes in its 
financial stability, the United States acted swiftly in leading the elaboration of an 
international rescue plan for its southern neighbor. The final package totaled about fifty 
billion dollars, with the United States and the International Monetary Fund (where the 
United States has the largest share of votes) contributing with more than two-thirds of 
667
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this value. Although the rescue package ended up being successful and the Mexican 
economy recovered from the crisis by 1996, the costs of rescuing Mexico reduced much 
of the enthusiasm in Washington for further agreements with other Latin American 
countries, which greatly contributed to the difficulties of the Clinton administration in 
obtaining fast track authority after 1994. Indeed, according to some analyses, the 
Mexican crisis represented a "lethal blow" for the FTAA.669 This US paralysis offered an 
opportunity for Brazil to push its agenda in South America, and while "U.S. 
congressional approval of any post-NAFTA trade agreements had been put in jeopardy 
by the Mexican crisis, Mercosur initiated negotiations with Bolivia, Venezuela, and 
Chile." By 1997, both Chile and Bolivia - which were two of the most enthusiast 
countries regarding the FTAA - had been added to Mercosur as associate members, thus 
starting a process of regional institutionalization that, as will be shown below, would 
eventually lead to something resembling the original Brazilian scheme of a South 
American Free Trade Area. 
Therefore, by the time of the Second Summit of the Americas in 1998, in 
Santiago, Chile, which officially launched the negotiations of the FTAA, there was a 
clear change in the mood from four years earlier. While in North America the United 
States had been intimately involved in rescuing Mexico from financial collapse, in South 
America, Brazil, as President Cardoso had remarked, was actively seeking to "organize 
the South American space" by using Mercosur as "the pole of attraction for a future 
South American Free Trade Area." As the United States, for better or for worse, became 
668
 New York Times, "Aid for Mexico Gives Economy Shot in the Arm," February 2, 1995. 
669
 Riordan Roett, "U.S. Policy Toward Mercosur: From Miami to Santiago," in Mercosur: Regional 
Integration, World Markets, ed. Riordan Roett (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 112. 
670
 Monica Hirst, "Mercosur's Complex Political Agenda," in Mercosur: Regional Integration, World 
Markets, ed. Riordan Roett (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 40. 
more involved in Mexican affairs and faced the domestic consequences of such 
involvement, a "leadership vacuum" was created in South America which "was quickly 
filled by Brazil reaching out to other South American countries so as to establish SAFTA 
to accumulate negotiating power" in order to deal with the United States. A clear 
illustration of this change in mood that facilitated Brazilian strategy is the fact that Chile 
was aligned with Mercosur at the negotiating table in Santiago. 
Consequently, at the Santiago Summit in 1998, the scenario was much more 
favorable to Brazil in comparison to Miami in 1994, as Brazil had achieved its key 
objective of negotiating the FTAA not in a country-by-country basis but "between a 
South American bloc, led by Brazil, and a North American bloc, led by the United 
States." 672 This notion of the FTAA as following the principle of "building blocs," that 
is, integration within the existent regional blocs, had been a key component of the 
Brazilian strategy, which was clearly much more focused on first securing its position in 
South America before reaching any agreement that included the United States. Hence, as 
the negotiations were formally launched in Santiago, what initially seemed as a process 
of hemispheric integration centered on NAFTA increasingly became a process of 
hemispheric integration with two poles of attraction, one in North America and the other 
in South America. In a matter of just four years, "the roles of US and Brazil in the FTAA 
negotiations had been reversed." 7 According to one US analyst at the time, "[fjhe 
balance of hemispheric power shifted at the Santiago summit" as "the United States had 
lost the initiative in the FTAA negotiations" and had "become a mere bystander in a 
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hemispheric process of trade liberalization in which Brazil now is setting the pace and 
direction of negotiations." 
Another financial crisis would soon have an impact on the negotiations of 
hemispheric integration in the Americas. Similarly to what had happened to Mexico after 
the Miami Summit, a few months after the Santiago Summit, Brazil would also be forced 
to abruptly devalue its currency at the beginning of 1999. Argentina, which at the time 
had a currency regime fixed by law to the value of the US dollar, soon suffered the 
consequences of the Brazilian devaluation and, after a brutal economic, political, and 
social crisis, was also eventually forced to abandon its fixed exchange rate in January 
2002. Therefore, between 1999 and 200,1 while Brazil had a flexible exchange rate, 
Argentina stuck to a fixed exchange rate, which created significant macroeconomic 
imbalances between the two major Mercosur members. These events had dreadful 
economic effects on Mercosur and created "a series of noisy trade disputes" between 
Brazil and Argentina, with Argentina resorting to a number of protectionists measures 
incompatible with Mercosur rules in order to compensate for the disparities in the 
exchange rates between the two countries, which had made Argentinean exports to Brazil 
less competitive. Intra-Mercosur exports, which had quadrupled between 1994 and 
1998, from around six to twenty billion dollars, dropped to ten billion dollars in 2002.676 
Thus, while Mercosur was seen as a great success by the time of the Santiago Summit in 
1998, at the next gathering of the heads of state and government of the Americas, which 
was held in Quebec, Canada, in 2001, the South American bloc had effectively lost much 
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of its economic rationale and faced its darkest period, with many analysts proclaiming its 
imminent demise. However, while the 1999-2001 crises underlined the economic 
limitations of Mercosur, the eventual survival of the bloc and the subsequent events 
underscored the importance of its political dimension, particularly to Brazil. 
But before examining the factors behind the survival of Mercosur even after it 
seemed to have collapsed, it is crucial to investigate how the Argentinean crisis made 
evident pressures at the regional subsystemic level. Similarly to the Mexican crisis, which 
brought Mexico and the United States closer together and at the same time decreased US 
eagerness for hemispheric integration, the Argentinean crisis ended up having 
comparable political effects in respect to the South American subsystem - as Argentina 
recovered from its economic crisis, it became closer to Brazil and far less enthusiastic 
about the FTAA. In other words, both the Mexican and the Argentine crises worked as 
catalysts for reinforcing patterns of relationships within their respective regional 
subsystems, thus demonstrating the difficulties of overcoming such patterns based on 
regular interactions and geography and, consequently, in bringing about subsystemic 
change. This assessment becomes even more apparent when one considers that both 
Mexico and Argentina had similar foreign policy trajectories in their relations with the 
United States - from a generally cool and sometimes confrontational policy during most 
of their history, to an abrupt shift in the late eighties and early nineties as both sought to 
develop a closest-as-possible policy. While this shift may be explained both by domestic 
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factors as well as a response to the changes in the international system, the regional 
subsystemic approach can help explain the differences in outcome of these two similar 
policies. Examining the distinct interactions that followed the Argentinean economic 
crisis in contrast to the Mexican economic crisis a few years earlier uncovers how 
subsystemic dynamics were at play. 
At least two factors can be pointed out to explain why the Argentinean crisis had 
the effect of bringing Brazil and Argentina closer together instead of further apart, as 
seemed to be the trend during the several trade disputes between Argentina and Brazil 
after 1999. One factor was that the economic crisis led Argentinean policy makers to the 
realization that the policy of "carnal relations" with the United States announced in the 
early nineties seemed to have produced few tangible results. In contrast to its behavior 
during the Mexican crisis a few years earlier, when the United States quickly acted to bail 
out its southern neighbor, Argentina was treated with "indifference and lack of 
assistance" by Washington. This evident dissimilarity in US attitudes accelerated a 
process of reorientation in Argentina's foreign policy towards a gradual distancing from 
Washington, which had in fact been taking place since 1997, by the end of the Menem 
• * 67Q 
administration. With the short-lived era of automatic alignment with the United States 
over, Brazil emerged as the "principal beneficiary" of US unresponsiveness to 
Argentina's economic debacle, as Argentina openly refocused its foreign policy in 
improving relations with its most important neighbor.680 Realizing an opportunity to 
reinforce its position in South America, Brazil, "in stark contrast to the perceived callous 
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indifference of the United States to Argentina's plight," took a series of unilateral 
measures beginning in 2002 in order to facilitate Argentinean exports. In addition, all 
the Mercosur countries, including the associated members Chile and Bolivia, convened 
an extraordinary meeting in Buenos Aires to offer their support and request financial 
assistance to Argentina from international institutions. Therefore, as Mario Carranza 
asserts, in spite of the negative effects of the Argentinean crisis on Mercosur, it "had a 
positive political impact" since the "absence of US leadership to deal with the crisis 
strengthened political solidarity among the Mercosur partners." 
The second factor accounting for why the Argentinean crisis ultimately had the 
effect of bringing Argentina closer to Brazil while it simultaneously became far less 
enthusiastic about the need for a FTAA is, in a sense, intimately related to the first: the 
fact that the extension and depth of the crisis that hit Argentina led to a "significant 
reassessment of the country's power position in the regional, hemispheric and multilateral 
systems." The immediate effect of this "downward revision of Argentina's power 
potential" was that it increased the "incentives for bandwagonning with its stronger 
neighbour in order to increase its leverage in external negotiations." In other words, 
the Argentinean crisis had such a psychological impact on policy makers and civil society 
alike as to remove Argentinean pretensions of joining the developed North - as 
symbolized by its inconsequential granting as a "major non-NATO ally" during the early 
nineties - and to "South-Americanize" Argentinean foreign policy. This reorientation 
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meant that Argentina's foreign policy had become closer to Brazil's, which had been 
constantly seeking to establish a united South American front to negotiate the FTAA. 
The above discussion helps to understand Mercosur's endurance in spite of its 
near collapse. The basic reason seems to be the fact that Mercosur "has always been 
about more than free trade," with important political and also military dimensions.684 
While Argentina, as well as Paraguay and Uruguay, initially saw the commercial aspects 
of Mercosur as the major factor for joining the regional trading bloc, for Brazil, whose 
economic benefits from Mercosur are less significant, the main motivation "would appear 
/joe 
to be its ambition to be a regional power." Successive Brazilian administrations have 
consistently valued Mercosur not merely for its potential economic benefits, but as a 
"potent symbol of Brazil's ambition to be a leader of South American unity."686 Before 
the Quebec meeting in 2001, at the height of the crisis between Brazil and Argentina, 
President Cardoso set the tone of Brazil's position declaring that '"Mercosur is a destiny 
for us, while the FTAA is an option." Without accounting for the strategic 
considerations behind Brazilian support for Mercosur, in terms of the consolidation of a 
sphere of influence in South America, it becomes definitely problematic to explain its 
resilience. In fact, the survival of Mercosur after bitter trade disputes between Brazil and 
Argentina following their financial crises can only be understood in the context of the 
political approximation that they contributed to bring about, even as it accelerated the 
shift in Argentinean foreign policy away from Washington and closer to Brasilia. In other 
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words, Mercosur's survival "reflected a convergence of foreign policy or 'strategic' 
incentives between the governments of Argentina and Brazil" that had been initiated in 
the late nineties.688 Also important is the fact that after both countries were forced to 
adopt a fluctuating exchange rate, this "strategic convergence" was followed by a gradual 
macroeconomic convergence, which removed much of the rationale behind their trade 
disputes. Indeed, intra-Mercosur exports grew every single year after hitting the bottom 
in 2002, from ten billion dollars to a record forty-one billion dollars in 2008. 
In regional subsystemic terms, the resilience of Mercosur is explained because it 
is not an artificial arrangement with no basis on actual interactions but an institutional 
translation of a regional subsystemic reality - the same way that NAFTA is.690 A putative 
FTAA, on the other hand, would have to either reflect or create new patterns of 
relationships in order to overcome subsystemic pressures and be an effective and 
enduring institution. Because the FTAA did not reflect actual patterns of interactions 
between the North and South American regional subsystems, it would have probably 
required a combination of specific political circumstances in order to bear the necessary 
costs to make it happen. Another possibility was that an unexpected disturbance in the 
regional subsystems in the hemisphere - such as a financial crisis in a key regional state -
could set in motion potentially self-reinforcing subsystemic dynamics, making it even 
more difficult or costly to create new patterns of relationship necessary for the 
establishment of an enduring hemispheric arrangement. 
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BRAZIL AS THE LEADER OF A SOUTH AMERICAN BLOC 
Therefore, during the course of their interactions following the goals enunciated at 
the Miami Summit in 1994, it became clear that neither US power nor the enthusiasm 
with which the FTAA proposal was initially received in Latin America would necessarily 
translate into a comprehensive hemispheric integration scheme centered on the United 
States. The difficulties in obtaining fast track authority and the discrepancies in behavior 
between the Mexican and Argentinean crises seemed to signal that the United States was 
either unwilling or unable to bear the costs of subsystemic change through the 
establishment of fundamentally new patterns of interactions. On the other hand, contrary 
to its past strategies aimed at preventing the United States to undertake such change and 
preserving the stability of the South American subsystem - when Brazil raised the 
benefits of subsystemic stability for the Unite States - now the Brazilian strategy was 
basically one of increasing the costs of subsystemic change through the consolidation of a 
South American bloc centered on Mercosur. 
By the time of the Third Summit of the Americas in April of 2001 in Quebec, in 
spite of the apparent collapse of Mercosur at the time, the Brazilian strategy, in great part 
because of the context explained above, was reasonably secured. As a new administration 
was inaugurated in the United States that openly proclaimed its commitment to free trade 
and to the establishment of the FTAA, the process of consolidation of a South American 
space had already been set in motion. As the preparations for the Quebec meeting 
began in 2000, Brazil launched a historic initiative: it brought all of South America's 
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leaders together for the first time to a conference in Brasilia in order to discuss a variety 
of issues pertaining to that regional subsystem. The significance of this event was that it 
was the first exclusive meeting of all South American presidents. The Mexican President, 
like every other Latin American leader outside South America, was not invited for the 
summit and declared that he "would like to have been invited," adding that "our 
geographical situation in North America in any way impedes us from having an intense 
relationship with Latin America." 692 This was not to be another "Latin American" 
meeting, but explicitly a South American one. It was a concrete symbol of the realization 
that South America was in fact a distinct regional subsystem, one in which Brazil played 
a central role. As Sean Burges commented, the 2000 meeting was "the first exclusive 
gathering of South American presidents, giving symbolic gravitas to South America as a 
viable geopolitical entity" and its outcome suggested "an implicit acceptance of the 
consensual leadership role that Brazil had been accruing over the previous six years." 
For Burges, who places particular emphasis on the abovementioned concept of 
"consensual leadership," this kind of leadership is based not on "coercion or imposition" 
but on "coordination, consultation, and discussion." Since it requires fewer resources 
than relying on coercion, it is particularly fitted for a country that occupies a key position 
in its region but at the same time has limited power resources, as is the case of Brazil. 
The concept alluded to by Burges is based on the notion of "co-operative hegemony" 
developed by Thomas Pedersen. In contrast to the hegemonic stability theory, which 
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focuses only on powerful states, the co-operative hegemony approach "centres around 
the proposition that major states which are militarily weak or weakened may seek to 
maximise or stabilise their influence through non coercive means by pursuing a strategy 
of co-operative hegemony within a multilateral structure." 696 Thus, Padersen's theory of 
co-operative hegemony seeks to explain the formative processes of regional 
institutionalization based on the long term strategies of major regional powers, while at 
the same time it highlights the importance of geopolitical and security elements, rather 
than economic factors, leading to regional institutionalization. A key element of the grand 
strategy of co-operative hegemony is what Pedersen denominates "power aggregation 
capacity," which "refers to the capacity of a regional big power to make a number of 
neighbouring states rally around its political project." The author adds that even though 
"this capacity is constrained by external structural factors at the regional and global level, 
it also depends upon psychological factors and leadership skills." Padersen's co-
operative hegemony approach provides a particularly appropriate framework to 
understand the role of Brazil during the FTAA negotiations, which became especially 
evident after the year 2000. 
By bringing together all twelve presidents of South America to Brasilia, the 
Brazilian government officially signaled its attempt to rally the South American states 
around Brazil's political project of organizing a South American space as a means of 
inserting the region in the post-Cold War international system. President Cardoso 
described the 2000 summit as a "moment of reaffirmation of South America's identity as 
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a region" adding that a "free trade agreement between Mercosur and the Andean 
Community will be the dorsal spine of South America as an extended economic space." 
Therefore, he concluded, "it should be seen as a political objective of immediate 
/ A O 
concern." These statements make plainly clear the goal as well as the means to 
accomplish it. The immediate goal was the construction of South America as a distinct 
economic and political space. In order to achieve it, it was necessary to act in two 
dimensions - at the ideational level, it was essential to affirm a South American identity, 
while at the practical level it was necessary to merge Mercosur and the Andean 
Community, which was the second major trading bloc in South America and at the time 
included Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela. This Brazilian proposal -
which was clearly an upshot of the original scheme of a South American Free Trade Area 
unveiled almost a decade before - is especially significant if considered within the 
context of the acute crisis that Mercosur was going through at the time, as pointed out 
above. 
The principle behind this policy was consistently supported by the administrations 
that preceded Cardoso as well as by the administrations that have succeeded him. In fact, 
the administration of Lula da Silva, which was inaugurated in 2003, saw the integration 
of South America as a top foreign policy priority699 and in 2004, during the third meeting 
of South American presidents in Peru, Mercosur and the Andean Community formalized 
a cooperation agreement thus creating the "South America Community of Nations," 
which later became the "Union of South American Nations," or Unasur. In May 2008, the 
Unasur countries met in Brasilia to sign its constitutive treaty, establishing its juridical 
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and political components and including the Brazilian proposal of a South American 
Defense Council. The Brazilian Defense Minister, when asked on a visit to Washington 
how the United States could help, said that the best way the United States could 
collaborate would be to "watch from the outside and keep its distance."700 Colombia, 
which has had strong military ties with the United States and was then in the middle of an 
acute diplomatic crisis with Venezuela and Ecuador, was the only country not to sign the 
pact that created the Defense Council. However, after intense negotiations led by Brazil 
and a growing fear of political isolation in the region, Colombia decided to join the 
701 * 
Council a couple of months later. In 2009, the South American Defense Council held 
its first meeting in Santiago, Chile, and was attended by all Defense Ministers of the 
region. The main significance of this body is that it excludes the United States and 
overlaps with functions that were previously performed by hemispheric bodies such as 
the Organization of American States (OAS). In particular, it represents a challenge to the 
security counterpart of the FTAA launched at the 1994 Miami Summit: the Defense 
Ministerial of the Americas, which assembled for the first time in 1995, in Williamsburg, 
Virginia and have met roughly every two years since then in different countries. 
By explicitly articulating the concept of a South America as a distinct regional 
subsystem, successive Brazilian administrations after the end of the Cold War were 
basically recuperating a recurrent theme of Brazil's foreign policy that, as indicated in 
chapter 5, was present since the early days of independence: the notion that in contrast to 
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rest of Latin America, where Brazil would seek not to get involved and would -
sometimes tacitly, sometimes explicitly - recognize US preeminence, South America was 
understood by Brazilian policy makers as being a Brazilian sphere of influence where US 
interference should be kept at arm's length since it could easily overtake Brazil as the 
predominant player in the region. The meeting of South American Presidents in 2000 
made explicit the concept of South America once again as a key component of Brazilian 
diplomacy, a reality that turned out to be even more salient during the Lula da Silva 
administration. One noteworthy change that was marked by the 2000 meeting was that, 
while initially the Brazilian view of South America had been mostly restricted to the 
Southern Cone, now it unequivocally incorporated the northern tier countries of South 
America, including Guiana and Suriname.704 This reflected a process that had began since 
at least the late seventies, and had become apparent by the Brazilian behavior during the 
case of Suriname in the eighties recounted in the previous chapter. The agreements 
between Mercosur and the Andean Community and the successive meetings of South 
American presidents that led to the creation of a Union of South America Nations are 
thus the institutional translation of these earlier interactions. 
Consequently, by the time the Bush administration finally got fast track authority 
from Congress in 2002, the Brazilian strategy was already clearly underway. Between 
1994 and 2002, the years that US administrations had no fast track and therefore could 
not provide clear leadership to the FTAA process, Brazil had achieved its goal of forging 
a South American bloc by using Mercosur as an alternative hub to NAFTA with 
reasonable success, and was also in the process of bringing Argentina closer to the 
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Brazilian camp. With this basic framework in place, Brazil could shift the focus away 
from the US lack of fast track and concentrate on more substantive issues such as 
agriculture liberalization, particularly regarding non-tariff barriers, which had been a 
focal point of disagreement between the United States and Brazil throughout the 
negotiations. Again, the United States helped the Brazilian case by providing the 
necessary ammunition when the US Congress passed a one-hundred-billion-dollar farm 
bill that significantly increased agricultural subsidies in the same year that President Bush 
got fast track authority, in 2002.705 The passing of the 2002 farm bill signaled the US 
unwillingness to liberalize a sector that was central to Brazilian interests in the FTAA and 
allowed President Cardoso to frame the United States, and not Brazil, as the real problem 
for the establishment of hemispheric free trade. In addition, the Bush administration 
after September 2001 was primarily focused on the Middle East, which dominated the US 
domestic political debate at the time. 
Within this context, the results of a ministerial meeting in Miami in 2003, at the 
final phase of the FTAA negotiations, was considered a Brazilian victory - the final 
outcome of Miami was termed as a "FTAA a la carte" or a "FTAA-light," that is, a non-
comprehensive FTAA with different levels of commitment.7 7 The Ministerial 
Declaration of Miami stated that the "Ministers recognize that countries may assume 
different levels of commitments" and that the "negotiations should allow for countries 
that so choose, within the FTAA, to agree to additional obligations and benefits."708 
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These statements meant that the notion that the FTAA should be negotiated as a 
comprehensive "single undertaking," which was a basic principle until then, had come to 
an end. Each country was free to negotiate which areas to put in a FTAA agreement and 
with the interests of the United States and Brazil "very much at opposite ends of the 
spectrum," (since the first was interested mainly on liberalization on services and 
investments and the latter on the agricultural sector) they did not have any incentives to 
compromise.709 It was the beginning of the end of the FTAA. 
As the American heads of state convened for the Fourth Summit of the Americas 
in Mar del Plata, Argentina, in 2005, the long process of FTAA agony that had become 
evident by the Miami Ministerial Declaration two years earlier came to an end. Since 
2005 marked the original deadline for a final agreement on the FTAA and no agreement 
was eventually reached, the ailing FTAA was virtually buried in Mar del Plata. The 2005 
summit was a perfect illustration of how Mercosur was efficiently used by Brazil as the 
core of its strategy to fend off the establishment of a hemispheric free trade area. Among 
the thirty-four participants of the summit, twenty-nine were in favor of moving forward 
on the FTAA negotiations. The five dissenting nations were composed by the four full 
members of Mercosur plus Venezuela, which a month later was officially invited to join 
Mercosur as a full member. It is noteworthy that these five nations together represent 
about seventy-five percent of the total GDP of South America. With the possibility of a 
comprehensive hemispheric agreement out of the table, and with the Trade Promotion 
Authority in hand, the Bush administration sought to establish bilateral free trade 
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agreements with individual countries, including Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador, at 
the same time that Brazil sought to establish South America as an "extended economic 
space," as President Cardoso had declared at the beginning of the decade. The biggest 
difference between the two strategies seems to be that while the United States relies on 
specific and detailed agreements with individual countries, Brazil seeks a higher degree 
of multilateral institutionalization though a regional framework coupled with the attempt 
to construct of a South American identity. These two approaches seem to be "on a 
collision course"711 and point toward a situation of what Henry Kissinger had termed at 
the beginning of the last decade as a "tacit competition" between Brazil and the United 
States in South America since the end of the Cold War.712 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The process involving the rise and fall of the FTAA negotiations is a clear 
illustration of Brazil's main regional strategy of keeping the United States at arm's length 
in the South American subsystem. However, while earlier periods were characterized by 
a general coinciding of core goals between the two biggest countries in the hemisphere -
which made Brazilian strategy less apparent and often confounded with subordination to 
US policies - the reorganization of hemispheric relations brought about by the end of the 
Cold War created the conditions for a clash in views and objectives between the United 
States and Brazil. This made evident that the generally cooperative attitudes of earlier 
times were contingent on US support to Brazilian broader regional goals. As Brazil 
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perceived the United States as competing with its goal of keeping the status quo in the 
South American regional subsystem, Brazilian strategy adapted to this perception. 
Therefore, if earlier strategies were aimed at increasing the benefits of regional 
subsystemic stability for the United States, now Brazil sought to increase the costs of 
subsystemic change. This was done through intense participation in the FTAA process, 
even though Brazil had clearly no enthusiasm for it, while in parallel leading the 
formation of a South American bloc by creating political and economic incentives that in 
many ways competed with the FTAA goals. Whereas the United States sought to use an 
extended NAFTA as a continental base from which it would lead the post Cold War 
world, Brazil sought to build a South American platform organized around Mercosur. 
Because these two objectives tended to collide, both the United States and Brazil saw 
each other's project as a threat to their own policies from the beginning. 
As it turned out, in spite of the disparities in power between the United States and 
Brazil, time was on the latter's side. Domestic and regional subsystemic pressures tended 
to favor the maintenance of the status quo, and all Brazil had to do was work to delay the 
conclusion of the FTAA in order to give time for these pressures to make themselves felt. 
Whereas the launching of the FTAA negotiations reflected the weight of US power in the 
hemisphere, the actual interactions among the American states following the Miami 
Summit in 1994 reinforced subsystemic dynamics and made power discrepancies less 
relevant to the outcome of the negotiations. In fact, in a matter of four years, between the 
Miami Summit in 1994 and the Santiago Summit in 1998, it became clear that two poles 
of attraction were being constituted in the hemisphere - one centered on the United 
States-NAFTA core and the other centered on Brazil-Mercosur. Focusing on the 
international system and on power imbalances would be of little help to explain this 
configuration. In order to provide an effective explanation for this outcome, it is 
necessary to take into account the interplay between domestic and regional subsystemic 
dynamics. 
Domestically, the difficulties of the Clinton administration in obtaining fast track 
authority to negotiate the FTAA made it clear that the United States was not willing to 
pay the costs of regional subsystemic change. This lack of effective leadership was a key 
element in enabling Brazil to push its agenda in South America more successfully. The 
case of Chile, which had gone from considering NAFTA membership to embracing 
Mercosur, provides a clear illustration of this claim. In regional subsystemic terms, the 
outbreak of the economic crises first in Mexico and later in Argentina acted as catalysts 
that helped to set in motion regional subsystemic dynamics by bringing closer together 
the two major actors of each regional subsystem - the United States and Mexico in North 
America, and Brazil and Argentina in South America. While the outcome of the Mexican 
crisis made it clear that NAFTA had definitively North-Americanized Mexico, the 
Argentinean crisis contributed to the South-Americanization of Argentina's foreign 
policy. Both of these processes reinforced interactions at the regional level making even 
more difficult the establishment of new patterns of interactions necessary for the 
reconfiguration of the regional subsystems in the hemisphere. 
These interactions favored the Brazilian strategy of consolidating a South 
American bloc around the Mercosur core, and when the United States eventually 
overcame some of its domestic obstacles as the US Congress granted fast track authority 
(then renamed Trade Promotion Authority) to the Bush administration in 2002, the 
original FTAA goals of a genuine hemispheric integration had lost much of its impulse. 
As a result, even with fast track authority in hands, the Bush administration was not able 
to conclude the FTAA by the original 2005 target date. The immediate consequence of 
the FTAA debacle was that the United States resorted to the establishment of bilateral 
trade agreements with individual countries in South America, while Brazil hoped to 
accelerate the process of institutionalization of the South American space, thus 
incorporating issues going beyond trade, such as security. 
In contrast to the US strategy, which relies mostly on specific trade agreements 
and therefore is much more restricted, Brazil seems to pursue a strategy of co-operative 
hegemony in which it attempts, within a multilateral structure and by stressing a common 
identity, to make all South American states rally around the political project of 
establishing South America as a distinct region within the hemisphere, thus increasing the 
costs of a more significant US involvement in that subsystem. The Brazilian strategy of 
leading a South American bloc seems to have been working so far, as indicated by a 
recent public opinion poll taken on eighteen Latin American countries which shows 
Brazil as being perceived as the country with greatest leadership in the region by 19% of 
• 71 ^ 
the population in Latin America followed by the United States with 9%. It is 
interesting to notice that the same report shows that 67% of the Latin American 
population sees the United States as a positive influence, contrasted to Brazil's 61%, 
which seems to indicate that US numbers are not related to an anti-US feeling. Since 
Brazilian leadership perception decreases as one moves from Argentina to Mexico, when 
considering only the nine South American countries in the sample (excluding Brazil), 
Brazil's average goes up to around 27%, with half of the Argentinean population 
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indicating Brazil as the regional leader. These numbers seem to indicate that Brazilian 
strategy of co-operative hegemony has achieved a considerable degree of success, which 
at the same time seems to depend to a great extent on keeping the United States as a 
relative absent empire in the South American regional subsystem. 
In decreasing order of Brazil's leadership perception: Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Colombia, 
Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, and Ecuador. 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation aimed to fundamentally address two broad sets of questions. 
First, it sought to challenge the notion that the concept of Latin America should take 
preeminence over other possible regional subdivisions within the field of international 
relations. For that reason, the first set of questions asks if there is such a thing as South 
America and, if so, what makes it distinctive from the rest of Latin America. The second 
set of questions builds upon the first and asks if, from the perspective of international 
relations, the fact that there is indeed a South American regional subsystem matters. In a 
nutshell, it was argued that geography and patterns of interactions justify the existence of 
a North and a South American regional subsystem in the Western Hemisphere, and that 
this is important so that one may understand the distinct interactions that characterize US 
relations with each of these subsystems. 
In order to answer these two sets of question, this research developed a 
methodology that was based on the literature on regional subsystems. Hence, chapter 2 
offered a review of this literature, in order to organize and locate it within the broader 
literature dealing with the issue of regions. A major concern of this chapter was to present 
the literature on regional subsystems as a distinct theoretical body, particularly in relation 
to the literature on regionalism. In examining the work produced on the subject, chapter 2 
laid out a conceptualization of regional subsystems that was both regional and systemic. 
Thus, a regional subsystem was defined as a subset of the international system reflecting 
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the outcome of actual patterns of interactions - including the whole spectrum between 
conflict and cooperation - among countries in condition of geographic proximity. By 
focusing on geography and patterns of interaction as necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the establishment of a regional subsystem, other variables, such as culture or level of 
development, were deemed as irrelevant. Subsequently, chapter 3 sought to use the 
insights of the previous chapter to understand the specific theoretical contributions of the 
regional subsystemic approach to the study of international relations. It was argued that 
the regional subsystem should be understood as a third level of analysis between the 
domestic and the international system, therefore adding an extra level to the international 
relations game. Because of the emphasis on patterns of interaction, it was demonstrated 
that a constructivist perspective provides the most adequate fit for the study of regional 
subsystems, which should take into consideration not only the spatial dimension (to 
reflect geography) but also the time dimension (to reflect patterns of interaction). While 
geography is hardly changeable, patterns of interaction are not and therefore this is where 
the roots of subsystemic change should be found. 
The theoretical framework developed in these two chapters, prepared the ground 
for chapter 4 to finally answer the central questions asked by this research. This chapter 
demonstrated that, if geography and patterns of interactions are considered as necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the determination of a regional subsystem, it logically 
follows that dividing the Western Hemisphere between a North American (including 
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean) and a South American regional subsystem 
makes more sense from the point of view of the study of international relations than 
dividing it between Latin America (including the Caribbean) and United States/Canada. 
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While the first subdivision follows the regional subsystemic criteria laid out by this 
dissertation, the second is based on variables that have little utility for the purposes of this 
research. Nevertheless, it is the latter categorization that has been most widely used by 
scholars of international relations. 
As this research argued, the concept of Latin America is clearly not a geographic 
one, even though it has been used as such. Indeed, making the case for a Latin American 
regional subsystem based only on geography is far more complicated than making the 
case for a South and a North American regional subsystem. On the other hand, chapter 4 
sought to offer the rudiments of a possible way to operationalize patterns of interactions 
based on the variables war/armed conflicts, trade, and international organizations. It was 
suggested that North and South American countries fight more within their own 
respective subsystems, trade more within their own subsystems, and create more 
enduring and relevant international organizations within their own subsystems. Hence, a 
central preoccupation of the present dissertation was to demonstrate that subdividing the 
Western Hemisphere between a North and a South American regional subsystem can 
provide relevant insights and uncover a number of important interactions that are 
neglected both by using the international-domestic dichotomy as well as by employing 
the concept of Latin America to explain the international relations of the Americas. In 
summary, that is why it does matter that there is a South American regional subsystem. 
Chapter 4 suggests that a key interaction that a regional subsystemic perspective 
for the study of South America helps to uncover is the relationship between that regional 
subsystem and the United States. While a number of students of Latin America have 
acknowledged that "the United States has treated South America somewhat differently 
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than it has Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean," this differentiation has not been 
sufficiently theorized and explained.715 Basically, those who dedicated some time to 
explain this differentiation have been content to point to two main variables: distance and 
stability, which combined would make South America strategically irrelevant for the 
United States. Although these variables can provide compelling explanations for the 
relative absence of the United States in South America vis-a-vis the rest of Latin 
America, the best they can do is perhaps explain a supposed lack of interest, or neglect, 
toward South America vis-a-vis Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. However, 
they have several shortcomings. First, they do little to satisfactorily explain why South 
American states would be more "stable" than other Latin American states. Moreover, 
these variables become less relevant in instances when the United States demonstrated a 
clear interest in South American affairs, and yet the outcome was the same relative 
absence. Finally, they tend to be a pretext to transform this US relative absence from 
South America in the studies of US foreign policy. 
The alternative explanation offered by this dissertation to account for the distinct 
interactions that have characterized the relations between the United States and South 
America in contrast to the rest of Latin America is based on the role of Brazil within the 
South American regional subsystem. Hence, in making the case for a subsystemic 
approach to the study of South America, this dissertation also makes the case for 
emphasizing the role of Brazil in that subsystem. It follows that a central argument of this 
research is that Brazil is a status quo power that has affected the calculations of costs and 
benefits of subsystemic change in South America for the United States. In other words, 
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this dissertation maintains that without understanding the role of Brazil in the South 
American subsystem, any explanation for US relative absence from South America is 
incomplete at best. Under this perspective, South America's allegedly strategic 
irrelevance would not provide a sufficient explanation for this phenomenon; instead, it 
may have worked in favor of Brazil in the sense that it gave more room for the South 
American country to pursue its regional objectives by spending fewer resources than 
would have been the case had South America been considered a region of high strategic 
value. 
In order to assess the validity of the hypotheses that Brazil has affected the 
calculations of US statesmen when interacting with the South American regional 
subsystem, chapters 5, 6, and 7 explore case studies demonstrating instances when a clear 
interest in South America was demonstrated - thus the argument of neglect could be 
discarded - and yet the outcome was consistently the same: an absence of imperial 
policies of the kind that often characterized US policies towards the rest of Latin 
America. Chapter 5 deals with the early interactions between the United States and the 
newly independent Latin American countries in order to demonstrate that there has been 
a clear differentiation, both in actions and discourse, between South America and the rest 
of the region since the beginning of their interactions. This differentiation is hardly 
acknowledged by the literature, which interprets the Monroe Doctrine as an all 
encompassing policy that was applied homogeneously to the whole of Latin America. 
Nevertheless, an examination that goes beyond the 1823 declaration and investigates how 
the Monroe Doctrine was actually applied throughout history as well as the interpretation 
given to it by subsequent administrations makes clear the scope and extent of that policy. 
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This examination is what chapter 5 attempted to accomplish. It sought to demonstrate that 
successive US administrations made progressively clear the Caribbean character of the 
doctrine. Distance from the United States and relative stability of core South American 
countries are just part of the explanation in the sense that these factors made possible the 
early development of a system of power politics in South America around the ABC 
countries: Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. It is noteworthy that the two administrations that 
were the most interventionist in Latin America - Theodore Roosevelt's and Woodrow 
Wilson's - were also the two administrations that most clearly made a distinction 
between the North and South American regional subsystems. This view was utterly 
reciprocated by Brazil, which pursued an "unwritten alliance" with the United States, 
meaning "a tacit accord whereby Brazil acknowledged the hegemony of the United States 
in North America and the United States respected Brazilian pretensions to the hegemony 
~IA s: 
of South America." This arrangement became even more relevant by the beginning of 
the twentieth century, when Chile declined in power and Argentina developed a foreign 
policy with a clear anti-United States component. Brazil's willingness to be the defender 
of the status quo in South America allowed the United States to concentrate its actions in 
the circum-Caribbean area, and there was no compelling reason for the United States to 
change this state of affairs. In other words, Brazil played a role in South America that 
increased the benefits of subsystemic stability for the United States. 
The examination of these early developments of the South American subsystem 
and its interaction with the United States helped to put in context the case studied in 
chapter 6. The overthrow of the Salvador Allende government in Chile is an especially 
Burns, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations: 207. 
relevant case for at least two reasons. First, it is a clear instance when both a Democrat 
and a Republican administration in the United States demonstrated a strong interest in 
employing imperial policies in South America, such as the ones previously implemented 
elsewhere in Latin America during the Cold War, like in Guatemala or in the Dominican 
Republic. This was because the Cold War environment increased the incentives for the 
United States, now a true global power, to intervene in several regions of the world in 
order to contain the spread of communism. This was particularly true, even if for 
symbolic reasons, in Latin America, which was considered the US most immediate 
sphere of influence, where its power should be uncontested. The second reason that 
makes the case of Chile particularly important is the fact that this has been widely 
mentioned as an example of a homogeneous imperial Latin American policy on the part 
of the United States. Because there is an abundance of evidence of US involvement in 
Chile, the usual interpretation is that this equals an evidence of abundance. On the other 
hand, there is much less evidence of involvement from third countries in the Chilean 
case, such as the Soviet Union and Brazil, and this lack of evidence seems to be 
interpreted as an evidence of lack. The result is that when it comes to the assessment of 
foreign influences leading to the military coup that eventually overthrew Allende, there is 
a virtual monologue when in fact there may have been more voices present. 
Therefore, congruent with this research's central argument, chapter 6 intended to 
emphasize the role played by Brazil during this process. By using both primary and 
secondary sources, the chapter sought to put the specific case of Chile into context by 
demonstrating Brazil military government's willingness to take action in order to prevent 
South American countries from tilting towards communism. In other words, chapter 6 
suggests that Brazil played a role in Chile that allowed the United States to limit its 
involvement to that of a great power, instead of having to resort to truly imperial 
solutions which would have involved taking decisive actions to topple Allende. Brazil's 
role in the Chilean case was far from being an isolated one during the Cold War, as 
demonstrated by the cases of Bolivia and Uruguay before that, and by the case of 
Suriname afterwards. 
Although covering different periods of time with different configurations of the 
international system, the cases studied on chapters five and six had one characteristic in 
common - they displayed a relative congruence in terms of foreign policy objectives 
between the United States and Brazil in regards to the South American subsystem as both 
sought the maintenance of the status quo there. This was not the case after the end of the 
Cold War, when the United States proposed a free trade area in the hemisphere that could 
potentially lead to the development of new patterns of interactions and, therefore, to 
subsystemic change by incorporating the South American subsystem into a truly 
hemispheric subsystem centered on the United States. Because this was perceived as a 
challenge to the status quo in South America, Brazil sought to increase the costs of 
subsystemic change for the United States. It did so by actively participating in the FTAA 
process while at the same time working to create a web of South American institutions in 
order to consolidate its position in that regional subsystem. Brazilian strategy was greatly 
facilitated by domestic issues in the United States that were translated into a lack of 
effective leadership to move forward with the FTAA. Additionally, economic crises in 
Mexico and Argentina acted as catalysts that reinforced regional subsystemic dynamics 
and brought closer together the pairs of countries that are the most relevant for each of 
the regional subsystems in the hemisphere. By the end the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, it was more evident than ever the distinction between a North and a South 
American regional subsystem in the Western Hemisphere. 
FINAL THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This research attempted to offer an alternative framework for the study of inter-
American relations in particular, and of international relations in general, based on the 
regional subsystemic approach. This approach was presented as a third level of analysis 
between - and distinct from - the customary two employed in the field of international 
relations. The cases studied in this dissertation sought to apply this regional subsystemic 
framework to the specific case of South America by emphasizing the interactions 
between the two most important members of each regional subsystem in the Western 
Hemisphere: the United States in North America and Brazil in South America. The focus 
was on how US foreign policies initiatives interacted with the South American subsystem 
to bring about outcomes that differed from the ones often produced elsewhere in Latin 
America. It has been argued that, within this regional subsystemic framework, the role of 
Brazil in the South American subsystem is the key to understanding the outcome of these 
interactions, which has kept the United States a relatively absent empire in South 
America. 
One criticism that could be raised regarding the explanation offered here is that 
each of the particular case studies could be satisfactorily explained by reference to 
domestic politics, without consideration to regional subsystemic dynamics. For example, 
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the failure to reach an agreement for a comprehensive free trade in the Americas could be 
attributed to the rise of leftist governments in South America by the early 2000s that were 
opposed to the FTAA project. Similarly, Brazilian policies during the military regime 
could be attributed to the particular characteristics of that type of government. In fact, if it 
could be demonstrated that the historical events studied by this dissertation were related 
mostly to particular domestic configurations of individual countries, with regional 
dynamics playing no distinctively relevant role, then this would obvious infirm the 
hypothesis set forth here. Nevertheless, one preoccupation that was present throughout 
this research was to make clear that there has been a regional pattern of interactions that 
remained relatively stable regardless of particular domestic circumstances both in the 
United States and in Brazil. Likewise, this was also true concerning the configuration of 
the international system and the role of the United States in it. Even as the United States 
went from a regional power in a multipolar world, to a global power in a bipolar world, 
and finally to the remaining superpower in a unipolar world, there were certain patterns 
of interaction that remained relatively unchanged. On the other hand, although Brazil 
went from a monarchy to a republic, from a military regime to a democracy with 
presidents from distinct political outlooks, the basic concern with the maintenance of the 
status quo in the South American regional subsystem remained. In other words, changes 
both in the domestic environments and in the international system did not lead to change 
in the regional subsystem, which seems to indicate that the latter operates with a distinct 
logic. 
Evidently, as this research also sought to make clear, the fact that the South 
American subsystem has shown a great deal of resilience does not mean that it is 
unchangeable. Here, the agent-structure debate mentioned in chapter 2 is germane as it 
indicated that agents and structures, or states and regional subsystems, both determine 
and are determined by the other, which means that they are not independent variables but 
the relationship is one of co-determination. This is central to explain the possibility of 
subsystemic change, and in fact, this was an overall theme present throughout this 
dissertation. One possibility for subsystemic change would be if the most powerful 
outside actor concluded that the benefits of change outweighed the costs, that is, if the 
United States decided, for example, to become a present empire in South America. This 
could happen through the emergence of particular international conditions and domestic 
circumstances in the United States combined with Brazilian inaptness to effectively affect 
US calculations. The result would probably be the establishment of new patterns of 
relationship in the Western Hemisphere, thus leading to a possible amalgamation of the 
North and South American subsystems which would make any differentiation between 
them largely irrelevant. Likewise, the hypothesis proposed by this research only remains 
valid as long as Brazilian interests remain linked to the maintenance of the status quo in 
the South American regional subsystem. It follows that if Brazil becomes unable or 
unwilling to uphold the status quo, the possibility for subsystemic change increases 
significantly. This dissertation sought to demonstrate that this basic interest has not 
changed throughout history, and that it has been present regardless of variations in 
domestic or international conditions. This is evidently not surprising, since it is 
reasonable to expect the dominant power in any given regional subsystem to favor the 
maintenance of the system's status quo, which perhaps explains the relative consistency 
in Brazilian regional goals as opposed to the wide variations in the foreign policies of a 
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number of other Latin American countries. As this dissertation intended to evidence, 
because US power has been perceived as a potential threat to the Brazilian position in the 
South American regional subsystem, keeping the United States an absent empire in that 
subsystem has been a central Brazilian concern. 
The discussion above is also important to address another important issue 
regarding the assumptions of this dissertation. The attentive reader will notice the 
constant references to "Brazilian" or "US" interests, which would indicate that, in spite of 
the constructivist methodology, this research has a realist bias since it both considers 
states as the main actors in international relations as well as it treats them as unitary 
actors primarily concerned with what they perceive as their own national interest. While 
the first is indeed a central assumption of this research, the second is only partially so. 
Because this research had a systemic/structural focus of which the aim was to explain 
continuity rather than change, as well as the outcome of foreign policies initiatives rather 
than decision-making processes leading to particular policies, treating states as unitary 
actors was nothing but a convenient expedient for the sake of parsimony. As pointed out 
above, a central concern of this dissertation was to show that there has been a broad 
pattern of interactions between the United States and the South American regional 
subsystem that has existed regardless of particular domestic circumstances. It would be 
difficult to make this kind of generalization and at the same time to take into 
consideration the complexities of domestic processes. Additionally, since this research 
covers a lengthy period of time, examining the peculiarities of each individual foreign 
policy decision would be a herculean task clearly beyond the scope of the dissertation. 
Nonetheless, a convenient expedient is not necessarily an assumption. Neorealists can 
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comfortably assume states as unitary actors in great part because they treat the 
international system as the independent variable, creating such dominating pressures that 
domestic dynamics are of little or no importance. The theoretical perspective employed 
by this research assumes that states and regional subsystems are mutually constitutive and 
therefore domestic changes may eventually lead to subsystemic change. In fact, this 
dissertation makes an important unit-level assumption when it claims that successive 
Brazilian governments have been concerned with the maintenance of the status quo in 
South America, which can also be understood as a response to a subsystemic incentive. 
As mentioned above, was this central concern to change, the subsystem might also 
change. Because this has not been the case, and the aim of this research was to explain 
the persistence rather than transformation of the South American regional subsystem, it 
was not necessary to resort to the examination of domestic dynamics. 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
As pointed out above, in order to answer the questions posed by this research, it 
was necessary to develop a methodology based on the concept of regional subsystem. 
This methodological choice was based on the grounds that neither the domestic nor the 
international system approaches were equipped to explain the main puzzle examined by 
this dissertation. Although the main concern of this dissertation was to analyze 
specifically the interaction between the United States and the South American subsystem, 
the methodology employed here could contribute to refining broader theoretical questions 
in the field of international relations. At least three major theoretical contributions can be 
pointed out. 
The first contribution that the regional subsystemic perspective developed here 
could offer to the study of international relations is when one moves from the strict focus 
on great powers to the study of lesser powers in the international system. The 
international system approach, with its explicit focus on the great powers, tends to ignore 
the importance of middle powers. Because middle powers are likely to have mostly 
regional - rather than global - interests, the regional subsystem approach seems uniquely 
equipped to understand the role of these states both in relation to their own regional 
subsystem as well as in relation to outside powers. This has become increasingly more 
important, as it becomes clear that traditional international system approaches to 
international relations have limited applicability in the current world. Conventional 
systemic approaches based on the number of poles in the system and the formation of 
global balances of power tend to become less relevant in a world that is neither 
multipolar, bipolar, and increasingly less unipolar. In the mid sixties, George Liska 
described the international system as bipolar, but "unifocal," meaning that even though 
there were two major poles in that system, it constituted in essence an "imperial system" 
centered around the United States - the relationship of individual countries with the 
United States was more important than the relationship those states had among 
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themselves. Drawing from Liska, one could describe the current international system 
as unipolar, but multifocal. That is, even though there is one clear major pole in the 
system, the system is not necessarily organized around this pole. It is not that the United 
States has lost its preeminence, or even that it will lose it in the near future, but that this 
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preeminence is becoming increasingly irrelevant. In other words, the international system 
may still be characterized as unipolar but that does not seem to matter much. If during the 
Cold War, global pressures emanating from the bipolar configuration of the international 
system could explain a number of phenomena, in the current world states are increasingly 
subjected to pressures emanating more from their own respective regional subsystems 
than from the international system as a whole. 
A second contribution of the regional subsystem approach to the study of 
international relations is the fact that it draws attention to the other fundamental feature of 
the international system, besides anarchy: non-mobility, that is, the fact that states are 
fixed in space. Applying systemic theories that were created and taking into consideration 
units that are mobile to a system where the major units are non-mobile may generate 
unsatisfactory explanations. If a system is composed by structure and interacting units, 
the regional subsystem approach highlights the fact that both anarchy and geography 
affect the interaction among states. Ignoring the role of non-mobility would mean to 
assume that if Brazil where located where Mexico is, little would change in Brazilian 
foreign policy. This seems counterintuitive for the simple fact that Brazil's foreign 
policy, as the foreign policy of any other state, is intimately related to its geographical 
situation. Therefore, the regional subsystems differ from the international system in 
which the first varies not only in time, but also in space. Applying the framework laid out 
by this dissertation to the study of other regional subsystems would require first 
delineating the borders of the regional subsystem based on geography and patterns of 
interactions, followed by the identification the specific characteristics of the regional 
subsystem under study, which is what chapter 4 attempted to do for the South American 
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subsystem. This characterization could start by deciphering the main regional actors and 
the main outside powers, followed by an examination of how the main regional actors 
interact within their own subsystem as well as how they interact with the outside powers. 
If a general theory of regional subsystems is to be developed, it should probably begin by 
establishing the main criteria to classify different types of regional subsystems in order to 
compare and evaluate whether similar regional subsystems display similar characteristics. 
Finally, the regional subsystem approach deals with two fundamental theoretical 
issues in international relations: the level-of-analysis question and the agent-structure 
debate. Regarding the first, the subsystemic perspective opens up new possibilities for 
research since it reveals a third level of analysis located between the domestic and the 
international system. Thus, it seeks to avoid both the artificial homogenization associated 
with the latter as well as the over-differentiation associated with the first by 
acknowledging different degrees of interaction among states but without necessarily 
looking into each individual country, since the main concern is with the role of the most 
powerful regional players. Nevertheless, because the overwhelming majority of the 
literature in international relations has focused either on the total international system or 
the national state, the regional level has remained considerably undertheorized. In 
relation to the agent-structure debate, the regional subsystem approach, with its 
acknowledgement of different levels of interaction among states, calls for the utilization 
of an approach equipped to deal with the relationship between social interaction and 
structural effects. Hence, this dissertation argued that a constructivist perspective, the 
basic premise of which is the notion that agents and structure are mutually constitutive, is 
appropriate. But while the constructivist literature tends to stress ideational structures in 
detriment of material structures, the regional subsystem approach, by stressing 
territoriality, highlights the latter. Consequently, it assumes that interactions among states 
are affected not only by the role of ideas, but also by the physical reality of geographic 
location, which also affects how ideas are produced and reproduced. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Demonstrating the existence of a distinctive South American subsystem and 
examining how it has interacted with the United States has not only implications for the 
study of inter-American relations but also has important policy implications for US 
policy makers. First and foremost, it makes evident that the United States must take into 
account that its initiatives toward Latin America will generally tend to have different 
outcomes in the different regional subsystems in the hemisphere. Almost forty years ago, 
Thompson commented that "the foreign policy of great powers have on occasion given 
the impression that subsystems either do not exist or at least need not to be taken 
seriously."718 Although it could be argued that overall the United States has improved in 
terms of designing specific foreign policies for different regional subsystems, in its own 
hemisphere there has been little advance, as there remains the premise that there is a 
Latin American regional subsystem. Therefore, it would be advisable for the United 
States to do away with its "Latin American" policy and design policies specifically 
directed to South America. In fact, the United States does not have an "African" policy 
that includes both Egypt and South Africa for the simple reason that this would be of 
little use in practical terms. The State Department has a "Bureau of African Affairs" that 
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covers sub-Saharan Africa, while having a separate "Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs" for 
North Africa and the Middle East. Conversely, the "Bureau of Western Hemisphere 
Affairs" covers all of Latin America. 
But bureaucratic subdivisions are less important than actual policy formulations, 
and the fact is that the United States has developed a specific set of policies for key 
countries in the world. Hence, successive US administrations have had to deal with the 
development of a China policy or a Russia policy. Likewise, within the context of a 
larger South American policy, a Brazil policy should be developed. This has become 
even more relevant given the increasing importance of Brazil in the international arena.71 
As Fareed Zakaria argues, in spite of political turmoil, the first years of the 2000s 
witnessed the largest period of global economy expansion, which benefited particularly 
the emerging economies in Asia and Latin America, and opened the way for a "tectonic 
power shift" in the distribution of power. For Zakaria, this redistribution of power has led 
to a "post-American world" characterized not necessarily by the decline of the United 
States, but by "the rise of the rest."720 Within this context, even though much attention 
has been paid to India, and especially to China, Brazil may become a relevant player. For 
Leslie Gelb, the current international system is characterized by a "pyramidal" structure 
in which the United States occupies the top and right below it there is a second tier 
composed by China, Japan, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and 
Brazil. Gelb terms these countries as "the Eight Principals," and claims that they possess 
"enough power to provide essential support to joint efforts with the United States and to 
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block or seriously impede action by Washington." According to Gelb, these are the key 
countries that the United States should take into consideration when seeking support for 
its actions in the different parts of the globe. 
Therefore, the development of a foreign policy distinctively designed for Brazil 
makes sense from the point of view of the United States both because of Brazil's 
increasing clout in the emerging international system as well as within the specific 
context of South America. As long as South America in general, and Brazil in particular, 
remains buried in the midst of a "Latin American" or a "Western Hemispheric" foreign 
policy, US initiatives toward the region will be destined to have few satisfactory results. 
If the United States could easily afford not having a South American policy in the past, 
the current global trends seem to indicate that this neglect will increasingly have more 
important consequences for US ability to shape the post-American world. 
But what kind of South American policy should the United States design? 
Although it is not the aim of this dissertation to offer an answer to this question, a few 
lessons from what has been demonstrated here could be helpful. Chiefly among them is 
the fact that any US policy that can be interpreted by Brazilian policy-makers as affecting 
the status quo in the South American subsystem will almost certainly face resistance in 
Brazil. The question is how an increasingly more powerful Brazil is going to manipulate 
this resistance within the context of the South American subsystem. If, on one hand, 
Brazil's growth may give it more resources to defend the status quo in South America 
and consolidate its position, on the other hand this same growth may generate suspicions 
among its neighbors and resurface fears of a Brazilian hegemony in the subsystem. 
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Therefore, Brazil's ability to handle its own rise regionally will be a key component of 
how regional subsystemic dynamics will evolve. In any case, if the United States intends 
to have any significant future leverage in Brazil and consequently in South America, one 
feasible alternative is to increase the level of interdependence, particularly in the 
economic field, between them. This would require taking measures, even if unilaterally, 
directed at increasing the level of trade between the two countries, particularly in areas 
sensitive to Brazil, such as agriculture. For example, Brazil has a successful sugarcane-
based ethanol program, and it could export much of it to the United States if it was not 
for the existence of an almost prohibitive tariff imposed in order to protect an inefficient 
corn-based domestic ethanol industry. Measures as simple as removing the tariff on 
Brazilian ethanol would significantly increase the level of interdependence between 
Brazil and the United States, thus approximating the two countries. Obviously, there are 
domestic obstacles in the United States that must be overcome in order to undertake such 
initiatives. The question then is whether US policy-makers will be willing to bear the 
costs of global and hemispheric leadership in the new emerging international 
environment or if domestic concerns will make the United States increasingly more 
absent from South America. 
I have discussed this topic earlier in more detail in: Carlos Gustavo Poggio Teixeira, "Brazil and United 
States: Fading Interdependence," Orbis 55, no. 1 (2011). 
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